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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE ALEVI REVIVAL: A TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
Mehmet Demiray 
 
M.A. Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
 
 
February 2004 
 
 
This thesis evaluates the concept of “Transnational Social Space” and 
investigates the characteristics of the claimed transnational space between Turkey 
and Germany. By taking the “Alevi Revival” of the 1990s as the case study, the 
thesis employs the concept of “Transnational Social Space” as an alternative 
explanation in the field of Turkish politics. By investigating the Alevi movement 
in Turkey and Germany in a comparative perspective, the thesis claims that the 
Alevi movement in Germany is an important factor affecting the direction of the 
Alevi movement in Turkey. In order to determine the effects of the Alevi 
movement in German on the Alevi movement in Turkey, the thesis takes three key 
events of the Alevi movement. These are, the Declaration of Alevism, the 
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Establishment of the Peace Party and the Constitutions of the Alevi-Bektashi 
Representative Council.  
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Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
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Bu tez, Ulus ötesi Toplumsal Alan (UTA) kavramını merkeze alarak, 
Almanya ve Türkiye arasında kurulduğu iddia edilen UTA’nın özelliklerini 
tartışmaktadır. 1990 sonrası yaşanan Alevi Uyanışını örnek olay alan tez, UTA’yı 
Türkiye’deki siyasal gelişmeleri açıklamak için kullanmaktadır. Tez, Türkiye’deki 
ve Almanya’daki Alevi hareketini karşılaştırmalı olarak inceleyerek, 
Almanya’daki Alevi hareketinin Türkiye’deki Alevi hareketi üzerindeki etkisini ve 
etkinliğini araştırmaktadır. Karşılaştırmalı analiz çerçevesinde; Alevilik Bildirgesi, 
Barış Partisi deneyimi ve Alevi-Bektaşi Temsilciler Meclisinin kuruluşu, örnek 
olaylar olarak seçilmiştir. Bu örneklerin kuruluş ve örgütlenme aşamalarında 
Almanya Alevi Örgütlerinin etkinliği araştırılmıştır. Temel olarak bu üç olay 
üzerinden, tez, Almanya’daki Alevi hareketinin Türkiye Siyasasını belirlemekte 
ihmal edilmemesi gereken bir öneme sahip olduğunu iddia etmektedir.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and 
girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. 
Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can 
only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: 
nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is 
the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to 
Facts, Sir! Thomas Grandgrind in Hard Times; Charles 
Dickens 
 
 
After the collapse of the bipolar world system, the previously silent ethno-religious 
actors started to be an important element within the discussions and analyses of world 
politics. The role of ethnic and religious groups for the regional stability or security has 
been continuously emphasized by scholars, and the discussions on identity politics and 
ethno-nationalism were eagerly articulated to the scope of political science (Stack, 
1981). Consequently, the before unnoticed groups were conceptualised as the new 
transnational actors affecting politics (See Paul, 1981; Piscatori, 1981). Within this 
picture also immigrants have been made the subject of inquiry by political scientists and 
they were conceptualised as significant actors that have the capacity to shape politics 
(See Slater, 1981). However, it is claimed that, unlike the discussion on ethno-religious 
groups, the conventional literature of political science is a late and reluctant participant 
within this emerging field. Probably the underlying reason behind this negligence is the 
perception of immigration as a temporary process, which will be inevitably concluded 
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with the complete rupture of immigrants from the political arena of the emigration 
country and automatic inclusion to that of the immigration country (Castles and Miller, 
1993). Therefore, immigrants and immigrant politics have been left to the sphere of the 
politics of the immigration country.  
 
All of these observations are valid for Turkish politics. Although the migration 
movements and immigrants constitute a central part of the Turkish political history, 
students of Turkish politics either ignore the issue totally or deal with it reluctantly. 
Therefore, neither immigrants nor the immigrant politics have been a frequently visited 
subject in Turkish politics, though almost 10 percent of the total Turkish population live 
abroad and engage in back and forth movements between Turkey and various 
immigration countries (Martin, 1991). Moreover, it is known that within the last two 
decades, an extensive network, which enabled persistent transfers of symbolic and 
economic capital as well as human capital between the immigration countries and 
Turkey, emerged. However, there are only a few pioneering studies that investigate the 
effects of immigrants on the domestic and international politics -in particular on the 
bilateral relations with the emigration country - of Turkey (See Ostergaard-Nielsen, 
2003 and Argun, 2003). This deficiency directs the existing studies on immigration to 
conceptualise the political behaviours of immigrants as the peculiar outgrowth of 
Turkish politics by ignoring the very possibility of the reverse. As a result, the field of 
Turkish studies is still blind to the role of immigrants in the making of Turkish politics.  
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On the basis of this observation, this thesis aims to shed light on two important points. 
Firstly, the thesis interrogates the validity of the existing studies that explain the 
connection between immigrants and Turkey in a uni-directional way and claims that 
immigrants also have an important potential to affect and even shape the Turkish 
politics. In other words, the thesis points out that the immigrant population living abroad 
should be included to the analyses of Turkish politics as an important actor that has the 
capacity to change the direction of the political movements within the Turkish political 
sphere. Secondly, the thesis investigates the peculiar connection between Turkey and 
Germany, which is deeply shaped by the migration movement from Turkey to Germany. 
Particularly, the thesis tries to propose the content and objectives of the connection 
between the immigrants living in Germany and their counterparts remained in Turkey. In 
order to achieve this task, the thesis takes the particular connection between the Alevis 
in Germany and Turkey and demonstrates the role of Alevi associations in shaping the 
Alevi movement in Turkey and in the creation of the Alevi identity politics within the 
Turkish political arena.   
 
The main outline of the study is as follows. In the first chapter, I provide a review of the 
discussions on transnationalism. Basically, I concentrate on three main attempts coming 
from distinctive disciplines, namely, social anthropology, sociology and political 
science. I discuss each attempt by interrogating their premises and analytical power to 
explain and to set a research agenda for prospective studies and I adopt the model 
proposed by the political scientist, Thomas Faist, that is, the transnational social space. 
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On the basis of the discussion, the chapter provides the general schema of transnational 
social space and discusses its delicate relationship with globalisation, and summarizes 
the preconditions and conditions conducive for the emergence of the transnational social 
space. Consistent with the main premises of the study, the second chapter discusses the 
emergence and content of the transnational space between Turkey and Germany. To 
provide an analytical picture of this emerging field, the chapter briefly discusses 
preconditions and conditions conducive of the transnational space in reference to the 
migration from Turkey to Germany. On the basis of these observations, the chapter 
confirms the existing literature that claims the emergence of a transnational space 
between the two countries within the last two decades. In addition, the chapter makes a 
crude typology among the immigrant population from Turkey on the basis of social 
stratification and claims that the background of immigrants in terms of social class is 
decisive in determining the extent and content of the transnational activities they 
participate in. Although the chapter discusses the lower and upper classes and mentions 
their particular means of engaging in the transnational space between Turkey and 
Germany, the main focus remains on the middle class migrants, who are in search of a 
symbolic identity within the Turkish political arena and consequently affect Turkish 
politics on the national level.  
 
The third chapter proposes a working definition of Alevism in reference to the three 
main institutions of Alevism, namely, dedelik, ayin-i cem and musahiplik and provides a 
short history of Alevis in reference to Turkish modernization and migration movement. 
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The chapter summarises the Alevi immigration to Germany and discusses the emergence 
and content of the primary networks among the Alevis in Germany and Turkey, by 
focusing on the particular connection between the early Alevi associations established in 
Germany and Turkey until the 1980s. On the basis of this short review of Alevism, the 
chapter introduces the methodology employed in the thesis. 
 
The fourth chapter provides a comparative study of the Alevi movement in Germany and 
Turkey and claims that due to the contextual differences; distinctive Alevisms, with 
different objectives and agendas emerged in Germany and Turkey respectively. In other 
words, the chapter claims that Alevis in Germany and Turkey developed different 
political objectives as a result of different opportunity structures and institutional 
contexts surrounding Alevis. For instance, whereas the main motive of the Alevi 
movement in Germany was the demand of difference from the state, the main demand of 
the Alevi movement in Turkey was indifference from the state.    
 
The fifth chapter focuses on the developments in the post 1990 period and investigates 
the particular connection between the Alevi movement in Turkey and Germany. 
Basically, the chapter provides an in-depth analysis of three main events that are argued 
as the cornerstones of the Alevi movement by the scholars. These are: The Declaration 
of Alevism, The Establishment of the Peace Party and The Constitution of the Alevi-
Bektashi Representative Council. By investigating the role of the Alevi associations in 
Germany within these events, the chapter claims that the understanding of Alevism of 
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Germany became effective among the Alevi associations in Turkey and this critical 
interaction in the transnational space between the two countries became influential in the 
evolution of the Alevi movement in Turkey to the identity politics. On the basis of the 
institutional analysis, the chapter challenges the validity of the conventional literature 
that claims that the developments in Turkey are decisive in the emergence of identity 
politics among the Alevis in Germany and argues that the connection between Germany 
and Turkey is bi-directional and the emergence of the Alevi identity politics can be 
analysed as the peculiar outgrowth of the symbolic capital transfer from Germany to 
Turkey as well.  
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 CHAPTER I 
THEORIZING TRANSNATIONALISM:  
THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL SPACE 
 
In this chapter, I briefly review the main paradigms in the immigration studies and 
discuss the deficiencies of the post 1980 studies in conceptualising immigrant politics 
and identities that arose from the culturalism adopted by immigration studies. On the 
basis of this deficiency, I summarize the emergence of the discussion on 
transnationalism. Principally, I concentrate on three main attempts to theorize 
transnationalism. The first attempt belongs to a group of social anthropologists, who 
proposed two novel concepts, namely, transnationalism and transmigrant as a response 
to the culturalist tendencies within the immigration studies. The second attempt belongs 
to the sociologist Portes, who concentrates on the emergence of transnationalism, which 
he observes within the process of globalisation. While discussing the emergence of 
transnationalism, I try to differentiate globalisation from transnationalism by visiting the 
discussion on cultural dimensions of globalisation and point out the localities that 
transnationalism contains. Finally, I discuss the attempt of the political scientist, Faist, 
who tries to propose a working definition of the discussion and presents the term 
transnational social space, instead of transnationalism and transmigrant.      
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 1.1 Immigration Studies  
Mass population movements have always been an integral part of the history of 
humankind and consequently many scholars from various disciplines have worked on 
the issue by drawing attention to the different aspects and dimensions of the 
phenomenon. As a result of these efforts, there is a vast literature on migration, which 
fruitfully gave way to various migration theories that interrogate reasons and 
destinations of human movement across political and social borders. Besides the 
divergences brought by the disciplinary differences, there are some paradigms that direct 
researchers to focus on a specific dimension of the subject or to investigate the issue 
from a particular theoretical perspective. For instance, the main focus of the studies on 
international migration to Europe conducted during the 1960s was on the economic 
impacts of the migration such as the ratios of worker remittances and the plans of return 
migration, which would eventually affect the composition of work force at home and 
host countries. However, in the 1970s, when the pace of migration decreased as a result 
of the restrictive measures taken by the host countries and the consolidation of the 
immigrant populations through naturalization and family reunifications, the focus of the 
researches shifted to the discussions on the integration and assimilation of the immigrant 
population in the host societies. Consequently, within a decade, the main subject of the 
studies on immigration shifted from the migrant as an economic asset to the migrant as a 
social being. Only after this shift, the absence of migrants’ social existence within the 
literature has been noticed and researchers started to concentrate on the socio-cultural 
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composition of the immigrants and their integration into the host country. “The famous 
playwright Max Frisch summed up the situation in a now famous phrase: “man hat 
Arbeitskraefte gerufen und es kommen Menschen”. We called for manpower, but people 
came instead” (Mandel, 1989: 28).  
 
During this second period, one of the main research questions was the socio-economic 
integration of migrants into the host country, that is, the level of socio-economic 
achievements such as housing, language abilities and educational enrolment of the 
migrant population. The key terms that were continuously employed during this period 
were “cultural shock” and “identity crisis”. Moreover, the discussions about the second 
and third generation started to occupy a central position in the literature. The second and 
third generations were compared to their parents and their ability to adapt to the 
mainstream society became the subject of inquiry.  
 
 
1.1.1 Culturalisation of Immigration Studies 
Meanwhile, social sciences adopted a culturalist stand and key words such as 
“difference”, “identity” and “authenticity” were added to the lexicon of the social 
sciences. Instead of structural conceptualisations, the emergence of new movements is 
insistently explained with continuous references to the highly obscure concept of 
“culture”. As a result of the re-invention of culture as a tool to explain human behaviour 
(Faist, 1994: 63), ethnology studies were replaced by ethnography (Al-Azmeh, 1996: 
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18). Even the political ideologies adopted more “culture sensitive” slogans such as 
“different is beautiful”. This trend also affected immigration studies and consequently, 
the literature started to conceptualise cultural identities of immigrants as handicaps 
towards their assimilation and integration into the host country. Mostly, the identity is 
dealt as if it is an eternal and abiding reality and it is accepted as the omni-determinant 
of the human behaviour (Faist, 1994). Even though it is acknowledged that humans are 
carriers of multiple identities, the scholars insisted that one of these identities was more 
dominant and determines the migrant behaviour on the last instance. “Culture in this 
sense, is presumed to be something virtually burnt into the genes, forever distinguishing 
and separating them” (Vertovec, 96: 51). As a result, several monographs that focus on 
the politics of the home country and its effect on the immigrant population have been 
written. Academicians of the host country preferred to make their researches in the home 
country instead of the host country, where the migrant actually live and construct their 
identities (Kaya, 2000:27). Within these explanations, the immigrant politics was 
conceptualised as the peculiar outgrowth of the domestic politics of the home country. A 
typical example of this trend can be seen in the writings about the sudden politicisation 
of Islam among the migrants in the European context. Basically, the whole event is 
explained as the “re-awakening of the religious identity”, which is claimed to be brought 
from the homeland. Within these explanations, the complex dimensions created by the 
ideological and contextual factors surrounding migrant populations were ignored in 
favour of the cultural factors, which were claimed to be a product of solely “the 
authentic culture” of the migrants. Such an understanding of the re-awakened identity 
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was made subject of satire by Al-Azmeh (1996:41), with the analogy of the well-known 
fairy tale, Aladdin and the magic lamp, in which the genie was brought to the light with 
the touch of Aladdin. It refers to the fact that ethno-religious identity of migrants 
suddenly came out of the sleeping lair, with the bewitched effects of the events 
occurring in the host country. During the studies of this period, migrants were analysed 
as the passive agents living in a country but determined by the realities of another 
country. In other words, the factors associated with the home country are 
overemphasized in reference to the socio-political context within the host country.  
 
 
1.2 The Emergence of the Discussion on Transnationalism  
As a reaction to the increasing ‘culturalisation’ of immigration studies, new conceptual 
tools and innovative approaches that interrogate and challenge the main premises of 
culturalism emerged. Partly as a response to culturalism and partly to merge the ongoing 
debate of globalisation with the migration studies, starting from 1980 onwards and 
especially during the period between 1990 and 1994, the field of migration studies 
experienced a sudden appearance of novel concepts which aim to illuminate the 
contemporary migration experience with the assertion of “those new times and new 
socio-historical circumstances demand a new theoretical paradigm” (Kivisto, 2001: 551, 
554). By following the critiques of the cultural anthropology about the bounded 
understanding of culture and ethnicity, this new perspective pointed out to the fact that 
migrants should not be conceptualised solely as an artefact of their culture, imported 
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from the home country without a substantial transformation; but rather, they should be 
conceptualised as a product of complex acculturation processes that create peculiar and 
creative combinations of the elements from both the home and host countries. As an 
extension of this discussion, many scholars emphasized the need for a new framework 
and unspoiled terms for understanding this complex situation.  
 
 
1.2.1 Anthropological Perspective: Transnationalism and Transmigrant 
The earliest attempt for developing a new terminology was articulated by a group of 
cultural anthropologists, namely, Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blac-
Szanton (Schiller et al., 1992 and Bash et al., 1994). Initially, they condemned the 
existing literature on immigration and immigrants for reproducing the understanding of 
migration as a “permanent rupture and complete abandonment of the old patterns” and 
they argued that the migrating populations of the contemporary world is an outgrowth of 
“networks, activities and patterns of life that encompasses both their host and home 
societies”; i.e. they claimed that the contemporary migrants were agents that “cut cross 
national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field” (Schiller et al., 
1992: 1). Parallel to this, by disregarding previous terms and frameworks that point out 
this multiple and combining feature of the immigrant population, such as “part societies” 
or “feet in two societies”, they proposed a new terminology; namely transnationalism 
and transmigrant (Schiller et al., 1992: 5).  
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At that level, we should note that the term transnationalism is definitely not a new 
concept and it is extensively used within the literature of political science and 
international relations since the 1960s to characterize all types of interactions and 
institutions above the national level, and to describe the international actors functioning 
beyond the national borders, such as the United Nations (Pries, 2001: 17). However, the 
conceptualisation developed by Schiller et al., proposes a novel meaning for the term 
transnationalism. Basically, they defined transnationalism as (Schiller et al., 1992: 1-2): 
… the process by which immigrants build social fields that link 
together their country of origin and their country of settlement. … 
Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations –familial, 
economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span 
borders. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, and feel 
concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect 
them to two or more societies simultaneously.  
They claimed that this new theoretical framework would enable scholars to understand 
how transmigrants created “varying and multiple identities generated from their 
simultaneous positioning in several social locations both to accommodate to and to resist 
the difficult circumstances and the dominant ideologies they encounter in their 
transnational fields” (Schiller et al., 1992: 4). In other words, the authors argued that the 
communities developed by international immigrants were not mere extensions of their 
communities of origin though they acknowledged that immigrants arrived to the host 
country with certain practices and concepts constructed at home, such as particular class 
affiliations and varying levels of politicisation. Within their conceptualisation, the main 
focus remains on the daily life experiences of immigrants and the peculiar identity 
construction of them, which is conceptualised as a by-product of the continuous and 
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simultaneous exposure to the nation building processes of at least two nation states 
(Schiller et al., 1992: 4). On the basis of this assertion, they claimed that transmigrants 
had started to imagine deterritorialized nation-states as a resistance to the hegemonic 
practices of nation-states that surround them (Basch et al., 1994: 280).  
 
1.2.2 Critique of the Early Account of Transnationalism 
By employing terms such as “de-nationalization” and “world system theory”, Schiller et 
al. aim to combine the discussion on transnationalism with the ongoing debate of 
globalisation. However, although they mention the role of global capitalism and 
changing conditions of capital and labour relations within the discussion, they do not 
provide a detailed elaboration of the concepts, “deterritorialization” or “globalisation”, 
and instead they accept them as given. Due to the under-theorization of such concepts, 
they fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question: to what extent the imagined 
nation of transmigrant is “deterritorialized” and emancipated from the constraints of the 
geographical realities and hegemonic nation building processes of the home country? As 
a result, their attempt created a strong criticism and initiated a theoretical discussion on 
the necessity and efficiency of these new terms (Portes et al., 1999: 218). It is argued 
that neither the migration of large masses nor the persistent connection of the immigrant 
population to their homeland, via sending remittances and/or information or by 
involving in the homeland politics, constitute an infallible evidence for accepting the 
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term as a new conceptual tool (Kivisto 2001: 555). As a result, their contribution to the 
literature remained primarily in their attempt to re-emphasize the multiple and fluid 
identities of contemporary migrants, which they formed as a resistance to the global 
political and economic situation surrounding them (Schiller et al., 1992: 11). 
 
It should be noted that, they do not propose an alternative conceptualisation of migrant 
identities to previous attempts. In fact, by basing itself on the discussions of cultural 
relativity and by investigating the artefacts of the popular culture created by the 
immigrant populations, cultural studies challenged the essentialised conceptualisation of 
identity and developed new concepts for de-essentialising and analysing cultural 
identities long before the discussions on transnationalism actually emerged. Within the 
tradition of cultural studies, cultural identities are defined as unfixed and in a constant 
flux, through which they are defined and re-defined according to the changing 
conditions surrounding them. As Hall (1994) points, cultural identities are not an 
essence but points of identification of suture, constructed through continuous interaction 
of history, culture and power. He describes this process as (Hall, 1994: 395):   
Far from being externally fixed in some essentialised past, they are 
subject to the continuous ‘play of history’, culture and power. Far from 
being grounded in mere ‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be 
found, and which when found will secure our sense of ourselves into 
eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are 
positioned by, and position ourselves within the narrative of the past.  
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Obviously, the claimed complex identities of the transmigrants of Schiller et al. can be 
conceptualised with no trouble as a repositioning occurred under the condition of the 
host society by the application of the framework developed by Hall. On the basis of this 
observation, it seems clear that the framework developed by Schiller et al. cannot 
provide a satisfactory answer to the question: what is the difference between the earlier 
migrants and the contemporary migrants that forces us to adopt a new framework? 
Nevertheless, though it is underemphasized, there is an answer that we can deduce from 
their conceptualisation: the simultaneity of the migrant existence in the home and host 
country (Pries, 2001: 17) which became possible after the technological revolution that 
enhanced convenient and cheap communication facilities and low-cost transportation 
services combining the host and home countries more densely than it was possible in the 
previous decades. 
 
1.3 Sociological Perspective: Transnational Migrant 
The role of technological development is first articulated to the conceptualisation of 
transnational communities systematically by the sociologist Alejandro Portes (See Portes 
et al., 1999; Portes 1999), who defends the usage and applicability of the term, 
transnationalism, and tries to develop a historical perspective, in which the development 
of transnational communities can be monitored. He proposes a two-factored analysis for 
explaining the emergence of transnational communities and its difference in reference to 
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the previous immigration experiences. The first factor he points out is the improvement 
of air transportation, long-distance telephone, facsimile communication, and electronic 
mails. Secondly, he emphasizes the availability of these services to the migrant 
population en masse, who are generally not the most prosperous members of the host 
society they live in (Portes et al., 1999: 223). For the mass acquirement of these facilities 
by the majority of the immigrant population, he foresees at least two decades and the 
emergence of the second generation, which according to him also coincides with the 
upward mobility of the migrants within the strata of the host society. Moreover, he 
emphasizes the relative distance between the host and home countries, which affects the 
possibility of regular contact between migrants and their counterparts in the home 
country (Portes et al., 1999: 224).  
 
Though he is in line with Schiller et al. in general, on the basis of his observations, he 
refuses the replacement of the term migrant with transmigrant, since according to him; 
transnationalism refers to a situation, affecting the lives of the migrants without entailing 
an essential change in the migrant per se. Therefore, he claims that the term migrant 
meets the necessary requirements for describing the nouvelle situation. What he 
proposes for explaining the difference between transnational migrants and previous 
migrant populations is the continuous pendulum like movement of both people and ideas 
between the host and home country. Portes et al. (1999: 217) explain the situation as:  
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While back and forth movements by immigrants have always existed, 
they have not acquired until recently the critical mass and complexity 
necessary to speak of an emergent social field. This field is composed 
of a growing number of persons who live dual lives; speaking two 
languages, having homes in two countries, and making living through 
continuous regular contacts across national borders.  
Paradoxically, these criteria, provided by him for classifying a given migrant community 
as a transnational community, also constitutes the primary handicap to his theory: 
limiting the applicability of the term, “transnational migrant”, only to a minority of the 
present day migrant population (Kivisto, 2001: 562). Nevertheless, in reference to the 
previous ones, Portes’ attempt is still more promising, since it provides an important step 
for future conceptualisations and sets an agenda for prospective research. For instance, 
unlike the monolithic conceptualisation of transnationalism of Schiller et al., Portes and 
his colleagues define three different fields of transnationalism: economic, political and 
socio-cultural. Obviously, economic transnationalism refers to the activities of the 
transnational entrepreneurs who engage in commodity production, combining and 
affecting both the host and home countries (Portes et al., 1999: 227). Political 
transnationalism involves the political campaigns of party officials, governmental 
functionaries or community leaders with the aim of the pursuit of political power and 
ambition for directing the politics in the host and home countries (Portes et al., 1999: 
221) and socio-cultural transnationalism refers to “the activities oriented towards the 
reinforcements of a national identity abroad or the collective enjoyment of cultural 
events and goods” (Portes et al., 1999: 221).  Moreover, he also provides a more 
systematic account of the factors shaping the construction of transnational communities. 
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These are the forces contributing to migration, the extent to which homeland issues 
remain relevant for immigrants, and the role of hostility directed against migrants 
(Portes, 1999: 464-66).  
 
1.3.1 The Delicate Connection: Transnationalism and Globalisation 
The most crucial contribution of Portes to the discussion of transnationalism lies in the 
connection he makes between globalisation and transnationalism, which was confused 
and used almost interchangeably by Schiller et al. In order to clarify the relationship, 
Portes and his colleagues define three distinguishing features of transnationalism. These 
are (Portes et al., 1999: 227-228): 
1) the emergence of these activities is tied to the logic of capitalist 
expansion itself; 2) while following well-established principles of 
social network development, transnational communities represent a 
phenomenon at variance with conventional expectations of immigrant 
assimilation; 3) because transnational enterprise is fuelled by the 
dynamics of capitalism, it has greater potential as a form of individual 
and group resistance to dominant structures than alternative strategies.   
Basically, Portes conceives transnational communities both as the outcome and the 
potential antidote of globalisation. According to him, the process of globalisation 
constructed the environment necessary for the embodiment of the transnational 
communities; but also through its regulatory power, the very same process of 
globalisation also limits and shapes the future of the communities. If we remember that 
the large-scale distribution of cheap transportation and communication channels are a 
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product of globalisation, the eminent role of globalisation in the emergence and 
improvements of transnationalism becomes more visible. Moreover, globally regulated 
migration waves continuously challenge the future of transnational communities by 
integrating previously stacked regions to the host country or by enabling the flow of new 
migrants, which will undermine the life chances of previous “transmigrants”.  Therefore, 
an approach that draws the line of similarity and difference between globalisation and 
transnationalism is necessary for the elaboration of the subject. Moreover, being aware 
of the difference between them would also enable us to perceive and differentiate the 
role of globalisation in the creative processes of identity construction within the migrant 
communities.  
 
For analysing globalisation and its cultural impulses, the most appropriate theoretician 
that we can consult is probably Arjun Appadurai (1999), who presented the pioneering 
account of the complex character of the global cultural capitalism and its effects on the 
migrant populations. Basically, he develops a new framework, which tries to 
operationalise the transformation brought by the new global cultural economy with five 
‘scapes’: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes. These 
five scapes refer to various fields, in which the transformation of cultural globalisation 
occurs. Ethnoscapes refer to the distribution of individuals, namely, tourists, immigrants 
and refugees, who become a new force that can and do affect the politics of and between 
nations to an unprecedented degree. Technoscapes refer to the distribution of 
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technology, both high and low in high speed over the “previously impervious 
boundaries”. The examples Appadurai proposes are the distribution of textile industry 
over several countries and the emergence of software engineering in India. For him, the 
peculiar distribution of technology is not governed by the economies of scale, of 
political control, or of market rationality anymore but by the complex relationship 
between money flows, political possibilities and the availability of both low and highly 
skilled labour (Appadurai, 1999: 102). Finanscapes refer to the distribution and 
disposition of global capital over national boundaries in an enormous speed. According 
to Appadurai, these three scapes are interconnected unpredictably and disjunctively so 
that all of them are constrained by their own incentives and do constrain each other to a 
great extent. The mediascapes refer to the distribution of information as in the form of 
newspaper, magazines, TV stations etc and to the images of the worlds imagined by the 
increasing number of private and public interests throughout the globe, in which the 
world of commodities and world of news are profoundly mixed. Finally, the ideoscapes 
refer to the distribution of political ideas and values, such as human rights, freedom of 
speech and cultural rights, which consists of state and counter ideologies, contesting 
with each other for the pursuit of the state power or a piece of it. For Appadurai, the 
current cultural flows occur in and through the growing disjunctures between these five 
scapes. Although global flows of people and things have always existed to some extent, 
Appadurai claims that the transformation in the last three decades brought a radical 
rapture from the past forms and thus due to “the sheer speed, scale and volume of each 
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of these flows … the disjunctures have became central to the politics of the global 
culture” (Appadurai, 1999: 105).  
 
Concerning all of these features, it seems that globalisation is the precondition for the 
emergence and survival of transnationalism en masse. However, unlike globalisation, 
transnationalism refers to a more specific phenomenon, which cannot be understood 
with the terms associated with globalisation such as deterritorialization, referring to the 
complete disconnection between the people and the geographic space. To clarify this 
point, we can examine the usage of the term, deterritorialization, by Appadurai within 
the context of global cultural capitalism. According to him, deterritorialization provides 
the fertile ground in which “mediascapes and ideoscapes of the modern world find their 
fractured and fragmented counterparts” (Appadurai, 1999: 107). For instance, through 
the creation of a mediascape, which preserves the contact of deterritorialized 
ethnoscapes with their homeland -though blurred-, the emergence of a new conflictual 
ideoscapes such as the project of Khalitisan, an imaginary homeland for the 
deterritorialized Sikh communities dispersed to the whole world, became possible. 
However, unlike the deterritorialized Sikh communities, transnational communities 
carry some sense of geographic boundedness; though cannot be compared to the nation-
state projects of the 19th century.  
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1.3.2 Transnationalism as Multi-Locality  
The delicate distinction between globalisation and transnationalism constitutes one of 
the most important factors of the phenomenon. Ludger Pries (2001: 21) emphasizes this 
feature of transnationalism and claims that transnational migrants live within “triadic 
connections” that link them to the localities of the host country and home country 
simultaneously. That is, whereas globalisation refers to the processes that are 
“decentred” or “deterritorialized”, transnationalization occurs within the setting of two 
or more nation-states and thus are not de-nationalized or deterritorialized in the strict 
sense of the term. However, the very logic of this multi-locality unintentionally 
emancipates migrants from the restriction of the prescribed localities as well. On the 
basis of this transformation, Ludger Pries says that instead of “transmigrant” and 
“transnationalism” or “transnational community”, which ascribes some essential features 
to the present migrants, the term “transnational social space” should be employed. He 
defines transnational social space as (Pries, 2001: 22-23):  
The term “transnational social space” indicates social realities of 
growing importance that are organized transversally to the metaphor 
sketched above of …[the]… circles which mutual embedded ness of 
social space and geographic space. Transnational social spaces can be 
understood as pluri-local frames of reference which structure everyday 
practices, social positions, biographical employment projects, and 
human identities, and simultaneously exist above and beyond the 
social context of national societies.  
The novel side of this explanation lies in its attempt to interchange the term social field 
with the social space. In fact, if we interrogate the connection between transnationalism 
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and discussion on modernization, this proposal turns out to be more important. 
Consistent to the theories of “time-space distanciation” (Giddens 1990) or “time-space 
compression” (Harvey, 1989), which are developed to understand the consequences of 
modernization, transnational social space refers to a meaning that is relatively 
emancipated from constraints of time, geography and political borders. However, the 
very concept of transnational space resonates with nationalism as a cultural and political 
project (Argun, 2003: 19). Faist (2000: 207-208) explains this situation as:  
[T]ransnational communities … without propinquity do not 
necessarily require individual persons living in two worlds 
simultaneously or between cultures in a total ‘global village’ of de-
territorialized space …however… [these communities] link through 
exchange, reciprocity, and solidarity to achieve a high degree of social 
cohesion, and a common repertoire of symbolic and collective 
representation. 
Thus, space in this sense refers to more than aggregation of geographic places and 
includes various migrant subjectivities, social and symbolic ties and diverse opportunity 
structures that extend the limits of simple territoriality, though limited, to an extent by 
them.  
 
1.4 The Perspective of Political Science: Transnational Space 
The first theoretician, who attempted to give a full account of transnational social space, 
is Thomas Faist (2000), who actually attempted to develop a migration theory, which 
can combine macro and micro approaches to migration. He proposes a more complex 
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system that has the power to affect and even to direct the migrant politics and claims that 
various factors contribute to the emergence of this highly elusive ground of transnational 
social space, which can be observed among various migrant groups. Indeed, according to 
him, the contemporary examples of Muslims in Morocco and Algeria, engaging in 
religious exchange with their country of origin; Kurdish organizations in Europe, trying 
to influence Turkish politics and Latin American politicians, campaigning within the 
borders of USA for national elections in Latin America, enforce us “to dissect the 
interstices between local, nation-state, and global elements in economic, political, and 
cultural activities of migrants” (Faist, 2000: 196). It can be claimed that he develops a 
more critical approach for differentiating globalisation and transnationalism, which 
refers to a more limited situation. For illustrating the multifaceted characteristics of this 
situation, he mentions the example of the “triadic identity” developed by the Turkish 
hip-hop youth by combining Turkish, German and global elements (Faist, 2000: 202). 
Whereas in this example the hip-hop culture developed within the metropoles of the 
world refers to the global, the German and Turkish elements refer to the pairs of the 
transnational social space. Moreover, the adaptation of the global discourse of human 
rights by the transnational communities, such as Kurds and Alevis can be analysed as a 
basic indicator of the articulation of the global ideoscapes by transnational migrant 
populations.  
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The theoretical framework employed by Faist is the world system theory and its basic 
axis of centre-periphery distinction. By adopting the world system theory to a particular 
geography, he claims that transnational social space combines usually a country in the 
centre with a country in the periphery or more than two countries in a way that involves 
not only the circulation of humans but also the circulation of ideas, symbols, and 
material culture (Faist, 2000: 13). Therefore, unlike the previous theoreticians he does 
not count globalisation as a prerequisite for the emergence of transnational social space, 
but parallel to Portes he affirms that the technological changes brought by globalisation, 
namely, improved communication technologies and transportation facilities enabled 
transnationalism to become more extensive and substantial than the earlier 
manifestations, which were rather short lived or included only a specific or an elite 
immigrant population (Kivisto 2001: 565). For a systematic analysis of transnational 
social spaces, he mentions the ceteris paribus conditions for the emergence of 
transnational social spaces as (Faist, 2000: 213): 
[F]irst, strong ties of migrants and refugees to the country of origin 
over an extended period of time. Social ties and symbolic ties need to 
flourish through vivid and border crossing social connections, 
language, religious, and cultural norms. Second, these ties and 
corresponding resources are not only embedded in migration flows but 
in other linkages as well, such as political and economic inter-state 
linkages –characteristics of migration systems. Third, juridical and 
political regulations, such as domestic and international regimes, allow 
to varying degrees for the movement of people and tolerate political 
and religious activities of former migrants.  
As it is seen in his prerequisites, he proposes a system in which various actors are 
constitutive in the creation of transnational social space. According to Faist (2000: 200), 
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transnational social space consists of pentagonic relationships between five main actors. 
These are the governments of host and home countries who engage in the policies to 
shape and direct the migrant community, the civil society in the host and home country 
which provides various opportunity structures to define and reproduce migrant identities 
and the transnationalized group itself. Moreover, instead of bringing a theory of sudden 
emergence of transnational social space, as an unintentional outcome of technological 
developments, he mentions of a staged model of emergence (Faist, 2000: 201). 
According to him, there are two main phases of the development of transnational social 
space. In the first phase, transnational social space is a by-product of international 
migration and mostly, it is a phenomenon limited to the first generation of migrants, who 
preserved their connection with their kin or co-ethnics instead of severing their ties 
irrevocably. As a result of these ties and prolonged international migration and return 
migration, the raw material of the new ethnic communities is formed. In the second 
phase, the connection between the host and home countries goes beyond the chain 
migration and sending remittances to the home country, and migrant communities 
develop distinctive ways of life, which engage border crossing activities on a regular 
basis and more often. In this stage, transnational movement of people ideas and symbols 
become an institutionalised activity among the migrant populations. Generally, in this 
second phase, main actors of transnational social space are second and third generation 
migrants.  
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Another factor that distinguishes Faist from the earlier theoreticians is his emphasis on 
the internal differentiation of the migrant community and its effect on the transnational 
activities they engage. Basically, he identifies three distinctive transnational social 
spaces. These are kinship groups, transnational circuits and transnational communities 
(Faist, 2000: 202-210). According to him, each one of these distinctive spaces indicates 
a particular kind of connection between the host and home countries. For instance, 
transnational kinship groups refer to the micro level connections between the immigrants 
and their kin, which are limited to the remittances and gift exchange or construction of 
networks that enable future immigrations. Most commonly, the individuals participating 
within these networks of transnational kinship are those of first generation and their 
effects in the home country is either local such as village level or involves only the 
family members such as in the case of transnational families of human capital migrants 
that dispersed to several countries (Faist, 2000: 202-206). In contrast, transnational 
circuits refer to the instrumental engagement of migrant population with the emigration 
country in order to utilize their advantages in terms of language and business networks 
for the sake of economic benefits. Typical examples of this type are the Indian and 
Chinese entrepreneurs constructing trading networks all around the world (Faist, 2000: 
206-207). The last group transnational communities are constructed out of the solidarity 
derived from the shared values and symbols that construct collective identities, i.e. 
transnational communities are ethnic groups settled in multiple localities that engage in 
continuous interaction with each other. Though this interaction can occur in local levels 
such as village communities or among the politicised communities as in the case of the 
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refugees, it occurs in a larger scale, in which migrants set goals for political struggles 
and/or nation building within the borders of the home country. The most famous 
examples of this group are Jews, Armenians, Palestinians and Kurds (Faist, 2000: 208).   
 
1.4.1 Conditions Conducive of the Transnational Space 
Before going on to the discussion of transnational space between Germany and Turkey, I 
would like to sum up the main premises for the emergence and development of 
transnational social space. The main prerequisite of transnational social space is the 
development of cheap and convenient transportation facilities, communication means 
and their dispersal to the migrant community en masse. However, the sole existence of 
these technological innovations cannot guarantee the emergence of transnational social 
space automatically. Besides, the construction and preservation of the primary social 
networks between the pioneering migrants and their counterparts, who remained in the 
home country, constitutes the necessary condition of the emergence of transnational 
social space. Only on the ground of these primary networks, the relatively 
institutionalised political and social connection that constitutes the embryonic existence 
of transnational social spaces can be constructed. Whereas these first preconditions are 
more connected with the transnationalizing community itself, also the four actors, the 
government and civil society of the home and host countries are the necessary agents in 
the construction of transnational social space. Therefore, the last condition conducive of 
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the transnational social space is the existence of opportunity structures within the home 
and host countries such as the prescription of political rights to the immigrant population 
by the home country, or the existence of institutionalised policies, such as 
multiculturalism to tolerate, which can even promote the cultural diversity among the 
migrant population in the host country. Nevertheless, the civil society both in the host 
and home countries constitutes the institutional channels of interaction between the two 
countries and the very existence of these institutions enable the large scale mobilization 
of transnational communities, i.e. they turn out to be the main agents regulating 
transnational transactions, either political, social or economic.   
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CHAPTER II 
TRANSNATIONAL SPACE BETWEEN GERMANY AND TURKEY 
 
In the previous chapter I summarized the evolution of the debate on transnationalism and 
discussed the conditions conducive for the emergence of transnational social spaces. In 
this chapter I will investigate conditions in reference to the immigration from Turkey to 
Germany and discuss the emergence and content of the transnational space between 
Germany and Turkey. In order to provide a more analytical picture of this emerging 
field, I will start with a brief summary of the migration movement from Turkey to 
Germany and then move to the technological preconditions for the emergence of the 
transnational space between Germany and Turkey.  
 
2.1 The Condition Conducive of Transnational Space Between Turkey and 
Germany 
The migration from Turkey to Germany started with the bilateral agreement between the 
German and Turkish governments in 1961. According to the needs of the German 
economy, the immigrants from Turkey were thought as a temporary work force that 
would sustain the economic expansion and return to Turkey after the establishment of 
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the equilibrium between the German workforce and the expanding economy. Consistent 
to this understanding, they were named as gastarbeiter, guest workers, and deprived of 
the majority of the rights that the native population enjoy. For instance, the foreigner law 
of the 1970s, which was changed only in the 1980s, were stating that: “The foreigners 
can enjoy all of the basic rights and freedoms, except the right to organize, the freedom 
of mobilization, the freedom of choosing the place of work and place of education” 
(quoted in Kaya, 2000: 48). Such regulations prevented the assimilation of the migrants 
into the mainstream society and promoted the emergence of “the myth of return”, which 
led many migrants to live in the minimum standards to collect the required money for 
establishing a job opportunity in Turkey after their eventual return (Gitmez and Wilpert, 
1987: 87). As a result of such regulations that prevent assimilation into the German 
society, immigrants from Turkey did not construct institutions and associations that 
would deal with the issues concerning their status in Germany or with homeland issues. 
Moreover, starting from the late 1970s and during 1980s, consistent to the logic of 
“gastarbeiter system”, Germany introduced several programs for encouraging return 
migration. For instance in the 1980s, a sum of 10,500 DM per person and for the each 
non-adult family member 1,500DM additional payment was offered to the migrants who 
engage in return migration (Kaya, 2000: 49). In fact, as a result of this return promotion, 
a sizeable proportion of the immigrants from Turkey returned. In 1974, the number of 
return migrants was 148,000 and in 1985, 213,000, which makes up 30 percent of the 
immigrant population (Penninx, 1982 cited in Argun, 2003: 58). At the same time, many 
new immigrants and refugees from Turkey entered the country via family reunifications 
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and continued international marriages and consequently, immigration from Turkey 
continued and the number of Turkish citizens and former Turkish citizens residing in 
Germany reached approximately 2.4 million in the aggregate level (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 
2003: 33).  
 
2.1.1 Technological Preconditions of the Transnational Space Between Germany 
and Turkey 
Although the immigrant population constituted the lowest strata of the German society 
in the initial decades, their position within the society improved gradually and in the 
mid-1970s, immigrants from Turkey acquired the economic strength to purchase the 
communication facilities such as facsimiles and cheap long-distance telephone lines, 
which turned out to be an effective means of communication between the German 
metropoles and Turkish villages, from which the majority of the migrants came 
(Abadan-Unat, 1993: 202). Besides this, the transportation facilities between Germany 
and Turkey increased to a great extent. According to the current statistics, there were 
30,000 planes that were taking off for Turkey from Germany, which carried 4.3 million 
people in 2000 (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 35). As a result of the relatively cheap plane 
tickets between Germany and the Turkish cities, the industrial metropoles of Germany 
are connected to Turkey in a more regular and systematic way than they are connected to 
each other (Kaya, 2000: 75). Interestingly, the institutionalisation of the communication 
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channels coincides with the prediction of Portes, who foresaw two decades and the 
emergence of the second generation for it. Indeed, in the second decade of the migration 
from Turkey, the necessary technological conditions for the emergence of a 
transnational space between the two countries were achieved.  
 
Nevertheless, statistically speaking, the level of interconnectedness between the 
immigrants in Germany and their counterparts in Turkey did not reach that of Latin-
American migration to USA, i.e. still there is no pendulum like movement of immigrants 
between Turkey and Germany (Jurgens, 2001: 94). Although there are various forms of 
visits between the two countries, and these visits are occurring more often than it was 
the case in the previous decades, still there is an absence in terms of actual physical 
contact in reference to the cases of pan-American transnationalism. However, this 
handicap against the construction of transnational space has been easily overcome by the 
improved electronic communication facilities and the spread of global media that render 
the geographical distances insignificant (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 16). As a result of 
this mediascape that connects Turkey to Germany, the transnational space between 
Germany and Turkey is constructed among the imagined medium of the increased 
communication channels (Jurgens, 2001). The immigrants from Turkey are able to 
follow the improvements in Turkey, even more seriously than they follow the 
improvements in Germany. Ostergaard-Nielsen explains this situation as (2003: 34-5):  
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More than a decade ago Turkish state-television channels, TRT, 
became available on cable throughout Europe and it was soon 
followed by private channels on satellite TV. One study found that 74 
per cent of Turks in Germany watched the Turkish News, and that 40 
per cent of Turks in Germany watched only Turkish TV. In addition, 
95 per cent of Turks read Turkish newspapers and 55 per cent only 
Turkish newspapers. This explains why more than 200,000 copies hit 
the streets in Germany everyday.  
 
 
2.1.2 The Construction and Evolution of Primary Networks Between 
Germany and Turkey 
For the emergence of transnational spaces, the literature emphasises the continuation and 
institutionalisation of the primary networks between the migrants and their counterparts 
remained in the home country. Starting in the initial decades, immigrants from Turkey 
have constructed informal networks, which connected immigrants with their 
counterparts in Turkey such as relatives or co-villagers. A basic indicator of these 
networks can be seen in the overrepresentation of some groups among the immigrant 
population. Indeed, this is a general phenomenon occurred in all European countries that 
received extensive migration from Turkey. The most famous examples of these groups 
are: the high proportion of immigrants from the town of Emirdağ in Belgium and Kulu 
in Sweden (Argun, 2003: 41). Although in the Turkish context, these are small-scale 
residential centres in inner Anatolia, they constitute a high proportion of the immigrant 
population in their host country. Such examples indicate that the immigrant populations 
did not severe their relation with their counterparts in Turkey and instead, these primary 
networks functioned as a bridge enforcing prospective migration. However, after the 
pace of migration has been decreased and the immigrant population consolidated, these 
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primary networks started to be evolved into ethno-religious enclaves and consequently, a 
more diversified ethno-religious consciousness within the immigrant community from 
Turkey emerged in Germany (Soysal, 1994). Indeed, it is claimed that the immigrant 
community residing in Germany exhibits a greater diversity than it was the case in 
Turkey or any other European country (Argun, 2003: 68-9). Consequently, scholars 
working on the issue point out this differentiation within the immigrant community. For 
instance, a recent study that compares immigrant communities from Turkey residing in 
Germany and France demonstrates that relatively similar communities exhibit 
organizational differences in terms of their associational activities. Whereas immigrants 
in Germany are divided among ethnic and religious ties, the main axis of differentiation 
among the immigrants in France is on the political affiliations (Yalçın-Heckmann, 1995: 
98).  
 
2.1.3 The Role of Germany in the Construction of Transnational Space 
In addition to the existence of primary networks among the immigrants in the host and 
home country, the literature also emphasizes the role of the institutional context within 
the host country. In the case of Germany, this context is one of the main constituents of 
the ethno-religious diversity in Germany. The existing literature on immigrant 
communities emphasizes two factors for explaining this diversity among the immigrant 
community (See Soysal, 1994 and Ireland, 1994). These are political opportunity 
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structures such as the understanding of citizenship and the immigration policy of the 
host country, and social institutions within the host country which function as 
“midwives” for regulating political participation of the immigrants (Ireland, 1994: 10).  
In Germany, all of these factors are prevalent. Firstly, the citizenship laws in Germany 
determines the right of citizenship on the basis of ethnicity, ius sanguinis, and by 
excluding immigrants from citizenry, it creates a mechanism of structural exclusion for 
the immigrant population (Brubaker, 1992). Secondly, through assigning the foreigner 
population to semi-public charity organizations according to their nationality and 
religion, the German system ethnicises the immigrant groups by creating separate legal 
and social status for foreigners and as a result, constructs a kind of “soft apartheid” 
(Joppke, 2003: 361). As a result of this mechanism, a significant number of the 
immigrant population is excluded from the political arena of the country and instead, 
they are directed to the home country. Şükran Ketenci (1989, quoted in Argun, 2003: 42) 
explains this tendency as:  
Even those who say that they decided to live in Germany and not go 
back to Turkey continue to be oriented, with their life styles and their 
interest, towards Turkey…. When are the early elections scheduled? 
How much does a kilogram of meat in Turkey cost now?  
Moreover, the comparative studies about the immigrant population residing in different 
European countries support the existence of this tendency. For instance, in a comparison 
between the migrant groups within different European countries, Ruud Koopmans and 
Paul Statham (2000) claim that immigrants residing in Germany are more prone to make 
claims concerning the issues related to their homeland, rather than immigration issues or 
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basic freedoms within the host country. As a result of these structural factors, 
immigrants from Turkey residing in Germany are led to engage in homeland politics 
more often and enthusiastically than their counterparts residing in other European 
countries.  
 
In addition to this institutional context, which furthers ethnic differentiation among the 
immigrant communities, the newly initiated multicultural policies that are adopted by 
the German states further promote the ethnic plurality within immigrants (Joppke, 2003: 
362). Basically, after the 1980s, though not in the national level, the multicultural 
policies were encouraged in the local level. These multicultural policies not only created 
the necessary ground for the survival of ethno-religious diversity among the immigrant 
population, but also encouraged the ethno-religious fragmentation, by creating a 
clientele system that channels immigrant communities to the ethnic and religious 
enclaves. Even though many of the group differences that are observed among the 
immigrant population are also visible in Turkey, the popular political awareness of 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity has been discovered earlier in Germany (Argun, 2003: 
67). On the basis of these observations, scholars working on the issue claimed that the 
multicultural policies created a kind of patron-client relationship with the immigrant 
populations and consequently, led to the transformation of the social conflicts into 
irrevocable ethno-cultural ones (Radtke, 1994; Kaya, 2000). With the system of 
multiculturalism in Germany, immigrants are (un)intentionally encouraged to express 
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their problems and demands in reference to their ethnic origins for acquiring support 
from the authorities of states, i.e. the immigrant minorities are kept away from the public 
sphere and imprisoned within the borders of a-political communities formed by the 
process of self-ethnicisation, instead of forming interest groups to defend their rights 
against the discriminatory practices (Radtke, 1994). The observation of Radtke (1994, 
36) is illustrative for understanding the process:  
When the city of Frankfurt e.g. establishes an ‘Office for Multi-
Cultural Affairs’, people who want to get help, advice money from the 
office have to present their problems with reference to their ethnic 
origins. If there is, for example, a conflict between a tenant and a 
landlord let’s say about noise and smell in a fast-food shop then the 
office only but surely will intervene if one of the conflicting parties 
plays the ethnic card. The noise and smell must be identified as ethnic 
noise and smell.  
Partly as a result of this translation of social problems into ethnic ones and partly due to 
taking a share from the prosperous budgets of the local authorities that promote 
multiculturalism, the ethnic differentiation within the immigrant community is furthered, 
by even creating distinctive identities that emphasise the primary differences among 
communities, such as religion, language and ethnic origin. The most easily recognizable 
groups are the Kurds, Yezidis, Alevis and various Islamic communities.  
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2.1.4 The Role of Turkey in the Construction of Transnational Space 
Moreover, the policies of Turkey towards the immigrants living in Europe and 
particularly in Germany are decisive in the construction of transnational space between 
Turkey and Germany. Whereas the Turkish state was a participant in the immigration 
process from the beginning of the labour migration, immigrants from Turkey were 
perceived as remittance machines or as mere statistical decreases in the increasing 
unemployment rates. However, in post 1980 period, partly to mobilize immigrants 
abroad as a pressure group for international politics such as EU accession (Ostergaard-
Nielsen, 2003: 107) and partly to attract the increasing amount of remittances (Abadan-
Unat, 1995), the perception of Turkey concerning her immigrants living abroad have 
been changed. This trend can be observed in the Turkish state discourse, in which the 
term; ‘our workers abroad’ have gradually evolved into the term; ‘our citizens abroad’ 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 107). Especially, after the 1980s, these changes became 
visible and the Turkish state defined dealing with the social security issue and problems 
of its citizens abroad as a constitutional mission (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 108). This 
mission included sending teachers to give religious and secular education to the 
immigrants in their receiving country and constructing mosques and consulates1 that will 
deal with the issues concerning the immigrants. Especially, after the 1990s the Turkish 
state developed specific policies to attract the immigrants living abroad. For instance, 
                                                 
1 As the country, that contains the largest amount of immigrants from Turkey, Germany has the largest 
amount of diplomatic representation in any one country in the whole world. There are 14 consulates 
employing 50 career diplomats and a total of 534 personals from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 109).  
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they “were granted the right to vote at national border entrances 70 days prior to the 
general elections in Turkey” (Argun, 2003: 75). Most importantly, the immigrants living 
in those countries that do not allow dual citizenship such as Germany, have been granted 
a range of economic and legal rights that the Turkish nationals enjoy besides the 
favourable legislative arrangements such as the reduction of the military service 
(Keyman and İçduygu, 2003). Basically, with all these regulations, Turkey 
acknowledged her immigrants residing in Germany as regular members of the Turkish 
society and promoted their continuous engagement with Turkish politics. In some cases 
Turkish state even facilitates immigrants to circumvent the German laws. For instance, 
since the German laws do not accept dual citizenship, naturalized Turkish citizens are 
required to give up their Turkish nationality. However, after the process of naturalization 
is finalized, Turkey admits immigrants back to the Turkish citizenship (Kaya, 2000: 46-
47). Especially after the 1990s, when the naturalization processes for the Turkish 
nationals is alleviated by the liberalization of citizenship law in Germany, this procedure 
was conducted in an institutionalised manner, by creating a de facto situation of dual 
citizenship, though it is illicit de jure. All of these arrangements and regulations 
furthered the bond between the immigrants residing in Germany and Turkey and the 
transnational space between Germany and Turkey is activated in the 1980s.   
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2.2 The Transnational Space Between Germany and Turkey 
In the last decade, many scholars argued that a transnational space between Turkey and 
Germany emerged after the 1980s (Argun, 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The earliest 
attempt to give an account of the transnationalized actors of this emerging field was 
given by Betigül Ercan Argun (2003), who proposed the term “Deutschkei”, a 
combination of German words for Turkey; Türkei and Germany; Deutschland, for 
describing the transnational space between Germany and Turkey. By following the 
conditions mentioned above, she claimed that the context of Deutschkei is highly 
controversial and creative in terms of ethno-religious differences and she defined four 
main actors that are active within this emerging field. These are Alevis, Kurds, ultra 
nationalists, and Islamists, who provide a powerful critique of Turkey with various aims 
and agendas: “the politics of state reformation (Alevis), of state formation (Kurds), of 
state appropriation (Islamists), and of state conservation (ultra-nationalists)” (Argun, 
2003: 6). Moreover, she claims that one of her objectives in dealing with the issue of 
Deutschkei is demonstrating that the transnational connections of the immigrants from 
Turkey function in a bi-directional way, i.e. she claims that immigrant communities in 
Germany also have the capacity to affect, shape or reform the domestic politics in 
Turkey (Argun, 2003: 12). Without doubt, her premise is a logical one and should not be 
underestimated in analysing Turkish politics. However, if we remember the structural 
exclusion that immigrants from Turkey (in Germany) are exposed and the policies of the 
Turkish state that accept the immigrant communities as regular members in the national 
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arena, even by promoting their engagement to the international and domestic politics of 
Turkey, I would claim that there is a continuous interaction between the immigrant 
groups and their counterparts in Turkey and most commonly it is the pair in Germany 
affecting Turkish politics on various levels. Typical examples of this process can be seen 
in the effects of the immigrants living in Germany to the villages of origin or the 
activities of the Kurdish refugees to affect the accession process of Turkey to the EU, 
the reverse of which are unlikely to occur.  
 
2.2.1 The Role of Socio-economic Background of Immigrants in the Transnational 
Space 
There is another factor which is effective in determining the content and objectives of 
the transnational space; that is, the socio-economic background of the immigrant 
population. Whereas multicultural policies and transnational networks can provide a 
valuable social and symbolic capital for the upwardly mobile migrants, these terms 
create different meanings when the lower strata of the immigrant population are 
considered (Cohen, 1999). Therefore, socio-economic positioning of the immigrants 
should be included to the analyses of the Deutschkei. On the basis of this observation, I 
will differentiate three main segments among the immigrant population from Turkey. 
These are: First, the upwardly mobile immigrant group that articulated itself to the 
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network society2 and acquired a prestigious position within the host country, in which it 
holds upper middle and middle class positions; second, the middle and lower middle 
strata of the immigrant groups, which are excluded from the German political arena and 
stacked in the lower stratum of the host society and third, the lower classes of the 
immigrant group, who either already returned to Turkey or still occupies the lowest 
stratum within the host country. Basically, I claim that each of these three groups engage 
in distinctive activities within the transnational space between Germany and Turkey and 
affect Turkish politics on various levels, namely, local, national and supra national.  
 
After the first migration waves and socio-economic achievements of the migrants, it is 
impossible to speak of the homogeneity of the Turkish migrants socio-economically, as 
it was the case during the 1960s. Whereas the upwardly mobile migrants, mainly 
composed of second and third generations, acquired the knowledge of another European 
language, mostly English next to German and Turkish, for some segments of the lower 
strata, it is still not possible to talk about the existence of the sufficient knowledge of 
German (Kaya, 2000), which is essential for integrating into the mainstream society. In 
fact, in the contemporary German context, it is possible to find upwardly mobile 
immigrants, who engage in constructing cosmopolitan identities that combines elements 
from the German and Turkish culture extensively as well as the global cultural trends. 
                                                 
2 Here I use the term network society referring to the definition proposed by Manuel Castells (See 
Castells, 1996).   
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On the various levels of the social life, this group differentiates itself from the majority 
of the immigrant population. Generally, the members of this group are over-represented 
among those who acquired German citizenship. Moreover, via their ties with the 
newspapers and political organizations, this group is participating in the political 
discussions in Germany more often. Unlike the first generation, for this group, Turkey is 
not the only destination for the holidays, and Germany has been the motherland, though 
symbolically they are attached to Turkey as well. Consequently, they demonstrate a 
higher level of integration in reference to the lower strata. Indeed, several members of 
the upwardly mobile immigrants attended to the politics in Germany and even some of 
them have been elected to the German Parliament. Probably, the most famous example 
of them is Cem Özdemir. 
 
Although this group is also exposed to racial discrimination, owing to their Turkish 
decent, their responses and means to fight against these activities are completely 
different than the majority of the immigrants from Turkey (See Özdemir, 1997: 8). 
Basically, they aim to restructure the self-understanding of the majority culture by 
rejecting the understanding of citizenship based on ethnicity, ius sanguinis instead of 
residence, ius soli. Instead of demanding the prevention of the racial discrimination 
solely, they aim to decompose the racist community itself, by proposing the acceptance 
of their difference as an integral part of the German society. This demand can be easily 
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observed in the writings of Zafer Şenocak3 who states: “Germany long ago became part 
of the German-Turks. Now a question is being posed, which we cannot answer alone: 
Are we also part of Germany?” (Şenocak, 1994: 268). As seen here, the request of 
German-Turks is not to be recognized as Turks residing in Germany but as equal 
members of German society, which is not just getting the legal rights of German 
citizenship. On the contrary, this request aims the redefinition of Germanness on a way, 
which will be able to include German-Turks, without forcing them for assimilation or 
involution. The attempts of this group created new symbols to fight against the racial 
stereotyping and exclusion of the German public. A typical example of this trend can be 
seen in the works of Zaimoğlu, a second-generation German writer of Turkish decent. 
Basically, he aims to retrospect the derogatory slur; Kanake4 against Turks and 
transform it to a sense of satiric pride, which is much more praised among the 
progressive German circles than among the majority of the second and third generation, 
on behalf of whom he speaks (Jurgens, 2001: 101). Without doubt, the engagement of 
these upwardly mobile immigrants in the transnational space between Germany and 
Turkey follows a completely different path in reference to the majority of the migrants 
from Turkey. Many of them take part in the transnational economic circuits, such as the 
famous Öger Tourism or Şahinler Holding or construct transnational families that 
dispersed to several European countries and Turkey as well. Their effects can be seen in 
                                                 
3 Şenocak is a German writer from Turkish origin. In general, he acts as the representative of the Turkish 
community in Germany by engaging in public discussions and publishing several books and documents 
about the Turkish migration to Germany.                           
4 Kanake is a mixed language that combines elements from Turkish and several German dialects. 
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the economic level, which increases trade and tourism between the two countries, or in 
the literature. On the basis of these observations, it is possible to claim that the 
engagement of this group in transnational space is stimulated more by individual 
motives in reference to the lower strata of the immigrants from Turkey, engaging in 
transnational communities.  
 
2.2.2 Structural Conditions that are Effective in the Transnational Activities of the 
Lower Strata of the Immigrant Population 
Unlike the upwardly mobile immigrants, the lower and middle strata of the immigrant 
population are not constructing cosmopolitan identities that aim to redefine and shape 
the majority society; on the contrary, they survive within the host society more passively 
(Kaya, 2000: 131). As a result, their motives and activities within the transnational space 
vary significantly. Jurgens (2001: 106) explains this differentiation in terms of socio-
economic background: 
As a result, I would argue that educated, upwardly mobile migrants 
are more likely to draw on an intellectualised discourse of culture and 
to express multi-ethnic or hybrid forms of identity in a self-conscious 
way… [However] … [m]igrants in less secure and less prestigious 
positions, mean-while, tend to be more strongly bound to Turkey, and 
they often seem to redraw the moral lines that separate them from 
Germanness. Muslim “fundamentalism” –which has a certain “centre 
of gravity” among rural peasant and urban “working-class” Turks in 
both Germany and Turkey – is one, but only one, form that this 
reassertion of boundaries may take.  
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The example of political Islam among the immigrants in the European context creates a 
suitable ground to analyse the effects of racial exclusion experienced by the immigrant 
population, which composes the lowest strata of the host society. When analysing 
political Islam among the immigrants groups in Britain, Al-Azmeh (1996: 2) mentions 
several factors that are effective in the emergence of this peculiar identity. These are:  
… in the fist instance, primary importance must be attributed to the 
impossibility of socio-economic assimilation experienced by second-
generation immigrants born in situations of urban degradation and 
into marginal, declining and unskilled industry, at a time of increasing 
state indifference and hostility coupled with racism in the very 
capillaries of the “host society” Added to this are pressures that push 
Asian Muslim (and other) shopkeepers to cater for the poorest, as 
slum landlords and purveyors of cheap goods, and thus take on the 
classic features of a middleman minority confronted with racist 
reactions. The work of ethnic entrepreneur, operating through kinship 
networks which provide the basis for domestic commodity production 
as well as for the sweatshop, is a classic condition conducive to social 
involution, and the formation of social as well as geographical 
ghettos.  
 
 
All of these cases are valid observations for analysing the contemporary positioning of 
lower class immigrants from Turkey in the German context. Obviously, according to the 
current statistics, the majority of the population does not welcome immigrants from 
Turkey and 34 percent of the German citizens do not prefer to have Turkish nationals in 
their neighbourhood (Fetzer, 2000: 124). This rejection of the immigrants from Turkey 
as potential neighbours resulted in the creation of special districts that are heavily 
populated by the immigrants from Turkey. The most widely cited example in the 
literature is the Kreuzberg of Berlin. According to statistics, approximately 40 percent of 
the population in the district is composed of foreigners and half of the foreigners are 
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actually immigrants from Turkey (Kaya, 2000: 77). If we remember that since the 
1990s, the number of neutralized Turkish nationals, who are officially registered as 
Germans increased, the actual number of immigrants and/or ex-immigrants from Turkey 
should be higher than the official statistics offer. Moreover, it is also known that the 
immigrants from Turkey circumvent the restrictive zoning laws5, regulating the level of 
concentration of the foreigners living in a given district, with the help of a friend or a 
relative living in somewhere else, i.e. they register themselves in a flat belonging to 
somebody else and actually live in Kreuzberg (Mandel, 1996: 148). Indeed, the general 
appearance of this district as “the little Istanbul” (See Kaya, 2000: 77; Gitmez and 
Wilpert, 1987: 86) supports the prediction of a higher concentration of immigrants from 
Turkey. 
 
In addition to the high concentration of the immigrants, the district’s infrastructure 
conditions also demonstrate significant differences in reference to the German standards. 
The old residential buildings are over represented in the district and the housing quality 
indicators are relatively low. For instance, “only 55 per cent of the apartments have 
modern amenities with bath, lavatory and central heating, whilst 41 per cent are still 
stove-heated” (Kemper, 1998: 1773). As the statistics indicate, the living conditions of 
the district Kreuzberg is lower than the German averages, but the buildings inhabited by 
the immigrants from Turkey are generally lower than the ones inhabited by the Germans 
                                                 
5 Zoning laws primarily aim to prevent the over-concentration of specific immigrant groups by limiting 
the maximum number of immigrant group in a given district. Although zoning laws are applied in Berlin, 
they are not in force in all of the German states.    
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living in the district. The description provided by Mandel (1996: 150) is illustrative for 
understanding the living conditions of the immigrants from Turkey: 
Upon entering some of these unrenovated apartment buildings, one is 
often confronted with the lingering odor of urine emanating from 
Ausentoiletten, tiny shared “water closets” located in the stairwell 
between floors. In many, there is no central heating, no hot water, and 
only one cold-water tap. Coal dust in the air settles on clothing, under 
fingernails, and of course, in the lungs.  
 
Actually, residential segregation is one of the most easily recognizable effects of racism 
surrounding the immigrant population. Moreover, there is regular racial discrimination 
that the immigrants are exposed in their daily life and such incidents are increased after 
the unification. The most extreme examples of these attacks are seen in Solingen, where 
the neo-nazi groups burned the houses of the immigrants. As a result of such events, the 
social involution of the immigrants from Turkey is increasing. A basic indicator of this 
is the low level of interaction between immigrants from Turkey and Germans. In the last 
decades, the share of immigrants from Turkey, who do not name a Germany as a friend, 
is three-quarter of the total immigrant population (Seifert, 1998).   
 
As a direct result of the increasing xenophobia towards the immigrants in Germany, a 
trend of ethnic businesses among the immigrants from Turkey emerged. Consequently, 
the numbers of self-employed people among the Turks in Germany have been increased 
since the early recruitment days and statistically, it seems that Turkish entrepreneurs will 
soon outnumber their German counterparts (Buch et al., 1994)6. Moreover, if we 
                                                 
6 There are 51.000 self employed Turks in Germany (Zentrum für Türkenstudien, 1999). 
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remember that there is concentration in specific cities and regions, the numbers became 
more amazing. For instance, there are five to six thousand Turkish entrepreneurs in 
Berlin alone (Hillmann, 1998). However, the business types preferred by the majority of 
the immigrants also demonstrate segregation and the emergence of ethnic niches. The 
sample studies illustrate these ethnic niches (Thieme and Dieter, 1996: 156):  
There is a strong concentration in a few business types. In a sample 
study of Turkish enterprises in three Ruhr cities of Essen, Dortmund, 
and Duisburg, more than 40 percent of the businesses were groceries. 
Restaurants came next with 21 percent followed by tailors with 10.5 
percent7.  
 
Most commonly, migrants engage in the ‘protected market’, satisfying the particular 
needs of the migrants, which provide a specialized area for the migrant entrepreneurs by 
excluding the native ones: a typical example is fresh fruits and vegetables exported from 
Turkey (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 99-107). Moreover, there are other protected 
markets. For instance, there is a growing market of “helal” meat8 industry in Germany, 
which offers everything from “helal” sausage to “helal” bread (Mandel, 1996: 151). 
Besides the economic features of the ethnic entrepreneurs, it is claimed that ethnic 
businesses do also provide migrants with particular identities, which emphasize their 
differences from the native population (Argun, 2003: 70-1). The clearest example of this 
can be seen in the discourses of “helal” meat which enforces the rejection of meat 
prepared by the Germans by creating a sense of disgust against the un“helal” and 
                                                 
7 The tailor shops owned by the immigrants from Turkey, primarily function as Aenderungsschneiderei; 
i.e. they mend clothing instead of designing (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 99-107).     
8 The type of meat, which is prepared according to the Islamic principles, is very close to kosher meat of 
the Jews. However, unlike the Kosher, there are no absolute rules that define the limits of “helal” and “un-
helal”. Therefore, the issue remains a personal preference instead of a religious observance.  
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consumers of it, i.e. Germans. At that level, it can be claimed that the producers of 
“helal” meat for creating themselves a secluded market from the German entrepreneurs, 
spread the stories and created a necessity for the Muslims to buy it even though the price 
is higher (Mandel, 1996: 152).  
 
2.3 The Search of a Symbolic Identity Within the Transnational Space  
All of the conditions discussed above are effective in the construction of distinctive 
identities among the immigrant population from Turkey. However, there is another 
dimension, which should be elaborated for understanding the direction and content of 
the transnational space between Germany and Turkey. That is the deficit of the social 
and symbolic capital among the immigrants from Turkey (Çağlar, 1995). Whereas the 
economic capital of the immigrants demonstrates a gradual but persistent increase, in 
terms of social capital there is a general deficit. In other words, for the majority of the 
immigrants from Turkey, the social capital is restricted to their relatives or co-ethnies 
(Çağlar, 1995: 310). Although the upwardly mobile immigrants are able to include some 
Germans to their social capital as well, for the lower strata of the immigrants, the scope 
of the social capital constrained very locally, by the village community or ethno-
religious enclave they participate in. This situation becomes more severe when the 
symbolic capital of the immigrants is considered. Basically, the immigrants are rejected 
by the mainstream German society as auslaender, foreigners, and exposed to the racial 
discrimination. Even the most successful members of the immigrant group are defined 
by ethnic terms and not accepted as equal members of the German society (Çağlar, 
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1995: 311). However, whereas the upwardly mobile immigrants are equipped by 
cosmopolitan identities to fight against this exclusion, as in the cases of German writers 
or politicians of Turkish descent, for the middle and lower strata of the immigrant 
population, this exclusion is hard to cope with. As a result, the immigrants are directed 
to compensate their symbolic capital within the limited social capital they have, i.e. 
within the fertile ground of Deutschkei, as it was the case in the hip-hop youth groups, 
or they are directed to Turkey. However, immigrants are symbolically rejected by the 
mainstream society in Turkey as well. Simply they are labelled as almancis, German-
like, and classified as morally inferior Turks. Even though their economic capital is 
highly valued in Turkey, they are accepted as moral foreigners and overseen by the 
majority society (Mandel, 1994). This double rejection of the symbolic capital of the 
immigrants directed them to invent new symbolic identities that fights against the 
mainstream German society and creates a sense of commonality in the mainstream 
Turkish society. In other words, the middle and lower strata of immigrants started to 
create distinctive identities that exaggerate their communalities with the Turkish society 
and over-emphasize the distinction they have in reference to the German society. This 
position is visible within the emergence of political Islam, which draws the line of 
separation with the German society very clearly and emphasises the religious 
communality they have with the Turkish society. However, due to the contextual and 
institutional differences between the two countries, these novel identities are also 
carrying strong divergences in reference to those in Turkey. 
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This process is most commonly observed among the lowest strata of the immigrants 
from Turkey who engaged in return migration or making regular visits to their villages. 
For instance, Tılıç-Rittersberger (1998) claims that as a reaction to the derogatory label 
of almanci, the returnee immigrants are emphasizing their religious identity more 
strongly than non-immigrant villagers. Moreover, she argues that within the process of 
reassessing their identities as genuine Turks, the returnees turn out to be an important 
agent in initiating the process of religious revival in the local level. Similarly, Shankland 
(1999: 161) draws our attention to the continuous interaction between the immigrants 
living in Germany and their counterparts remained in the village and claims that the 
former is responsible in some transformation within the village. For instance, he 
mentions that the previously esoteric religious ceremonies have been publicized after the 
example of the immigrants living in Germany. It is possible to increase the cases by 
reviewing the Turkish village monographs with extensive migration rates. Indeed, the 
role of returnees or absentee members of the village community, residing abroad, is 
emphasized within the literature of the immigration from Turkey to Germany (See 
Abadan-Unat, 1993 and Abadan-Unat, 1997).  
 
On the basis of these observations, I do claim that whereas the engagement of the lower 
strata of the immigrants creates effects in the local level, the middle strata of the 
immigrants has an impact in the national level, i.e. within the Turkish politics. Like the 
lower strata of the immigrants, they are also in a continuous search of a symbolic 
identity. However, unlike the former, the locality of their search is the transnational 
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space between Turkey and Germany. Precisely, they engage in institutional activities 
combining the two countries and claiming distinctive identities that struggle to acquire a 
symbolic capital within the Turkish political arena. In the proceeding chapter, I pick up 
the case of the Alevis and discuss their particular positioning within the transnational 
space. My primary aim is providing the picture of the Alevi movement by drawing the 
line of distinction between the Alevis in Germany and Turkey and explain the 
emergence of the Alevi identity politics with the interaction between these two pairs of 
the transnational space.  
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 CHAPTER III 
ALEVISM AND FORMATION OF THE PRIMARY ALEVI 
NETWORKS  
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the emergence and the content of the transnational 
space between Germany and Turkey. In this chapter, I focus on Alevism and after giving 
a working definition of traditional Alevism, I provide the particular positioning of 
Alevism in reference to the Turkish state and discuss the history both in internal and 
international migration. Basically, this chapter investigates the construction of the 
primary networks between the Alevis migrated to Germany and their counterparts 
remained in Turkey and discusses the content of the interaction between the two groups 
until the 1980s.   
 
 
31. What is Alevism?  
Basically, Alevism is a heterodoxial community, which is characterized by their great 
devotion to the fourth Caliph, Ali, the son in-law of Muhammed (Olsson, 1998). Though 
there are Alevi communities in several countries in the Balkans and the Middle East, the 
highest concentration of Alevis are in Anatolia, i.e. the present day Turkey.  
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Alevis traditionally inhabit rural Central and Eastern Anatolia; in 
particular, the triangle of Kayseri-Sivas-Divrigi. Kurdish Alevis are 
mainly found in Tunceli, Elazığ and Muş provinces of south-eastern 
Anatolia, and some tribal settlement of Tahtaci and Çepni exist on the 
Mediterranean coast.  Many Alevis have migrated from their rural 
villages, which tend to be peripheral and underdeveloped, to the large 
industrialized cities of Western Turkey and to Western Europe, 
mainly Germany (Zeidan, 2001).   
 
Although some predictions have been proposed for the number of Alevis, providing a 
precise number is almost impossible due to the lack of governmental data on sectarian 
differences in the Turkish Republic (Güneş-Ayata, 1992). However, by following the 
various researches on Alevism, a rough estimation between 6 to 17 million, which is 
approximately %10-25 of the population, can be made (Shindeldecker, 2001). Without 
doubt, this huge difference between the numbers indicates the ambiguity of whom to 
classify as an Alevi. Most commonly, researchers include several distinctive groups 
under this macro banner according to their subjective criteria.  
 
This ambiguity is also observable in the religious structure of the community. Despite 
the increasing numbers of studies on the Alevi theology, it is still impossible to figure 
out a generally accepted definition of Alevism (Bozarslan, 2003). It can be claimed that 
to some extent, this ambiguity is resulted from the syncretic religious system, which 
combines various elements from surrounding traditions such as Islam, Christianity, and 
Animism and so on (Ocak, 1991). In addition to this, the absence of empirical data and 
historical resources makes the issue of Alevism one of the most ideological subjects in 
the contemporary Turkish political arena. Obviously, each researcher, depending on 
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his/her own background, defines Alevism differently, claims a different number and 
asserts a distinctive character for the community. For instance, when the researcher is 
coming from Christian background, the elements that show resemblance to Christianity 
is emphasized over the elements of Islam and the community is analysed as a 
diversification of the neo-Platonist-Christian philosophy (Vorhoff 1998), or researchers 
coming from the Kurdish background tend to explain Alevism as an artefact of the 
Kurdish civilization by ignoring other elements it may contain (Algül, 1999). Thus, all 
of these features enforce scholars to revisit the issue and create a new working 
definition, in which we can monitor the historical developments within the community.  
 
 
3.1.1 A Working Definition of Alevism9 
Indeed, students of Alevism are well aware of these problems and subsequent 
deficiencies. Consequently, the studies on Alevism are heavily criticized within the 
literature as well (See For instance; Bozarslan, 2003; Aykan, 2002; Livni, 2002) For 
instance, Livni (2002) even proposed to reject the usage of the term, Alevi, totally. In 
fact, what he rejects is the claim that there is a unified community, bound together with a 
shared culture and common ancestor that existed prior to the Turkish modernization. 
Instead, he offered to study Alevism as a by-product of Turkish modernization project. 
Indeed, if we consider that even the term itself was not employed till the 19th century 
                                                 
9 An earlier version of this working definition was presented at the 8th Annual Congress of Sociology 
Students with collaboration of Besim Can Zırh (See Demiray and Zırh, 2002).  
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(Ortaylı, 1997: 210) this proposal seems rather a plausible one. In order to get rid of this 
obstacle, I propose a new working definition and throughout this essay I define Alevism 
in reference to three main institutions: ayin-i cem, musahiplik, and dedelik. These three 
institutions provide the required restriction for recognizing Alevism from the Ottoman 
history till the present10 and enable us to differentiate Alevism from other similar 
syncretic traditions in the Middle East11. Moreover, this working definition of Alevism 
is consistent with the given accounts of the community. For instance, one of the earliest 
researchers dealt with the issue, Yörükhan (1998: 35) claims that Alevism would 
disappear as a “distinctive religious community” if one of these institutions vanishes. 
Also, the scholars continuously emphasize the constitutive role of these three institutions 
for the reproduction of the community and reassuring group solidarity and constantly 
employ these terms in order to monitor the transformation of the community (See Okan, 
1999 and Yalçınkaya, 1996).  
 
Dedelik: Dede; literally means Grandfather, is the practitioner of the Alevi faith. 
Basically dede is the holy man of Alevism, which is the only person capable of 
conducting religious ceremonies. In this sense, dede occupies the central position within 
the community.  No one can be initiated to the community without the approval of him 
                                                 
10 There are references to these three institutions in the writings of travellers in the Ottoman land (For a 
discussion of them see, Dankoff, 1995). 
11 Indeed, confusing Alevism with the nearby communities is a common incident in the literature. For 
instance, although researchers are strongly connecting the Alawites of Syria and the Alevis of Anatolia 
(See Olsson 1998), historically and traditionally they constitute completely different traditions (Melikoff, 
1999). Therefore, such a definition will enable us to define our subject precisely and monitor the historical 
transformation within the community in a historical perspective. 
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or without being a disciple of the dede (Aktaş, 2000). In addition to his religious 
function; he -a dede is always a male- also controls the closed justice system of the 
community as being the primary judge. In the beginning of the collective rituals, dede 
plays the role of the judge and the community accepts his decisions as court verdicts. A 
dede has a juridical power to exile a member of the community temporarily or for 
lifetime from the village, by declaring him/her as an excommunity. These functions of 
dede enabled the reproduction of the Alevi community in the isolated rural setting till 
the migration waves of 1950s. A basic indicator of the survival of the closed rural 
system can be seen in the absence of the recourses to the official judiciary system till the 
1960s (Demir, 1999: 24). 
 
Musahiplik: Literally meaning Fraternity of Conversation; it is the basic mechanism that 
keeps the solidarity among the members alive. In terms of religious doctrine, it 
constitutes the first step towards the initiation to the esoteric doctrine of the Alevi faith, 
i.e. without having been bound by the tie of musahiplik no one can be initiated to the 
community and can participate in the collective rituals. In fact, in the traditional rural 
settings, it is impossible to talk about Alevism without musahiplik (Yalçınkaya, 1996: 
6). Moreover, Musahiplik creates a social tie between two adult individuals and their 
families, which requires a spiritual solidarity as well as a material one (Bal, 1997a: 149). 
A musahip is held responsible for paying debts of his musahip and even can be accepted 
as guilty for the crimes of his musahip (Kaygusuz, 1991: 11).  
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Ayin-i Cem: Literally meaning the Ceremony of Integration; it is the main ritual of the 
Alevi faith. Traditionally, Ayin-i Cem is practiced by the attendance of both male and 
female members during the winter season in the largest house of the village -most 
commonly in the house of the dede- (Bal, 1997b: 84). During the rituals, Semah; 
traditional religious dances, are performed with the company of the saz,12 and commonly 
alcoholic drinks are consumed, which creates the strongest controversy with the Sunni 
majority of the country. Also the traditional courts are held in the beginning of these 
rituals. In the traditional settings, adults without a musahip and individuals who found 
guilty of a crime previously were not accepted to the rituals. Ayin-i Cem aims to 
strengthen the inner solidarity by reproducing and strengthening the group identity with 
continuous repetition of hymns, which recalls the collective history of Alevism.  
 
Besides these three institutions, common symbols, selected from the collective memory 
of Alevism, imagined or real, created a sense of ‘Alevi-ness’ even above the institutional 
communalities. Without doubt, the most significant symbol for Alevis is the figure of 
Ali. The figure of Ali occupies the central position within the Alevi literature and 
constitutes the main signifier of the ‘Alevi-ness’. Basically, Ali is Allah’ın Aslanı; the 
lion of the God, who helps people in need and fights against the cruel and the evil. 
Similarly, Hacı Bektaş Veli, who is claimed to be the reincarnated Ali, constitutes a 
central figure within the community and since 1960 the annual festival of Hacı Bektaş 
                                                 
12 A saz is a short length lute, belonging to the tambour family; it is the most commonly used instrument 
among the Alevis.  
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Veli became an important field where Alevis meat and commemorate the common 
cultural heritage (Massicard, 2003).  These common historical symbols are employed for 
building a distinctive linguistic habitus; i.e. specific set of meanings and symbols, which 
determine both interaction with each other and with ‘others’ (Stillar, 1998). With the 
specific attribution to these common symbols, the boo words and hurrah words, which 
signifies “us” and them” are created (Cohen, 2000). For instance, within the Alevi 
lexicon, Ali is understood as the oppressed but rightful and symbolically employed as a 
hurrah Word, whereas Yezid, the political rival of Ali for the caliphate is symbolized 
with evilness and cruelty and employed as a boo word. A typical example of how they 
function can be seen in the anecdote told by a leader of an Alevi association13: 
When I was fifteen years old, during a dispute, a playmate of mine 
called me Kızılbaş (a derogatory term for Alevi). Later on, I told the 
event to my mother and she advised me: ‘when they call you Kızılbaş 
again, … call them Yezid!’ That is how I learned that I am an Alevi. 
 
As a result of the linguistic habitus, though the term Alevi or a direct index of Alevism 
is not used, it is possible to trace the signifiers referring to Alevism by investigating the 
continuously employed Alevi lexicon. For instance, the fire brigade, which could not 
accomplish its duty during the Sivas events14, is compared with Muaviye, the son of 
Yezid, who did not provide water to Hasan and Hüseyin in Kerbela15  (See Eral, 1995: 
201). Similarly, the writers who are proponents of political Islam in Turkey are 
                                                 
13 Interview with the former leader of the Hacı Bektaş Association, Ulaş Dinçer 05.08. 2001 Ankara. 
14 In 3 July 1993, 37 people, gathered for the annual Alevi Festival, were killed by fire in Sivas by the 
fundamentalist demonstrators. 
15 In Kerbela Desert Hüseyin, the son of Ali, was killed by Yezid, the son of Muaviye, due to the struggle 
for Khalifah, in the Kerbela desert (now in Iraq) by drought. 
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compared to Yavuz Sultan Selim16, who was held responsible for the massacre of Alevis 
(See Demir, 1992: 3). 
 
 
3.1.2 How to Investigate Alevism?  
Investigating the Alevi movement in Turkey or in a European country is not an easy task 
and the literature on Alevism continuously point out this difficulties and handicaps 
(Livni, 2002; Bozarslan, 2003; Say, 2003). The first and probably the most important 
one of these problems is the great divergences within the tradition. Basically, Alevism is 
a protean that shows great variation according to geography and ethno-linguistic factors. 
The characteristics of rituals and religious leaders show great disparities according to 
these criteria (Melikoff, 1998; Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997a). Such differentiations have so deep 
effects that the Alevi activists say that there are as many Alevisms as there are individual 
Alevis (See Gül, 1999: 99). Moreover this protean tradition is also very prone to 
juxtapose itself with the surrounding ideologies and political movements, which 
consequently direct the movement to transform itself into something else very easily. In 
other words, whenever the researcher claims that he/she found the “essence” or “true 
nature” of Alevism, it transforms itself in a very novel way and changes some of the 
basic elements that have been the fundamental block of the given study and 
consequently imprison the findings of the researcher to be either archive materials or 
                                                 
16 In the reign of Yavuz, as a security measurement in the eastern border thousands of Alevis were either 
killed or forced to migrate to the western part of the empire.  
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simply obsolete them. The pre-republican history as well as the last four decades is full 
of creative cases of such juxtapositions. The most famous cases are the juxtaposition of 
Alevism with the Marxist-Left and Kemalist-Secularism.  
 
The second problem in investigating Alevism is the absence/insufficiency of reliable 
historical documents about the community and still there are no quantitative researches 
that can shed light to main problems such as how many Alevis there are, where the 
majority of the Alevis live etc. The absence of the quantitative material also enforces 
scholars to speak in the speculative realm, since there are no objective materials to test 
the validity of their hypotheses (Livni, 2002). Therefore, the literature on Alevism is a 
“slippery ground”, in which fallacies happen more often than not. As a result of these 
features, conventional research methods such as survey study or content analysis of the 
publications are not so applicable or to phrase it properly, if applicable not fertile 
methods to grasp this complex tradition in its totality, which includes divergences and in 
most cases controversies simultaneously (See Erdemir, 2002).  
 
On the basis of these observations, I aim to investigate the Alevi movement especially in 
the last two decades and in the discursive field. In other words, instead of trying to find 
what Alevism was, is or going to be, my aim is to demonstrate the complex processes in 
which rival Alevi discourses compete to define and direct Alevism. My basic objective 
is to show the peculiar effects of the German Alevi associations on the ongoing debate 
of Alevism in Turkey, i.e. to demonstrate how the particular discourse of Alevism 
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constructed in Germany has been transmitted to Turkey and established itself as an 
effective agent in the Turkish political arena. Therefore, instead of taking the individual 
Alevi subjects as the unit of analysis, I concentrate on the associations and endowments 
established on the basis of Alevism and investigate their particular claims on Alevism. 
At that level, there is the problem of representation; since the Alevi associations and 
endowments only cover a limited number of Alevis living in Turkey and abroad. 
However, various discourses on Alevism are constructed within these institutions and 
the majority of Alevi population remains silent about the ongoing disputes. Therefore, 
determining the effects of these discourses on the Alevi subjects is out of the scope of 
this study and this study focuses strictly on the Alevi discourses created by the Alevi 
associations, foundations and endowments. In other words, the study provides an 
institutional analysis of the Alevi associations in Turkey and Germany to understand the 
critical interaction occurring between them.     
 
There are an abundant number of Alevi associations in Turkey and Germany. However, 
the associations in Germany established federations that gather various tiny associations 
under a single roof and created a unified Alevi discourse within the federation. Three 
federations exist in Germany (Sökefeld and Schwalgin, 2000), The Federation of 
German Alevi Union (AABF), which represents the majority of the Alevi associations, 
there are 89 associations organized under the roof of the Federation, which represent 
12,000 individuals. In addition, there is the Federation of the Alevis of Kurdistan, there 
are 22 local Alevi associations under this federation, which represents 2000 members in 
 65
total and finally there is the Cem Foundations in Germany, gather a few organizations 
and presents unknown members. Moreover, there are also other local organization, that 
are active in Germany, 21 of which (representing 2,400 individual) collaborates with the 
Federation of German Alevi union and they are on the verge of becoming full members. 
Whereas the Federation of German Alevi Union is effective in the national and supra 
national level by arranging congresses in Europe and Turkey or making speeches with 
the authorities of the Turkish and German state as well as with the European Parliament, 
the other two federations remain mainly local. Moreover, only the Federation of German 
Alevi Union has consistent organs of publication, which enable us to investigate their 
claims concerning Alevism. Therefore, I only concentrate on the process of the 
establishment of the Federation of German Alevi Union and investigate the constitution 
and public declarations of the Federation for analysing the German associations.  
 
The associational activity in Turkey -though limited in reference to Germany- contains 
more diversity and lacked a unifying organ, at least till the Constitution of the Unity of 
the Alevi-Bektashi Institutions in 1999; however, still the level of representation of this 
umbrella organization is not comparable to that of in Germany. Therefore, instead of 
fragmenting the research into several associations, I choose three main intuitions to 
investigate. These are the CEM Foundations (CEM) (established in 1995 and has 
currently 22 branches), the Anatolian Hacı Bektaş Veli Culture Foundation (HBVAKD) 
(established in 1994 and has currently 32 branches) and the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture 
Associations (PSKAD) (established in 1978 as a local association, in 1988 organized 
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nationally, currently has 35 branches) (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001). My primary reasons in 
choosing these three institutions are as follows: Firstly, according to the 2003 reports 
provided by the Associations Desk in Ankara Police Headquarter, these three 
organizations are the only active cultural organizations, providing the required legal 
documents for the continuation of the association and conducting regular meetings and 
elections. In addition to these three institutions, other Alevi organizations are either 
passive participants in the field that will be closed down according to the current law of 
associations –since they have absences in their legal documents- or they are classified as 
village associations and/or endowments that are organized locally. Secondly, these three 
organizations are the pioneering and the largest organizations that achieved to open 
several branches that show a considerable geographic diversity accompanied by an 
institutional character. Moreover, these three associations have the greatest number of 
members and created differentiable discourses and claims about Alevism and even 
engaged in the continuous struggle about the “authenticity” and “truth” of their own 
definition and their publications and declarations. Though these publications and 
declarations are not regular as it was the case in Germany, they provide the necessary 
ground to investigate their particular discourses concerning Alevism and monitor the 
changes in their claims.  
 
My primary methodology is in-depth analysis of the constitutions and public 
declarations concerning Alevism, given by the headquarters of the fallowing 
associations: CEM Foundations, Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Associations and Anatolian 
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Hacı Bektaş Veli Culture Foundations in Turkey and the Federation of German Alevi 
Union in Germany. The texts of the declarations were gathered from the headquarters of 
these three intuitions, the majority of which were also published in the dailies and 
journals of the associations. Among these, I preferred to cite the ones, which were 
published in the dailies and journals instead of the verbal declarations that did not appear 
in any accessible sources. Primarily, I made the content analysis of these declarations 
and classified their particular discourses on Alevism. The main objective of this 
investigation was to figure out the changes and transformation in the claims concerning 
Alevism. In addition to the content analyses of the declarations, I conducted 
unstructured interviews with the prominent members of the associations, which I employ 
to support and further explain the data provided in the thesis. Moreover, though not 
conducted in a systematic way, I attended several meetings and elections in the 
associations and collected the periodicals of the associations and pamphlets distributed 
in the festivals and meetings. The periodicals that are published by these Associations 
are as fallows: the Journal of Cem, published by the Cem Foundation, Pir Sultan Abdal 
Culture and Art Journal published by the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association, and 
Alevilerin Sesi published by the Federation of German Alevi Union. The Anatolian Hacı 
Bektaş Veli Culture Foundation does not have any journals that appear periodically; 
generally the declaration of the leaders of the foundation is published in the Journal of 
Kervan. However, since these materials are not systematically produced, they are not 
employed for comparative purposes, but as supportive and explanatory materials.      
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3.2 History of Alevism Until 1980  
Although it is possible to give a popular history of Alevism starting from the Babai 
revolts of the 13th century (Ocak, 1996), I provide a short introduction of Alevi history 
with reference to Turkish modernization in line with the main premises of this study. My 
objective is to clarify the ‘paradoxical relations of Alevis with the Republic of Turkey’ 
and then I focus on the migration movement, which I think is the main factor affecting 
the contemporary positioning of Alevism.  
 
 
3.2.1 The Positioning of Alevis in Reference to the Republic of Turkey 
Basically, due to the heterodoxial belief system and their perception as a potential ally 
for the surrounding enemies, Alevis were persecuted by the Ottoman state periodically. 
Whenever a threat from the eastern border rose, the Alevi communities settled in the 
border regions were deported, exiled and/or massacred. Though with some ups and 
downs, the general policy of the state towards Alevis did not change significantly until 
the establishment of the new republic. Though Alevis were protected from 
discrimination, they were not guaranteed an official recognition from the new nation-
state during the early years of the republic. Instead, the state remained blind towards the 
Alevis, as it was the case in the late Ottoman modernization (Ortaylı, 1999).  However, 
with the introduction of the succeeding reformations, this attitude was changed and the 
basic structure of Alevism; namely, the institution of dede, which has an intermediary 
role between the state and the individual were rejected for the sake of “modernization”. 
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This understanding of the early-republican ideology can be seen in the words of Atatürk, 
the founder of the modern Turkish republic (1989: 536):  
Is it possible to classify the mass, which follows some sheiks, dedes, 
seyits, çelebis, babas, and relies his/her life and chance to some 
magicians, fortune-tellers, healers and breath exhalers, as a civilized 
nation? [The titles written in italic are extensively used by Alevis] 
 
Although in the early republican years there is no record of the persecution of the Alevi 
dedes, there are no signs of sympathy towards them either (Okan, 1999). Moreover, 
through the introduction of the new laws, which abolish religious orders and announce 
all communal worshipping practices outside the mosque as illegal, the possibility of 
traditional Alevism to reproduce itself as a community organized in the national level 
was destructed. As we discussed above, the primary Alevi ritual ayin-i cem is practiced 
only with the presence of a dede, the main executer, and it is held out of the Mosque. 
Though there is no registration of a trial against the Alevis for conducting rituals or for 
the preservation of dedelik during the early republican years, the renounce of the central 
hierarchy, which was binding the main dede lineages and their disciples in the villages, 
was destructed. This policy of the new regime created a general unrest among the Alevi 
communities, majority of which eagerly supported the republican movement.17 In fact, 
the roots of this unrest can be traced in the rebellion of Dersim (Çamuroğlu, 1998: 114). 
However, except for the incidents in Dersim, it seems that this paradoxical position did 
                                                 
17 Though the new regime rejected the traditional Alevi society by the introduction of modern laws and 
the abolishment of the Sunni system of legislation, it brought a considerable freedom to the Alevis. 
Basically, Alevis achieved to participate in education and since they accepted the newly introduced mixed 
education system (in terms of gender) they achieved a considerable upward mobility in the social 
stratification of the society (Arinberg-Lantza 1998: 156).  
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not result in conflict; on the contrary, the ideology of modern nation state remained 
mainly urban (Onulduran 1974: 46) and the religious life of the Alevis continued to 
remain untouched in the rural side. Only after 1950s, with the first waves of rural to 
urban migration, Alevis were encountered with the nation state and its policy towards 
Alevism.  
 
3.2.2 Migration and Construction of Primary Networks Among Alevis 
The traditional community life was challenged after the first rural to urban migration 
waves, which resulted in the continuous population loss in the Alevi villages and 
subsequent urbanization of the Alevi population. On the basis of the fieldwork in north-
central Anatolia, Shankland (1993a: 3) mentions that whereas the Alevi villages were 
loosing almost half of their population, Sunni villages were able to maintain their 
population. In fact, as a result of the mass-migration, the predominantly rural Alevis 
turned out to be an urban population within the Turkish and European metropoles within 
three decades. Although there are no statistical data on the rates of Alevi migration on 
the national scale, on the basis of field research and statistics of specific regions, 
scholars working on the issue agree that Alevis villagers are more prone to migration 
than their Sunni neighbours (Güneş-Ayata 1992; Martin 1991; Shankland, 1999: 168).  
Indeed, the out-migration rates of Turkish cities, which are densely populated by Alevis, 
support this view (Şahin, 2001: 97): 
The out-migration rate of Alevi dense provinces was much higher than 
the national average since 1950s. In 1950, one of the Alevi populated 
provinces; Elazığ had the second highest out-migration rate with 
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16.89%, while another Alevi populated province, Erzincan, was on the 
way to have the highest out-migration rate.  Erzincan’s out migration 
reached 26.53% in 1965, 36.81% in the 1975 and 45% in 1985.  
Tunceli’s out-migration rate was significantly high during the 60s and 
70s, but increased sharply and reached to 43.32% in 1985. In 1980, 
Erzincan (42.02%), Sivas (34.94%), and Tunceli (35.47) were among 
the provinces whose out migration rates were much higher than the 
national average (19.2%).  
 
Similar to the students of migration and urbanization in Turkey, scholars working on the 
labour migration from Turkey to Europe and particularly to Germany emphasize the 
tendency of Alevis to migrate more (Faist 2000; Martin 1991). Consistent to this, 
Alevism is defined as a factor that promotes chain migration, which enables the 
continuation of migrant flow with the same ethnic-religious characteristics (Wilpert, 
1988). The existing studies on Alevism confirm that the migration of the Alevis most 
commonly occurs as chain migration, through which, first the close-relatives of the 
pioneering migrant, then the village and in some cases the whole province engage in 
migration with high proportions. To observe this tendency, we can employ the 
ethnographic data gathered in three Alevi villages that illustrate great geographic 
diversification: Dereköy (South-West), Susesi (Central-North) and Sarılar (South-East). 
For instance, in Dereköy, despite the 514 inhabitants living in the village (1985 census) 
there are, 70 living in the provincial centre, 300-50 in İzmir (west coast of Turkey), 150 
in Norway and 50 in West Germany, with a total of 1200 people (Naess 1988: 175). 
Similarly in Sarılar, despite 400 families living in the village, 50 families are living in 
Adana, 200,-250 in Gaziantep, 200 in Germany and about 50 in other places (McElwain, 
2001). The migration statistics are not different for Susesi, where almost two thirds of 
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the population lives in Europe and in the cities of Turkey (Shankland 1999: 155). 
Moreover, it is claimed that Alevis constitute a more determinant migrating group and 
most often do not engage in return migration. Argun (2003: 107) explains this situation 
as:  
In the early stages of Turkish migration to Europe, several Alevi 
villages reported heavy emigration, while the nearby Sunni Muslim 
villages experienced relatively fewer exits. Villages from which half 
or more of the adult men emigrated and often did not return were 
frequently Alevi rather than Sunni.  
 
Moreover, scholars mention that the migrants of these three villages preserved their ties 
with their villages and co-villagers and engaged in persistent interaction even within the 
international setting, which enabled further migration and construction of communities 
based on village solidarity. These primary networks among the immigrants of Alevi 
origin constitute the ground on which the Alevi transnational social space will be built 
later.  
 
As a result of chain migration, small semi-isolated communities consist of Alevis, 
mainly co-villagers or co-ethnics within the cities. For instance, since the population 
movement occurred as chain migration, some districts within the cities became 
settlements with high Alevi concentrations18. The researches working on Alevi 
                                                 
18 Although the common type of migration in Turkey corresponds to the step migration model developed 
by Ravenstein (Abdan-Unat, 1993), the Alevi migration is mostly targeted towards the metropoles directly 
rather than a first step towards the nearest small town and/or city. It can be argued that instead of 
migrating to the nearby cities, where they are not welcomed by the majority Sunni population, Alevis 
preferred to migrate to the cosmopolitan metropoles more, where their religious differences became less 
visible (Sahin, 2001: 98). This observation is valid, if we consider the migrants in Europe. Studies 
conducted on the labour migration from Turkey to Europe confirm that a significant number of immigrant 
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communities in the squatter-settlements of urban Turkey show that the Alevis tend to 
settle in different districts or in different parts (Mahalles) of the same district in the cities 
(Karpat, 1976 & Dubetsky, 1977). For instance, though the Alevis constitutes a minority 
with 10-25% of the total population, in the district of Aktepe they constitute %35 of the 
population of Turkey (Sewell 1964). Similar to the case in the Turkish metropoles, 
instead of organizing around the ‘Turkish nationality’, migrant communities formed 
enclaves on the basis of ethnic and religious differences (Faist 2000, Gitmez and Wilpert 
1987, Wilpert 1988). Therefore, the improvement of semi-isolated communities is a 
valid observation also for the Alevi migrants in the European setting.  
 
3.2.3 The Effects of Migration and Subsequent Mass Urbanization on Alevism 
In the previous chapter, we observed that Alevis were exposed to migration both 
quantitatively and qualitatively more than their Sunni counterparts. Obviously, the 
effects of mass migration are not only a population transfer and the emergence of the 
Alevi districts in the cities, but also an irreversible transformation to the traditional 
Alevism through the adaptation to urban conditions. Within the semi-isolated 
settlements in the urban centres, the reference point of the Alevi identity shifted from the 
inner strata of the village (Mahalles or different lineages) to the village itself, which 
became the basic unifying identity for the migrants within the city (Karpat, 1976: 165; 
Shankland, 1999: 157). Basically, these districts became the places where the Alevi 
                                                                                                                                                
workers from Turkey both from Sunni and Alevi backgrounds had village origins (Abadan-Unat, 1969; 
Wilpert, 1988). 
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migrants met with the destructive effects of urbanization. Beginning from the pre-
republican period, migration and consequent urbanization for Alevis turned out to be a 
constitutive factor, affecting the traditional community life negatively. In other words, 
migration to the city meant the dissolution of the traditional community for the Alevis 
(Vergin, 2000). Consistent with this, many scholars emphasized the importance of 
urbanization as condition conducive of the present picture of Alevism (Raudvere, 1998: 
192; Shankland, 1999: 168; Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997a: 120).  
 
In the urban context, the traditional community structure started to transform itself and 
adapt to the urban conditions. As a result of urbanization and consequent modernization, 
several changes, which deeply affected the present Alevism, took place. Firstly, the 
Alevi migrants created a new identity that based itself on the solidarity of the fellow 
villagers, which cross cut the internal stratification within the village to an extent. 
Today, this tendency can still be seen in the vast number of village associations among 
the Alevi population19, where Alevis were organized under the name of the village, 
independent from their status in the village. Secondly, the traditional institutions of 
Alevism, which are the basic identity markers, either disappeared in the urban conditions 
or marginalized. The three main social institutions, dedelik, musahiplik and ayin-i cem 
provide the basic tools for observing this process. The first effects of urbanization were 
                                                 
19 Şahin (2002: 100) explains the situation as: “The first Alevi associations that appeared in the major 
cities were hometown associations in the 1960s.  Alevis coming from the same village, town or province 
came together and formed these hometown associations to maintain primordial ties, create solidarity and 
provide help for newcomers. The associations founded by the Alevis served spaces to meet, discuss Alevi 
tradition and knowledge, and organize cem ceremony.” Moreover, the existing literature shows that 
village associations established by Alevi migrants outnumber those of Sunni origins (Coşkun, 2003).   
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experienced in the institution of musahiplik, the functional solidarity system of rural life, 
which was unable to survive in the severe economic conditions of cities. Obviously, it 
was impossible to continue for the Alevis, who are competing with each other in the 
urban workforce, to support their musahip economically (Bozkurt, 1998: 87). The most 
important event of plain rural life, ayin-i cem was postponed to the weekends and turned 
out to be a folkloric entertainment by loosing its religious content (Bozkurt, 1998: 87). 
Finally, dedes, the only executers of the Alevi ceremonies, were not able to cope with 
the economic conditions only by performing their religious functions. The severe 
economic conditions of the Metropoles forced the dedes, either to continue being the 
holy-men or an acquaintance, competing in the labour market with his fellow villagers. 
Since their occupational position was left behind their disciples, they lost their charisma. 
Moreover, the powerful control mechanism of rural life; excommunity, which may force 
people even to commit suicide (Kehl-Bodrogi 1997b: 127), was not applicable in the 
cosmopolitan character of the city, where the village community was replaced by the 
urban society. Thus, the endogamous justice system of Alevism was not able to compete 
with the modern judiciary system and gradually faded away (Bozkurt, 1998: 89). 
 
The effects of urbanization, which I discussed above, have occurred simultaneously both 
in the German and Turkish metropoles. In other words, the mass migration and 
consequent urbanisation dissolved the traditional organisation patterns and created 
destructive effects for traditional Alevism. However, it can be claimed that Alevis, who 
migrated to the Turkish metropoles were relatively “advantageous” in comparison to 
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their counterparts, who migrated to Germany. There are several reasons for this. First, 
there was no (or sufficient numbers of) dedes who are able to conduct ceremonies in 
Germany. Secondly, visiting Turkey for participating in the ceremonies was too costly 
and time schedules of these ceremonies were incompatible with the industrial work 
shifts. Thirdly, the traditional structure of Alevism lacks the required institutions that 
can create a spatial structure, which will enable the continuation of the religious life in a 
foreign environment.  
 
When the migration to Germany started in 1961, Alevis were within the first migrants. 
Though there were some migrants who are descendant of dede lineages, no practicing 
dede migrated to Germany and only in the 1970s, a few dedes from Turkey visited their 
disciples in Germany; but in these rare visits no ayin-i cem was organized (Sökefeld, 
2002: 171). Whereas regular visits to the villages were a common practice among the 
migrants in Turkish metropoles -depending on the distance between village and the 
metropolis- this option was too costly to afford for the new migrants in Germany. 
Moreover, the schedules of the ceremonies, which are mainly held during the winter, 
were not compatible with the working shifts of the industrial labour. Especially, if we 
recall that the early migrants were planning to stay temporarily in Germany only to earn 
a sufficient amount of capital to return to Turkey, such an investment solely for the sake 
of religious life seems impractical. Finally, as Sökefeld (2002: 172) points out, unlike 
the orthodox Sunni migrants who could arrange a place of worship, and choose an 
ordinary individual to lead prays, irrelevant to his background, it was impossible for the 
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Alevis to replace a dede, who collects his charisma from his holy descent. Therefore, 
unlike the Sunni migrants the Alevis were not able to develop institutions on the basis of 
religion at least until the 1980s. Sökefeld (2002: 170) explains the difference between 
the Alevi and Sunni migrants as follows:      
First, Alevis had no religious structures, institutions and practices that 
could easily be transferred from one place to another. Sunnis had their 
prescribed prayers (namaz) which could be practiced anywhere, when 
the direction towards Mecca was ascertained. Communal prayers are 
said in the mosque and almost any room could be converted into a 
provisional mosque with little effort. Alevi worship, in contrast, does 
not focus in a fixed sequence of words and movements, but is rather 
established upon specific social relationships and networks, which 
cannot easily be relocated. Alevi places of worship were more 
positions within a specific social structure than a spatial 
structure…Dedes could not be transferred from one congregation to 
another like a Christian priest or a Sunni hoca as they occupied 
specific positions within particular and fixed networks of talips.    
 
 
3.3 The Interaction Between the Alevi Network in Germany and Turkey Until 1980  
The continued interaction between the village community, a district in Turkish 
metropolis and a German industrial city constitutes the basis of the informal Alevi 
networks. Within these networks continuous interactions between the immigrants have 
occurred. Until the 1980s mostly, the remittances from abroad were directed to the 
village or the Turkish metropoles, and new immigrants were directed to the settlements 
in Germany. During this period, the scope of exchange remained limited and created 
effects only in the local level such as the initiation of new technologies to villages or 
creating new migration waves to the Turkish or German cities. Although these primary 
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networks cannot be classified as transnational social space, they constituted the 
necessary ground to build the transnational Alevi space between Germany and Turkey. 
Indeed, the interaction between the Alevi associations in Germany and Turkey till the 
1980s supports this statement.  
 
Although the first decades of the migration to the Turkish metropoles and Germany were 
marked by the construction of informal networks, Alevis both in Turkey and Germany 
started to construct associations and political organizations starting from the 1970s. The 
first Alevi organization; The Cultural Association of Hacı Bektaş Veli (HBKDV) was 
first established in 1960s in the small town of Hacı Bektaş, then a branch was opened in 
Ankara and in 1963 in İstanbul. Although, there have been organizations established by 
the Alevis, mostly village and town associations, it is the first Alevi association 
organized in the national level. Parallel to the establishment of HBKDV, several village 
and town associations, of which the majority of the members were Alevis, were 
established between 1960 and 1980. Most commonly cited of these associations are The 
Culture Centre of Divriği, The Endowment of Tunceli, The Association of Turhal and 
The Association of Tourism and Culture of Banaz Village (Şener and İlknur, 1995: 121-
122). After the 1980s, some of these associations started to be organized on the national 
level and became central actors within the Alevi politics. For instance, the Village 
Association of Banaz changed its name to the Cultural Association of Pir Sultan Abdal 
and gathered the largest number of Alevis under its roof. At the same time, the 
previously closed religious endowments and places were renovated and became cultural 
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associations. The most famous example of this trend was the Association of the Karaca 
Ahmet Sultan (1969), which still functions in Istanbul (Şener and İlknur, 1995: 87-90).   
However, the most interesting and important event in the organizational life of the 
Alevis during this time is the establishment of the Unity Party (BP)20. On 12 October 
1966, the Unity Party, which had changed its name later as the Unity Party of Turkey 
(TBP), was established as the first political movement of Alevis (Schüler, 1999: 163).  
Though some scholars claim that the party does not carry precise Alevi features (Kehl-
Bodrogi, 1988: 126), the fact that all of the founders were Alevi individuals (Şener and 
İlknur, 1995: 69) and the existence of symbols and hurrah words prizing Alevism within 
the articles of the party program, the party flag, posters and slogans indicate that the 
party has a strong Alevi sentiment within the party. The party flag was in the colour of 
red and in the centre there was the figure of a lion, which is surrounded by 12 stars. 
Obviously, the lion was symbolizing Ali; “the lion of the god”, and 12 stars were 
recalling the memory of the 12 imams. In fact, not only Alevis associated the party with 
Alevism but also other political groups condemned the party for basing itself solely to 
ethnic and religious identity. Indeed, the party was taken to the court with the accusation 
of being a representative of a specific ethnic identity (Şener and İlknur, 1995: 69-70).  
 
                                                 
20 BP/TBP attended only three elections, 1969, 1973 and 1977; the highest success was achieved in the 
1969 election with 2.8 % of the votes. The party sent only 7 MP’s to the parliament. In this election TBP 
joined the elections only in 38 cities, which have a high concentration of Alevi electorates, like Amasya, 
Tokat, Çorum, Sivas, Erzincan, Malatya, Kahraman Maraş, Tunceli, İçel and Yozgat. In the first 6 cities 
TBP achieved to get more than 10% and in the later four cities more than 5%; in the other areas the votes 
of the party remained unimportant.  
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Moreover, three of the MP’s, Yusuf Ulusoy, Kazım Ulusoy, Ali Naki Ulusoy, were 
descendants of Hacı Bektaş Veli and belonged to respected dede lineages. Also, in the 
party program some of the statements were implying the unrest of the Alevi 
communities though latent, such as the Article9: 
Everybody has the freedom to choose his/her religion and belief. The 
religious rituals that are not against the ethic and good of society 
should be set free. Nobody can be forced to attend to religious rituals 
and ceremonies without his/her own will or to declare his/her own 
religious beliefs and nobody can be condemned due to his/her religious 
beliefs.   
Obviously, the article is referring to the ban of the Alevi ritual, ayin-i cem, and the idea 
that the discriminatory public view towards Alevism should be changed. Furthermore, 
some of the terms used in the party program were simply referring to the linguistic 
habitus of Alevism. For instance, instead of party program or declaration, the word; Yol, 
literally means way, which was entailing the Alevi order was used. However, the most 
basic indicator of the Alevi background of the party was observed in the incidents of 
1972, when five of the seven MP’s of BP gave vote of confidence for the Justice Party 
(AP) of Süleyman Demirel. The MPs who voted for JP were declared ex-community and 
rejected by the Alevi Society (Şener and İlknur, 1995: 70).  
 
During the 1970s, lots of worker organizations, which were primarily organized among 
the Alevis were established in Germany. The first of these associations was the Union of 
Turkish Worker Association (TALEB). However, the leader of the association, 
Süleyman Cem, was saying that it actually meant the Union of Turkish Alevi 
Association, since the words “Alevi” and “Amele”, i.e. worker, start with the same letter 
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and such a reading of the abbreviation is also possible. In the 1970s, another 
organization with the name of the Worker Union is established in Münich and this 
organization gathered various worker associations established by Alevis and constructed 
a federation. This federation constituted the backbone of the Alevi organizations in 
Germany. The association published a journal and worked as a shadow organization of 
BP/TBP and provided financial support to the party. However, the most important 
success of the organization was changing the derogatory translation of Kızılbaş in the 
Turkish-German dictionary of Langenscheidt in Germany. The organization was in close 
contact with the TBP and even Süleyman Cem was declared as a candidate of TBP in 
the national election of 1977 (Şener and İlknur, 1995: 115-116). However, the 
organization was closed after the abolishment of TBP with the military coup d’etat of 
1980 (Gül, 1999: 84).   
 
As the examples of the TBP and its shadow organizations in Germany demonstrate, the 
associations in Germany were very much dependent on the Turkish associations for 
ideological guidance and agenda setting, though their Turkish counterpart eagerly 
accepted the financial aid of the German associations. Moreover, their activities were 
limited to a minority of the first generation migrants, and level of interconnectedness 
between the pairs was relatively low in comparison to the post-1980 present picture of 
the Alevi movement. During this time interaction between the pairs occurred in a more 
informal network due to the lack of a vivid Alevi associational life both in Turkey and 
Germany. This situation is changed with the establishment of numerous Alevi 
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associations in Turkey and Germany.  
 
As the examples of the TBP and its shadow organizations in Germany demonstrate, the 
associations in Germany were very much dependent on the Turkish associations for 
ideological guidance and agenda setting, though their Turkish counterparts eagerly 
accepted the financial aid of the German associations. Moreover, their activities were 
limited to a minority of the first generation migrants, and level of interconnectedness 
between the pairs was relatively low in comparison to the post-1980 present picture of 
the Alevi movement. During this time, interaction between the transnational pairs 
occurred within the informal networks due to the lack of a vivid Alevi associational life 
both in Turkey and Germany. This situation is changed with the establishment of 
numerous Alevi associations in Turkey and Germany during the 1980s. 
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 CHAPTER IV 
CONSTRUCTION OF DISTINCTIVE ALEVISMS IN 
GERMANY AND TURKEY 
 
Although there have been a continuous interaction between the Alevis in Turkey and 
Germany, the geographical spread of the Alevis created divergent patterns within the 
traditional Alevism. The most important factor affecting the traditional life was the mass 
migration and subsequent urbanization that created a tremendous restructuration in 
traditional Alevism, which I discussed in the previous chapter in reference to the Turkish 
case. However, the particular migration history in Germany constituted a distinctive 
context, surrounding Alevism and as a result, starting from the initial decades of the 
immigration, Alevis in Germany and Turkey embarked on developing a divergent 
version of Alevism, which I will label respectively as the ‘multicultural Alevism’ in 
Germany and ‘urban Alevism’ in Turkey. More importantly, in addition to the effects of 
the mass migration, the various contexts and different opportunity structures such as 
different citizenship understandings and multicultural policies furthered the creation of a 
distinctive Alevism by even determining its main goals and premises in the German and 
Turkish context. On the basis of these observations, this chapter compares the 
positioning of Alevis in Germany to that of Alevis in Turkey and discusses the main 
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premises and conditions conducive of ‘multicultural Alevism’ in Germany and ‘urban 
Alevism’ in Turkey.  
 
4.1 The Alevi Movement in Germany 
Although the effects of migration and subsequent urbanization are more or less similar 
for the Alevis in Germany and Turkey, after the 1970s the institutional context 
surrounding Alevis created divergences within the understanding of Alevism and led to 
the construction of distinctive Alevisms in Germany and Turkey. The most important 
factor affecting this divergence within Alevism is different opportunity structures and 
political currents within these settings. In other words, differences in the citizenship laws 
and policies of Germany and Turkey, concerning the religious minorities created 
distinctive positioning among the Alevis in Germany and Turkey. In brief, whereas 
Turkey was insisting on her unitary structure and undermining ethno-religious 
differences among her citizens by encouraging homogenisation, Germany accepted the 
ethno-cultural differences among the immigrant groups and provided a public space for 
uttering this difference via the multicultural policies, though consistent to her ethnic 
understanding of citizenship, excluded the immigrant groups from the political arena of 
Germany.  
 
In the liberal context of Germany, in which the main discussion were on cultural rights 
and multiculturalism, the Alevi migrants created a distinctive understanding of Alevism, 
which shows great deviations from the Alevism in Turkey. For instance, whereas under 
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the hegemonic discourse of the Turkish state, Alevis in Turkey showed conformity to 
the basic premises of Turkish nationalism, Alevis in Germany found opportunities to 
challenge it. Indeed, in the relative freedom of Deutschkei, the criticism of the Alevis in 
Germany is more direct and harsh in reference to the Alevis in Turkey. Most commonly, 
they compare the conditions in Turkey to the conditions in Germany and on the basis of 
this comparison; they condemn the policies of Turkey. For instance, in 1998, Ali Rıza 
Gülççiçek21, the leader of the Federation of European Alevi Associations, was saying 
(Cumhuriyet, August 2, 1998): 
The belief institutions of the Alevi-Bektashis are prohibited in 
Turkey…On the other hand the Alevis living in Europe have the 
opportunity to improve their culture and beliefs in the context of 
unconditional democracy without facing any handicap.  
 
Moreover, there are many attempts that carry strong elements adopted from the 
European political heritage for imagining Alevism. For instance, in explaining the 
emergence of Alevi movement in Germany, Turgut Öker, the leader of the AABF, 
mentioned the multiculturalist movement of Algerian students, which challenged the 
understanding of French nation-state by claiming the right to be different with the slogan 
of “black is beautiful”22.  
 
                                                 
21 Ali Rıza Gülçiçek later became a member of the Party Assembly in the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP). Therefore, he did not become a nominee for the leadership of the Federation of European Alevi 
Union (AABF) again and even resigned from the position of the honorary leadership of the AABF due to 
his political identity. Succeedingly, Ali Kılıç was elected as the leader of the AABF (January 1, 1998, 
Cumhuriyet).     
22 Interview with Turgut Öker, the leader of the AABF, 23. 08. 2001, PSAD, Ankara 
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Indeed, the role of the German political context is more than a tendency of comparing 
the two countries. In addition to this, immigrants from Turkey, extensively borrow 
concepts and slogans from the political language in Germany. These barrowing can be 
easily seen among the marginal attempts, which demonstrates great diversifications from 
the main discussion in Turkey. For instance, Haşim Kutlu, who is a refugee living in 
Germany and writing in the journal of Zülfikar, a pro Kurdish Alevi journal published in 
Germany only, was pointing to a controversial definition of Alevism: 
The meaning of the word Kızılbaş (literally redhead, a pejorative of 
Alevi) in its motherland is Ser-ü Sor. It finds its roots within the sun 
and fire cult. We learn from the holy book of Zoroastrianism (Zara 
Tuşt Ta); Zend Avesta that the word “Airyanem Vejo” means “the 
seed of the Aryans” which is employed with the meaning of those of 
the Aryan descent … Parallel to the later evolution of their language 
and improvement of their culture “Ser-ü Sor” was also employed for 
defining decent … Moreover, “Redness” is blood. Blood is the life, 
the descent, the continuity. For emphasizing the blood connection this 
word is employed…. Being aware of such designations, racist Hitler 
claimed that the German race is that of Aryan descent. He conducted 
his racism on the basis of that (Kutlu, 1997: 127).  
 
Without doubt, most Alevis would accept this conceptualisation of Alevism as nothing 
but a chimera or insanity. However, this marginal example demonstrates how the 
political currents in the host country affect the imagination of the Alevi immigrants. 
Without any difficulty, the words such as Aryan, motherland, blood, the Aryan decent 
and race can be traced back to the lexicon of the Nazi era and in fact, instead of the 
motherland, urland (the mythical original country of the Aryans in German) can be a 
more appropriate translation.  
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In addition to such individualistic attempts, there are active political movements within 
Deutschkei that operate on the basis of Alevism, though they are not less marginal. For 
instance, there is “one extremist group that advocates the establishment of an 
autonomous nation of “Alevistan” with Zaza, or Dersimce, being the national language” 
(Mandel, 1996: 428). Such an idea of Alevistan is hard to be imagined within the 
Turkish borders and it creates a general disgust among the Alevi population in Turkey 
(Stokes, 1999: 268). When this radical project made subject by Abdülkadir Sezgin, the 
former inspector of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey, he was strongly 
criticized by the Alevi Associations. The Alevi associations in Turkey strongly rejected 
the idea of Alevistan and they accused Sezgin for insulting and trying to degrade 
Alevism by creating aspersions like Alevistan (Evrensel, 22.08.2001). Obviously, the 
project of Alevistan is a marginal one, and it is far away from representing Alevism. 
However, the very notion of Alevistan indicates that a distinctive Alevism, which is 
transformed in the host country, by patterning itself on separatist Kurdish movement and 
western discourse of nationalism, is emerging (Mandel, 1996: 429). Consistently, the 
journal of the group of Alevistan; Kızıl Yol; literally meaning the Red Path, had made an 
analogy between the Alevis of Turkey and the Sikh minority of India and imagined a 
nation for the Alevis based on the religious difference (Şener & İlknur, 1995: 64). In 
fact, the similarities between the Sikh movement and the Red Path are more than this; 
both movements are constructed among the immigrant populations and reflect the 
disjuncture created by the global cultural capitalism that position itself against the 
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resistant nationalisms of the home countries. This example demonstrates how the global 
ideoscapes are at work in creating peculiar imaginations.    
 
Although these marginal cases such as Alevistan and Alevism as a genetic heritage of 
the Aryan civilization are suitable to define the outer limits of the movement and 
highlight the difference between the Alevi movement in Germany and Turkey, a deeper 
analysis that will reveal the content and main premises of the Alevi movement in 
Germany is necessary. As we discussed in the previous chapters, the majority of the 
Alevi population in Germany, who engage in the Alevi transnational space are from the 
lower stratum of the immigrant population and live under the conditions of urban 
degradation; as described in the second chapter. Therefore, repeating these conditions in 
particular for the Alevis would be an appropriate method for understanding the content 
and premises of the peculiar Alevi movement constructed in Germany.  
 
4.1.1 The Effects of Structural Conditions on the Alevi Movement in Germany  
In the second chapter, the residential segregation experienced by the immigrants from 
Turkey was emphasized. However, if we focus on the Alevi communities, the residential 
segregation gains another dimension. Basically, Alevis in Germany are a minority within 
the minority; and they live under the conditions of double segregation; simultaneous 
segregation from the German Society and from the Sunni majority of the immigrant 
population (Mandel, 1996). Even though Alevis in Turkish metropoles are also exposed 
to segregation to an extent, the channels to get in touch with the majority population and 
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to find ways for integrating themselves to the mainstream society are not blocked as 
firmly as it was seen among the Alevis in Germany.  
 
Under the condition of being a double segregation, the trigger of the Alevi movement in 
Germany has been the reaction against the activities of the Sunni immigrants. Within the 
creative environment of Deutschkei, the differences between the Alevi and Sunni 
migrants were felt more strongly after the construction of the first mosques in the 
European setting (Okan, 1999: 104-5). Spontaneously, Alevi migrants started to protest 
these activities and organization with large Alevi members started to emphasize their 
Alevi identity. Consistent to this, the leaders of the Alevi associations in Europe 
emphasized the activities of the Islamic groups who engaged in the construction of 
mosques and associations nearby the Alevi communities as a reason for the emergence 
of Alevi movement in the European setting (Şener and İlknur, 1995: 118). However, in 
Turkey, activities such as mosque building and increasing activities of the Islamic 
organisations are associated with the right wing politics and its segments within the state 
functionaries. Therefore, whereas Alevis in Turkey showed conformity to the main 
principles of Kemalism, perhaps with the aim of creating allies against the exclusionary 
practices that generates an unprivileged position for Alevism, in Germany, these 
activities resulted in the creation of an Alevism that emphasize its difference in reference 
to the Sunni immigrants by institutionalising the existing differences. The typical 
examples of this case can be seen in the construction of cem evis. Whereas in the 
traditional Alevism there are no institutionalised buildings for the religious ceremonies, 
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in Germany and later on, in Turkey buildings were constructed specifically for religious 
needs. Now there are cem evis in the districts of the cities with dense Alevi population. 
The construction of cem evis led to the institutionalisation of the religious ceremony as 
well, which traditionally demonstrates great geographic and cultural variations. As a 
result of the reformation of religious ceremonies, the ceremonies conducted in Germany 
carry nouvelle elements in reference to the rural ayin-i cem. For instance, the majority of 
the participants sit in the rows, instead of sitting on their knees surrounding the platform 
where the dede conducts the ceremony. Moreover, during the ceremonies, video cameras 
and stereo sound systems are among the common elements, which was unthinkable in 
the traditional Alevism23. In fact, this construction of “a more secular version” of Alevi 
rituals is also prevalent in Turkey. However, Alevis in Germany are either the 
pioneering pair of this event or prefer more spectacular and extreme versions than it 
were observed in Turkey. For instance, it is possible to observe Alevi dedes, celebrating 
the Ashura day, in front of the Köln cathedral or an Alevi orchestra24 with thousands of 
saz virtuosi, playing the previously secret religious hymns in huge stadiums publicly are 
not exceptional events in Germany.  
 
                                                 
23 Indeed, the ayin-i cem ceremonies conducted in Germany demonstrate several differences in reference 
to the ones held in Turkey. For instance, there are cases in which the whole ceremony was conducted in 
German for enabling foreign (German) visitors to follow the ceremony (Cumhuriyet 29.07.1998). 
24 This event is named as Binyılın Türküsü, literally “the folk song of the millennium”, on May 13, 2000 in 
Köln Arena, Germany. Within the organisation 1264 saz virtuosi and 700 Semah dancers were 
accompanied by the Köln symphony orchestra. On October 5, 2002, this activity was repeated in Turkey 
with the addition of 1000 saz virtuosi from several Turkish cities (Özgür Politika, 06.10.2002). 
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Moreover, there are activities of the Alevi ethnic entrepreneurs, which constitute 
contrasting cases in reference to Turkey.  In Germany, new jobs or material products are 
invented or developed specifically for the Alevi customers. The most controversial of 
this can be seen in the case of Erenler Cenaze, a specific funeral house for the Alevis.  
Although it is known that practically there are no differences between the burial 
ceremony of Alevis and Sunnis (Shankland, 1999: 143-4), in the post 1980 period some 
Alevi entrepreneurs founded a funeral house specialized on Alevi funerals. It can be 
claimed that the very existence of such a business enforces the “Alevi identity” and even 
re-imagines it, by stressing its difference from the Sunni migrants and native Germans. 
In line with this development, now, there is a movement to open an Alevi cemetery in 
Berlin. It is a practice impossible to observe and even imagine in Turkey, where there is 
no reference on the existence of such a separated graveyard throughout the history. 
Similar to the funeral house, there is also a primary school specifically constructed for 
the Alevi children living in Berlin.     
 
4.1.2 The Multicultural Alevism of Germany 
In addition to these effects of the German context, the multicultural policies of the 
German states require a special attention for understanding the particular discourse of 
Alevism, constructed in Germany. In the second chapter I briefly mentioned the role of 
the multiculturalism in promoting ethno-religious diversity among the immigrants by 
creating clientele ties and translating the social conflicts into ethno-cultural ones. 
Basically, now I discuss the role of multicultural policies on the transformation of the 
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Alevi community. Although many scholars mention the existence of the multicultural 
policies in Germany and acknowledge that they are effective in the identity construction 
of the immigrants, still the subject remains under-theorized and there is no detailed 
analysis of multiculturalism in Germany in the national scale. However, there are several 
studies that discuss the role and effects of multicultural policies on the Alevi movement 
in Germany (See Sökefeld and Schwalgin, 2000; Kaya, 1998; Massicard, 2003). Before 
going in detail on the connection of Alevism with the authorities that promotes 
multiculturalism, I first outline the multicultural policies that became the central debate 
in Germany after the 1980s.  
 
Starting from the mid 1980s onwards, institutions with the aim of dealing with the 
problems of immigrants and promoting their integration to the German society emerged. 
The typical examples of these are the Haus der Kulturen der Welt; established in 
Kreuzberg, Berlin (Kaya, 1998) and Deutsch-Auslaendische Begegnungsstaetten; in 
Hamburg (Sökefeld and Schwalgin, 2000). Such intuitions arrange festivals that bring 
together the “claimed distinct cultures” for promoting intercultural understanding and 
encouraging mutual tolerance. However, the scholars working on the issue radically 
reject the ability of such events for creating equality and effective communication 
channel, in which immigrants can utter their problems. For instance, Alund and Schierup 
(1991) make the analogy of the ethnic tower of the Babel, in which various ethno-
linguistic groups existed without any substantial interaction, for understanding 
multicultural policies.  In fact, even the word, Auslaender, foreigners in the institutions 
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or the phrase of the House of the cultures of the World, indicates the paradoxes that the 
very notion of multiculturalism contains. For constructing an egalitarian platform, 
migrants or minorities should be used instead of the word foreigner, the opposite of 
which indicates the continuation of the “soft apartheid” of the German foreigner policy. 
Similarly, the usage of the cultures of the world instead of the cultures of Berlin or 
Germany indicates that the immigrant cultures are defined as heterogonous, ethnic 
particularities in reference to the universalistic, homogeneous German Culture (Kaya, 
1998). Simply, within these policies the structural exclusion of the immigrants and the 
rejection of the symbolic identity of them is continued and even transferred to the 
institutional activities. Such classification of the immigrant cultures as distinct entities, 
that can not be translated to the German society, inevitably contributes to the broadening 
of the differences between the German and “migrant” cultures.  Within this climate the 
activities of these institutions do not go beyond creating platforms where the folkloric 
practices of the immigrant populations are demonstrated. However, they are effective in 
creating a sense of identity among the immigrants. For instance, Sökefeld (Sökefeld and 
Schwalgin, 2000: 15) claims that while Alevis were participating in the activities of 
these intuitions they gained an awareness of their peculiar culture and identity. These 
activities channelled the Alevi immigrants to express their identity more explicitly and 
often than their counterparts remaining in Turkey. The multicultural institutions of 
German states25 finance the activities of the Alevi associations assist them to conduct 
                                                 
25 For instance, an important meeting, in which Alevism was discussed and the existing literature on 
Alevism was revaluated, was held in Bielefeld on 17-19 May 2002 with the assistance of the German 
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meetings, in which Alevism is discussed and reconstructed (See Kaya, 1998: 40). Such 
meetings created a sense of Aleviness, which is a novel construct for the Alevi subjects, 
who have been Alevi throughout their life. At that level the anecdote mentioned by 
Sökefeld is illustrative (Sökefeld and Schwalgin, 2000: 16):  
For example, one of the Hamburg Alevis who participated was visited 
by a cousin from Turkey during this event. He related this story that he 
drove with his cousin directly from the airport to a discussion about 
Alevism. The cousin was struck by the experience of a large crowded 
audience, listening to Alevi intellectuals and debating Alevism. After 
that event the cousin told his host: ‘today it is the first time I really felt 
to be Alevi!’  
 
German politicians and academicians are regular participants of these events. For 
instance, Kaya (1998: 42) mentions the attendance of Barbara John (Commissioner for 
Foreigners Affairs), Hans Nisble (Mayor of Wedding, Social Democratic Party), Franz 
Schulz (Major of Kreuzberg, The Greens), and İsmail Hakkı Koşan, (a member of the 
Berlin Senate, The Greens) in the Alevi cultural night in Berlin. Among the circles of the 
German politicians Alevism is compared to Sunni immigrant communities, and it is 
perceived as the liberal version of Islam, which is more suitable to the cohabitation with 
the German majority26 (Mandel, 1996: 156). In the same way Nisble was calling the 
German citizens to collaborate with the Alevis against the challenge of radical Islam 
prevalent among the Sunni immigrants from Turkey (Kaya, 1998: 43). Such perceptions 
                                                                                                                                                
Ministry of  the Internal Affairs and collaboration of Bielefeld University.   
26 Such a view of Alevism as the liberal version of Islam, which is more suitable to cohabitation with the 
German majority is prevalent also among the German academicians. For instance, Kieser (2003: 11-18) 
claims that Alevis have a long tradition to live with Christians side by side, without mixing with Christian 
population and keeping their distinct culture intact among the Christian majorities.  
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of the German politicians and media are effective for the construction of the 
multicultural discourse of Alevism. On the basis of these observations, Massicard (2003) 
claims that the institutions define the scope and the criteria of the claim makings of the 
immigrants by distributing or withholding subsidies and awarding or denying state aid to 
Alevi organizations. In addition, the role of multiculturalism in the creation of Alevi 
movement in Germany is also emphasised by other scholars. For instance Argun (2003: 
116) claims that Alevis are the pioneering and the champion among the actors in 
Deutschkei in embracing the idea of multiculturalism and consequently they developed a 
political stand that defines cultural pluralism as the fundamental building block of 
Turkey’s democratisation. However, the multicultural policies not only provide the 
institutional context and the novel terms, such as recognition and cultural difference, but 
also through their continuous interaction with the Alevi associations in Germany they 
initiate and promote a process of institutionalisation within the Alevi movement 
(Massicard, 2003). This process of institutionalisation is observable within the 
discussion on the Alevi religious courses in Berlin. When the Islamic Federation of 
Berlin was accepted as the religious community and grated the right to provide religious 
courses in the public schools, the Alevi organisations in Berlin vocally rejected the 
provision of religious courses, which will be based on the Sunni understanding of the 
Islamic Federation of Berlin. As a result of the ongoing debate between the authorities of 
the Berlin state and the local Alevi Association in Berlin, Alevis are also accepted as a 
religious community and granted the right of giving religious education according to the 
principles of Alevism in 2000 (Massicard, 2003; Kehl-Bodrogi, 2003). In fact, this 
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process constitutes a controversy with the process of increasing secularisation of the 
Alevism, as a result of the destructive effects of urbanisation. Indeed, this event occurred 
approximately simultaneously in the other German states, as well (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2003).  
In the present picture the umbrella organisation of the Alevi associations in Germany, 
the Federation of German Alevi Union struggles to be recognized as a 
Religiongemeinschaft; a religious community in Germany. Within this debate Massicard 
(2003) points out the possibility of the construction of Alevism as a denomination, 
within the German context. Kehl-Bodrogi (2003) mentions the existence of the main 
objective among the Alevi activists in Germany to transfer the process of legalisation 
and achievements in the way of public recognition of the Alevi difference to Turkey. 
Although it is still to early to give an answer to the question, whether these development 
will create a tendency to return to the religious ground for defining Alevism, it can be 
claimed that with these processes, a distinctive discourse of Alevism, that pays a special 
attention to the identity building27 and recognition of the Alevi identity in Turkey has 
been emerged and this peculiar identity construction is search of a space within the 
Turkish political arena.  
 
The typical example of this trend can be seen in the constitution of AABF, which 
defines the constitutional recognition of Alevism in Turkey as one of its missions. 
Consistent to this article in the constitution, the leader of the Federation makes 
                                                 
27 Even in the attempts to create a textbook for Alevism, this strong emphasis on the legalisation and 
identity building is prevalent (Massicard, 2003).  
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declaration concerning the position of Alevis in Turkey. For instance in 1998, Ali Kılıç, 
the leader of the federation at the time was saying: “Our name is still forbidden [in 
Turkey]. We couldn’t set our own agenda. [Instead]It was always set by other people 
and we [Alevis] followed. However, from now on, this will change” (Cumhuriyet, 
December 1, 1998).  
 
4.2. The Alevi Movement in Turkey  
Unlike the counterparts in Germany, the Alevis in the Turkish metropoles were exposed 
to different factors, which shaped their understanding of Alevism deeply. As I elaborated 
in the previous chapter under the destructive conditions of urbanity, Alevism embarked 
on loosing its traditional structure. Starting from 1970s, the destructive effects of 
urbanization increased to a great extent and most of the traditional institutions were either 
forgotten or became obsolete. Consequently many scholars working on the issue accepted 
the trivialization and disappearance of the traditional forms as the signs of the total 
extinction of Alevism as a distinctive religious community (Vorhoff, 1998: 31), which is 
believed to be a matter of time in the 1980s (Çamuroğlu, 1997). As a result of the 
destructive effects of urbanism, Alevi communities started to neglect many elements of 
traditional Alevism and adopted a more sceptical position against the religious teachings, 
which contains many mythological elements and legends where the saints conduct 
various miracles such as transforming themselves into a bird or move the giant stones by 
ordering. In fact, if we survey the Alevi literature of post-1980 period, we can observe 
this trend. For instance, there is a large stone located in the courtyard of the house of Pir 
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Sultan Abdal, in Banaz (Sivas) (east of central Anatolia), which is claimed to be carried 
by him from Horasan (northern Iran) in horseback, approximately a thousand kilometres 
away. In 1980, an Alevi visitor who is a teacher and an urbanite was interpreting this 
belief as a superstition. 
It is impossible to bring it on horseback… Moreover, the stone also 
isn’t special at all. When I entered the courtyard, I also noticed that 
many green fabrics were tied to the trees. Thus, our folk show its 
loyalty to Pir Sultan Abdal in a superstitious way (Erseven, 1992: 11).  
 
Astonishingly, the teacher in the example is one of the pioneering activists among the 
Alevi organizations. Later on he worked as an instructor for ayin-i cem teams in several 
associations and published several books on ayin-i cem ceremonies and Alevism in 
general. It is possible to increase the number of such seemingly paradoxical cases. 
However, instead of indicating the extinction of community, these examples demonstrate 
the metamorphosis28 of the traditional Alevism into a new form. Unlike the predictions of 
scholars, the Alevi community invented and acquired a new form of Alevism (Güneş-
Ayata, 1992), which showed a great adaptation to the metropolitan life in Turkey. Indeed, 
the differences between the traditional Alevism and this contemporary urban Alevism is 
emphasised by many scholars. For instance, Yalçınkaya (1996: 1-10) claims there are an 
archaic Alevism, which is connected to the Islamic history and rural life, and a 
contemporary Alevism, which stays away from theological discussions and is 
predominantly urban. Basically, the new form of Alevism shifts the emphasis from the 
religious sphere to the cultural, where Alevism still functions as an important creator of 
                                                 
28 I owe this word to Yasin Aktay (1999: 38). 
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symbols and concepts for self-identification (Shankland, 1993a: 153, Kehl-Bodrogi, 
1997b). Without doubt, in this new form, Alevism underwent through a dramatic re-
positioning, through which religious ceremonies are replaced with the extrovert ones, in 
which village community is celebrated and Aleviness is remembered and reproduced in 
the profane rituals (Shankland, 1999: 160). Consistently, in the urban context, new actors 
emerged, reflecting this new identity. For instance, in the squatter settlements of Ankara 
there is Zöhre Ana, a self claimed saint that does not came from the holy lineages of 
Alevism, but works as a healer in a two storey building and in the first store there is a 
shop that sells Atatürk pictures and republican souvenirs (Dole, 2001). Within this new 
identity, the collective music, poetry, dance and songs fused with the republican 
ideology29 and created an urban ethic, an urban identity for the villagers (Shankland, 
1998: 61). In the same vain, Güneş-Ayata (1992) claims that as a result of these shared 
experiences of city life, Alevi identity was re-interpreted and the Alevi solidaristic ethnic 
networks are converted into a secularised political discourse of the left30, in which Alevi 
identity is used through the cover-up of cultural and political symbols. Within this ‘urban 
Alevism’, the Alevi identity has never been expressed in terms of minority rights, 
however, it has been continuously used for the political bargaining (Güneş-Ayata, 1992). 
                                                 
29 The existing literature emphasises the juxtaposition of Alevism with the founding ideology of Turkey; 
Kemalism (See Shankalnd, 1999, Vorhoff, 1995). Basically, the literature focuses on the employment of 
the Atatürk pictures and statues by the Alevis extensively and cites their continuous references to the 
principle of secularism for the well being of the Alevism.    
30 The literature is full of examples that show the connection between the Turkish leftist movement and 
Alevism (See Melikoff, 1998 and Vorhoff, 1995). In general, the extensive employment of the Alevi 
songs within the leftist circles is emphasized and the adoption of the leftist lexicon by the Alevi musicians 
and even by the Alevi dedes were exemplified within the literature as a proof of the juxtaposition between 
these two traditions  
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As a result a more silent Alevism in reference to the institutionalised version of Germany 
emerged in the Turkey. Whereas in Germany more visible and institutionalised symbols 
are employed for indicating Alevism, in Turkey, Alevism remained more hidden and the 
allegoric signifiers of Alevism is employed instead of direct indexes.  
 
4.2.1 The Military Coup D’etat of 1980 and the Urban Alevism of Turkey 
Similar to the multicultural policies in Germany, the Alevi movement in Turkey affected 
by the emergence of new opportunity structures within the Turkish context.  The most 
important event that changed the span of Alevism in Turkey was the military coup d’etat 
of 1980 and subsequent cultural policies. Partly as an as response to the legitimacy crisis 
of the Turkish state and partly to stop the political polarization in the Turkish context, the 
leaders of military coup d’etat of the 1980 initiated a process for redefinition of the 
Turkish identity. This new trend is described as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and created 
a definition of Turkishness that combines elements claimed to be originating from the 
Turkic culture and Islamic tradition. At that level, we should note that scholars working 
on the Turkish identity has always emphasized that the Islamic tradition had always been 
an important element of the Turkish identity and right from the beginning of the republic, 
the Turkish identity have been constructed around the lines of Islam. However, unlike the 
civic-republican definition of Kemalism, this new definition of Turkishness emphasized 
being Muslim over being Turkish and promoted ethno-religious dimension of being 
Turkish over the civic citizenship understanding of Turkey (Bora and Can, 1991: 148). 
Consistent to this main premise, the military government and later on the Motherland 
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party instrumentalised Islam for naturalizing the politicization in the country and 
(un)intentionally supported the Islamic indoctrination (Ahmed, 1988:762). As a result, 
compulsory religious courses, which only include Sunni and even only Hanefi branch of 
Islam, are initiated. The construction of mosques increased and the number of high 
schools giving religious education became higher than ever. These policies produced a 
mechanism that aim to assimilate the heterodox Alevism into the Sunni Islam, which 
created a general unrest among the Alevis (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1992: 14).  
 
However, more importantly these policies dislocated the unitary understanding of the 
Turkish nationalism, which previously provided a safe ground for the religious and ethnic 
minorities and resulted in the alienation of some segments of the society from the state 
(Bora and Can, 1991: 148). The most commonly cited of these segments are the Alevis 
and Kurds. Obviously the state policies are understood as a process of turkification by the 
Kurds and sunnification by the Alevis. As a result of this re-politicisation of Alevism, the 
silent Alevi associations, which deal with the activities of culture preservation in the 
metropolitan districts, or struggling to improve the infra structure of their villages gained 
a new impetus and started to organize on the national level, by protesting the state 
policies or demanding the prevention of the discriminatory practices brought by the 
military coup d’etat. The main demand of Alevism was the prevention of the 
discrimination and reconstruction of the Turkish citizenship according to the civic-
republican principles, which promoted secularism and created a channel for their 
inclusion to the national identity. Therefore, instead of demanding a differentiated policy 
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from the state, Alevis in Turkey created discourses that demand the finalization of 
differentiated policies that favour the Turkic and Islamic elements over those of Alevi. 
Their slogans were equality and freedom of speech and religion. Moreover, since the 
Alevi movement in Turkey emerged as a reaction to the state policies, it shows a greater 
diversity in reference to that of Germany. Alevi subjects previously enrolled within 
different political circles juxtaposed their previous ideological positioning with the 
elements of Alevism and as a result various discourses articulated around the main 
signifier of Alevism emerged in Turkey.   
 
As a result of these different contexts, Alevi subjects migrated to Germany constructed a 
distinctive Alevism, which defines Alevism in reference to the key concepts such as 
“difference”, “identity” and “recognition” and developed political demands for the 
affirmation of the “Alevi difference” and recognition of the Alevi identity on legal 
grounds. On the contrary, in the Turkish context, Alevi subject constructed a more 
“traditional Alevism”, which employs key concepts such as “equality” and “religious 
freedom” and developed political demands for the affirmation of “state indifference 
towards Alevis”. Instead of the particularistic stand of the Alevis in Germany, which 
claims specific rights as Alevi subjects, Alevis in Turkey located themselves in the 
universalistic position of egalitarian citizenship and condemned the practices persecuting 
Alevi subjects. 
 103
CHAPTER V 
TRANSNATIONAL ALEVI POLITICS 
As a result of the military coup d’etat, the migrant networks between Turkey and 
Germany experienced a short-term interruption. However, after the first elections in 
1983, Turkey started to develop a more liberal ground, which encouraged the 
development of civil society organizations. Alevi associations also took part within the 
boom of civil society. With the establishment of the Alevi associations in Turkey, the 
Alevi transnational space between Germany and Turkey is fully actualised. Starting 
from the mid 1980s, leaders of the Alevi associations in Germany started to travel to 
Turkey, and have taken part in the discussions and provided financial resources for the 
establishment and/or development of Alevi associations in Turkey.  
 
5.1 Understanding Alevi Politics from a Transnational Perspective  
However, the existing literature generally explains this connection in the opposite 
direction, i.e. the conventional literature claims that Alevis started to organize in Germany 
as a result of the developments in Turkey. In fact, such a conceptualisation is a repetition 
of the culturalist fallacies that conceptualised immigrant population a product of their 
“exotic cultures” brought from the homeland. Most of these accounts provide either false 
information about the actual event or they are over interpretations reached without 
sufficient knowledge. For instance, Joppke (Joppke 1999: 220), while analysing the 
 104
contemporary politics within the immigrant groups from Turkey, extensively cites the 
German daily, die Zeit, and claims that “after the … bloody pogroms by fundamentalist 
Muslims against Alevites in Turkey, sizeable sections of Alevites … among the Turkish 
immigrants in Germany, suddenly discovered, and began to act on, their difference”. 
However, he ignores several factors, firstly, at the time of Sivas events, The Federation of 
European Alevi Union31 (later, changed its name to the Federation of German Alevi 
Union) was in preparation to make its third annual meeting. So, although the importance of 
Sivas event for Alevi movement is undeniable, it is clear that Alevis in Germany started to 
organize on their difference long before the Sivas event. However, several scholars 
recognized this fallacy within the literature and corrected the synchrony between 
associational life in Turkey and Germany. For instance, Karin Vorhoff (1998: 39) claimed 
that “[a]s associational activities and publication started a bit earlier in the Alevi diaspora 
than in Turkey, one can assume that migrants in Europe may have to some extent 
stimulated the Alevi awakening in their native country.” On the same way, Massicard 
(2003) worked on the Alevi movement in Germany and Turkey and claimed that for 
analysing the emergence of identity politics among the Alevis, we should look at the roles 
of diaspora population and localization processes. As a result of this observation, several 
studies investigated the European and Turkish Alevi movement in a comparative 
                                                 
31 The Federation of German Alevi Union is first established in 19-20.06.1990 with the name of the 
Federation of Alevi Communities and accepted by the German law in 17.01.1991. The first headquarter of 
the Federation was in the city of Mainz (Rheinland Pfalz, Germany). In 1993, the organisation started to 
organise in other European countries and changed its name to the Federation of European Alevi Unions 
and transferred the headquarter to the city of Köln (Nord-Westphallian, Germany). As a result of the 
protest of association from other European countries, the federation changed its name to the Federation of 
German Alevi Unions in 25.11.1997, and initiated the construction of the Confederation of European 
Alevi Unions, which gathered the majority of the Alevi associations in Europe under its roof.   
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perspective in the last decades (Rigoni, 2003). These studies focused on the connections 
between the Alevi associations in Germany and Turkey and some of them pointed out the 
material and information exchanges between them as well. For instance, Argun (2003: 
108) states that: 
 …Alevis [in Europe, particularly in Germany] nevertheless have made 
progress … and gained significant experience in associationism. This 
experience has, under favourable conditions and from time to time, been 
transferred to the Turkish political arena, especially in the form of sharing 
organizational skills and leadership between Europe and Turkey.  
 
Although these scholars, employing comparative perspective, rejected the understanding of 
a monolithic Alevi movement that occurred in various localities simultaneously and 
demonstrated the divergences within the Alevi movement, their main explanations are still 
bounded with their conceptualisation of the Turkish politics and they analysed the Alevi 
movement in Germany as the peculiar by-product of the political improvements in Turkey. 
Contrary to this main trend, I will propose an explanation that conceptualises the Alevi 
associations in Germany, especially the umbrella organisation AABF, as the main actor(s), 
affecting the direction of the Alevi movement in Turkey.  
 
5.2 Symbolic Capital Transfer in the Transnational Alevi Space  
The emergence of the German Alevi associations as active actors within the Turkish 
political arena became possible only after 1985 and especially during 1990s, when the 
Alevi associations in Germany and Turkey were established and institutionalised to some 
extent. Moreover, this date also coincides with the acquirement of the technological 
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preconditions, improved telecommunication channels and cheap transportation facilities. 
Consistent to the hypothesis proposed in the second chapter, instead of the individual Alevi 
subjects, continuous back and forth movements between the two countries are conducted 
by the leaders and prominent members of these associations or executed via sending 
facsimiles and e-mail messages, between the associations. By the 1990s, the leaders of the 
Alevi associations in Turkey and Germany were making continuous travels between the 
two countries (Sökefeld and Schwalgin, 2000: 21). For instance, Turgut Öker, the leader of 
the federation, was almost always on the road to address Alevi audiences in Turkey and 
Germany or to represent Alevis in meetings with the political parties and government 
functionaries. Similar to the actors of the German associations, the leaders of Alevi 
associations in Turkey started to engage in continuous back and forth travels between the 
two countries. The most famous examples of them are Ali Doğan, the leader of the 
Anatolian Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultural Foundations and the leader of the Cem Foundations, 
İzzettin Doğan. Especially in the 1990s, observing Turgut Öker or the previous leaders of 
AABF: Ali Rıza Gülçiçek and Ali Kılıç, opening a new Alevi association in Turkey or 
providing financial source for a meeting on Alevism was an ordinary event. Right from the 
beginning the German organisations were important actors in initiating the Alevi 
movement in Turkey. For instance, the buying of the headquarter of the Pir Sultan Abdal 
Culture Associations in Ankara became only possible with the financial aid, provided by 
the Alevi association from Wunppertal, Germany (Balkız, 2002:24). Similar examples can 
be increased by investigating the budgets of the Alevi associations in Turkey. Although the 
transnational Alevi space is started be constructed in the 1980s, the interaction between the 
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two countries is intensified after the 1990s and during this time the multicultural Alevism 
of Germany made its first public appearance in Turkey. Therefore, my main focus will be 
the interactions occurred in the 1990s.  
 
To provide an analytical investigation of the interaction in the 1990s, I take three events 
that are accepted by the scholars working on Alevism as turning points and discuss these 
events in reference to the role played by the Alevi associations in Germany. These events 
are “The Declaration of Alevism” (1990), “The establishment of the Peace Party” (1995) 
and “The Constitution of Alevi-Bektashi Representative Council” (1994-1999). Although 
the importance and consequences of these events within the Turkish politics is dubious, 
they are the keystones of the Alevi movement. For instance, the declaration of Alevism is 
generally accepted as the turning point of the Alevi movement, which defends the Alevi 
identity explicitly for the first time. Similarly, the foundation of the Peace Party is the 
second attempt to establish a party that organized among the Alevi population after the 
TBP. Only after the establishment of the party, the issue of Alevism became more apparent 
in the Turkish public; more television programs dedicated to the subject emerged, more 
political leaders employed the word Alevism and Alevi in their speeches, which was 
almost absent in the previous decades. Finally, the constitution of Alevi-Bektashi 
Representative Council is a unique event in the history of Alevism, which gathered a vast 
number of Alevi associations under its roof with the claim of being the only legitimate 
actor to speak in behalf of Alevism. Moreover, it is also the first attempt to establish a 
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corporate unity, which combines the European and Turkish organizations under the name 
of the same association.  
 
It is possible to figure out some other events that are effective on Alevism such as Sivas 
and Gazi events, and without doubt these events have tremendous effects on Alevism. 
However, although they renovated the interest of the Alevi population to organize and 
increased the membership to Alevi associations, these events do not provide a suitable 
ground for investigating the connection between Alevis in Germany and Turkey. Rather, 
these events created a general protest among the Alevi population and acquired 
spontaneous reaction from Alevis both in Turkey and Germany, by skyrocketing the 
number of Alevi associations and accelerating the pace of organization. On the contrary, 
the selected events occurred in a more institutionalised environment and in a long period of 
time with the cooperation of Alevis in Germany and Turkey. Therefore, they constitute the 
suitable ground for an institutional analysis of the connection between the transnational 
pairs.   
 
5.2.1 The Declaration of Alevism 
On May 6, 1990 in the daily Cumhuriyet a declaration with the name: ‘The Alevi 
declaration’ was published with the struggles of Rıza Zelyut32. Basically, the declaration 
describes Alevism in modern Turkey and demands some rights from the Turkish state on 
                                                 
32 Rıza Zelyut is a former Teacher and writer. Since 1968 he works as a journalist; mostly he writes about 
Alevism. He has published several books and articles on Alevism, he is a well-known Alevi activist 
(Vorhoff, 1995: 202).  
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the behalf of the Alevi population. In fact, this declaration is the first attempt that calls “for 
acceptance of the difference of the Alevi faith and culture, and equal representation and 
opportunities in education, media and in receiving their own religious services” (Göker, 
1999: 196). Without doubt, the declaration is a controversial one in reference to the 
previous attempts to speak on the behalf of Alevism. Firstly, for the first time, the 
declaration speaks of Alevism directly and demands rights for Alevis, instead of using a 
more allegoric language, which would signify Alevism, without mentioning it, or instead 
of employing common symbols, as it was the case in the TBP. On the bases of these 
observations, the scholars accept the declaration as the first attempt to make Alevism 
public and demand recognition and right of self-determination from the Turkish state 
(Vorhoff, 1998: 31). Similar to Vorhoff, Göker (1999: 106) claims that the declaration is 
the first influential public appearance of the Alevi identity (See also Erman and Göker, 
2000). Consistently, many scholars defined the declaration as the actual starting point of 
the Alevi movement (Şener, 1989a), or claimed that the declaration changed the direction 
and content of the Alevi movement radically. For instance, by naming the pre-declaration 
period as the emergence of the Alevi movement and post-declaration period as the judicial 
struggle for the Alevi identity Lütfi Kaleli, announces the declaration as the turning point 
of the Alevi movement (Kaleli, 2000). At that level we observe that the discourse of 
‘difference’, ‘identity politics’ and eventual “demand of recognition from the Turkish 
state’, which were the key concepts employed by the Alevis in Germany, made their first 
appearance in the Turkish public scene.  
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The articles within the declaration illustrate this situation clearly. Basically, the declaration 
emphasises the “difference of Alevism” in reference to the Sunni majority and underlines 
that although Alevism is a branch of Islam and it is as old as the Sunni version, in terms of 
practice and religious teaching it includes considerable differences. Moreover, the 
declaration describes the discriminatory practices against Alevis: the absence of 
publications and television programs about Alevism in the Turkish media, the absence of 
Alevism in the religious textbooks, the absence of Alevism in the Directorate of the 
Religious Affairs and the continuation of policies of building mosques in the Alevi 
villages. The declaration demands the recognition of the existence of these discriminatory 
practices and asks for prevention by means of initiating new policies and measures. For 
instance, the declaration demands the building of schools and cem evis to Alevi villages 
instead of mosques; the introduction of Alevi courses to the schools and representation of 
Alevis in the Directorate of the Religious Affairs. Although these demands utter the 
common protests of Alevis living both in Germany and Turkey, the suggested solutions 
contradict with the general schema of the Alevis in Turkey: “indifference from the state”, 
since all of the prescribed solutions require a differentiated policy of Turkey towards her 
citizens of Alevi origin and demonstrates a commonality with the demand of Alevis in 
Germany: “recognition of difference from the state”.  
 
In addition to the demand of recognition of the Alevi difference, there are other elements 
that carry strong indexes of the German context. Similar to the declaration given by the 
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leaders of the Alevi associations in Germany, the declaration compares the situation in 
Europe to that of Turkey. For instance: 
For the creation of a real, peaceful society in Turkey, the Alevi and Sunni 
masses should have positive thoughts for each other… The negative 
thoughts should be thrown away. Each belief and each culture should 
show respect to others. Today, the families in Europe belonging to the 
Protestant and Catholic sects are living peacefully and friendly, side by 
side. Such an honest cohesion is possible for Turkey as well.  
 
Within the declaration, there are other references to Europe and particularly to Germany as 
well. For instance, the declaration claims that there are 350-400,000 Alevis living in 
Germany and enlists the problems experienced by the Alevis in Germany and on behalf of 
the Alevi population in Germany, the declaration demands some regulations and policies 
that would help them to teach Alevism to their children, such as Alevi courses or television 
programs on Alevism. These demands are in total conformity with those of the Alevi 
association in Germany.  
 
Furthermore, the existence of the global ideoscapes is visible within the demands as well. 
For instance, the declaration makes reference to the universal human rights and claims that 
Alevis are not able to enjoy the freedom of speech and belief and the manifestation of 
Alevism is restricted by the pressures of the Turkish state. On the basis of this, the 
declaration demands the Turkish intellectuals to defend the existence of Alevism in 
reference to the universal human rights. In fact, since all of the demands in the declaration 
are concerning the group rights but not the individual ones, the very existence of such a 
statement within the declaration demonstrates the ability of the global ideoscapes in 
 112
articulating itself to the diverse political trends, even by creating paradoxical positions. 
However, the most important statements within the declaration are the demands concerning 
the institutions of dede and ayin-i cem. Basically, the declaration compares the position of 
Alevism with those of Christian and Jewish minorities in Turkey and claims that due to 
“the denial of the Alevi existence”, there are no institutions to reproduce Alevism. 
Moreover, the dedes are compared to the imams and a reformulation of the institution of 
dede that requires direct engagement of the Turkish state was demanded. The declaration 
even demanded, the training of dedes by the Turkish state to be sent to Germany for 
providing religious education for the Alevis residing there.  
 
Not surprisingly, all of these demands correspond with those of multicultural Alevism, 
which is on the way of transforming itself into a denomination in the liberal context of 
Germany. Indeed, none of these are lucky coincidences, but a symbolic capital transfer 
from Germany to Turkey. Even the actual text of the declaration had written in Germany 
with the name of ‘the Alevi Declaration of Hamburg’ in December 1988 and a year later it 
was published in Turkey with slight differences (Kaleli, 2000:173-184). The scholars 
working on the issue also points out this transnational dimension of the declaration. For 
instance, Sökefeld (Sökefeld and Schwalgin, 2000: 25) describes the discursive connection 
between the Alevis in Germany and Turkey and mentions that after the Alevi Declaration 
of Hamburg, a similar declaration is published in Turkey that created a great impact on the 
discussion on Alevism. However, he is reluctant to draw a direct connection between the 
two declarations and claims that the Alevi politics in Germany is always related to 
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developments in Turkey and explians the connection between the Hamburg declaration and 
that of published in daily Cumhuriyet as an indirect impetus created by the former 
(Sökefeld and Schwalgin, 2000: 25). Nevertheless, the connection between the two 
declarations is more than a discursive communality constructed within the transnational 
Alevi space between the two countries; on the contrary, it is a transnational symbolic 
capital transfer from Germany to Turkey and the Hamburg Alevi Culture Centre (HAKM) 
is the activist of this transfer. Even Rıza Zelyut33, who enabled the publication in Turkey, 
was invited by the HAKM to Germany and later sent to Turkey to publish the declaration 
(Kaleli, 2000, 177). 
 
5.2.2 The Establishment of the Peace Party (BP) 
In the 1990s, for the second time in its history, Alevi movement established a political 
party, the Democratic Peace Movement (DBH). Similar to the TBP of the 1970s, founders 
of the party were influential Alevis and Ali Haydar Veziroğlu34, an Alevi businessman, 
emerged as the main financier of the party35 (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001: 85). However, unlike 
the case of the TBP, the easily recognizable signifiers of Alevism were absent in the party 
                                                 
33 Rıza Zelyut explains this event as: “I and the Alevi Associations in Europe prepared a declaration that 
would utter the demands and problems of the Alevis to the public. I made all respectable businessmen and 
intellectuals, initially, Yaşar Kemal and Aziz Nesin, to sign this text, which was named as the Alevi 
Declaration” (Güneş, 31.10.2002) 
34 Although he was not known with his Alevi identity before the establishment of the DHP and he claimed 
that majority of the party staff were actually Sunnis, both the leaders of other political parties/movements 
and opposing Alevis defined the party as an Alevi party (For instance see Zelyut in Akşam, 28.08.1998).   
35 Ali Haydar Veziroğlu is known as the owner of a large construction company, which generally works in 
the construction of infra-structural facilities for municipalities. In a survey conducted in 1998 with the 
participation of 20,000 individuals, Ali Haydar Verziroğlu was declared in the first ten of the most 
successful businessmen of the last 75 years of the Turkish Republic (Cumhuriyet, Octobe2 9,1998). 
According to his own declaration, “he (himself) spent a treasure for the establishment and organisation of 
the party” (Hürriyet, 15.02.1998). 
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flag and the program, but still, there were many elements that directed the public and other 
political movements to label the DBH and later on BP36 as an Alevi party. Indeed, both the 
party officials and activists extensively engaged in the public debates concerning Alevism. 
For instance, on August 10, 1998 in Çorum, the Party officials attended to demonstrations, 
organised by the Alevi associations for protesting the ongoing trial about Gazi events 
(Cumhuriyet, 15.08.1998). Similarly, in the proceeding days, the party provided free bus 
services for Alevi associations to organise a similar demonstration in Samsun (Cumhuriyet, 
13.08.1998). Moreover, the party officials participated in ongoing discussions about 
Alevism by giving speeches or endorsing the declaration prepared by the Alevi 
associations. For instance, when Şevket Kazan, the minister of Justice of the period, uttered 
the words Alevi and deviant/psycho interchangeably in a speech about Turco-Syrian 
relations, Abidin Özgünay, the leader of the party, gave a declaration condemning Kazan 
and his party for representing the views of religious fundamentalists (08.10.1998, 
Hürriyet). Needless to say, neither the party officials nor the activists paid a similar 
attention to demonstration organised by other civil society organisations or by other 
political groups; other than those that were arranged by Alevi organisations or 
attended/supported by Alevis en masse.  On the basis of these observations it can be 
                                                 
36 The party was established with the name Democratic Peace Movement (DBH) on October 1996. 
However, as a result of the trial against the party, the party cadre resigned and instead established the 
Peace Party (BP) on May 1997. Although the trial finalised in favour of the DBH, since the party could 
not achieve its organisation in the national scale, the general attorney decided for its dissolution on 
December 1997. BP, the successor of the DBH, took all sub structure of the DBH and attended to the 
general and local election in 1999. However, due to the failure in these elections, the BP was dissolved on 
May 9, 1999.  
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claimed that the DHB was a political movement that engaged in making of Alevi politics 
though this stand of the party was not expressed as clearly as it was the case in TBP.  
 
 In general, instead of employing the Alevi lexicon and declaring itself openly as an Alevi 
movement, the party was more oriented to the discussions of ethno-religious pluralism and 
multiculturalism. This trend was visible, within the party program and the declarations 
given by the influential party members. For instance, on December 5, 1996, the Party gave 
full-page advertisement to the most prominent Turkish newspapers with a slogan, “Our 
names are different, but our surname is Turkey”. Without doubt this slogan, which calls for 
the diversity as the richness of the country, resembles to the multicultural slogans of 
Germany. Indeed, the slogan is almost the translation of the famous statement, “Wir sind 
Berlin: wir sind helle und Dunkle”; we are Berlin, we are bright and dark. Obviously, this 
statement and many other features expressed in the party program and declarations were 
symbolic capital transfers from Germany to Turkey. Not surprisingly, the AABF was an 
active participant in the establishment of the party from the beginning. Argun (2003: 112) 
explains this situation as:  
The leadership of European Alevism also participated in the formation of 
an Alevi political movement in Turkey, which later became a political 
party. Under Ali Haydar Veziroğlu the Democratic Peace Movement 
(DBH) was formed in 1995. The European leadership took part in the 
DBH congress in 1995 in Turkey. But they later withdrew their support 
because of organizational disagreements.  
 
In the same vein, Ali Kılıç, the leader of the AABF, explained the support of AABF to the 
Party as follows (Hürriyet, 23.01.1999): 
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With this slogan [our address would be, where our name is] we meant that 
we will support the parties that would accept the concrete demands of the 
Alevi society… Among the 21 parties, that were announced to attend the 
elections, there is only a single party that has articles in the party program 
concerning demands of the Alevi society such as the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs, secularism, democracy and national and sub-national 
identities.  
  
The Turkish press also emphasized this dimension of the party. For instance, the meeting 
(Autumn 1995) in which the decision for the establishment of the party is held, was 
described by the daily Cumhuriyet as “the Democratic Peace Movement established by 
Hacı Bektaş Veli Association and the Federation of European Alevi Unions with the 
attendance of 500 buses and 18 airplanes from Europe” (Cumhuriyet 26.11.1995). In these 
meetings it was decided to join the national election with 30 independent candidates. The 
selected election districts were the places populated mainly by the Alevis and they 
demonstrated a perfect correspondence with the election districts that the TBP gathered the 
majority of its votes in the 1970s. The basic idea of this movement was to send at least 20 
MPs and create a powerful block within the parliament that will raise the problems of the 
Alevis. However, since the surveys showed that the possible numbers of MP’s would be 
less than 20, Veziroğlu rejected to participate in the elections and instead declared his 
support for the Republican People’s Party (Kaleli, 2000: 93). This created a dispute 
between the Turkish and German parts and as a result, the AABF declared that they would 
continue to support independent candidates with the help of 73 associations dependent to 
the federation (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001: 85). However, this claimed support could not be 
achieved and consequently the party withdrew from the election. After the elections in 
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1996 and heavy debates within the party, the movement started to institutionalise itself and 
took the name of “Democratic Peace Movement” (DBH). However, due to the paragraph in 
the article:  
We are in favour of the abolition of the Directorate of Religious Affairs as 
a state institution. The institutions should be given to believers; only the 
volunteer community leaders, who want to participate in the institution, 
should determine the budget and the principles of representation.  
 
the party was taken to the constitutional court with the charge of opposition to the 136. 
article of the Turkish Constitution. Within this process, 162 of 164 constitutive members 
resigned and established the Peace Party (BP). The Peace Party participated in general 
elections of 1999 and gathered only 80.000 votes, which is % 0.18 of the total votes, and 
after this dramatic failure, the Party abolished itself on May 9, 1999 (Kaleli, 2000: 95).  
 
As it was the case in the Alevi declaration, there were various traces of the multicultural 
Alevism of Germany in the process of the BP. When the BP is compared to the TBP, this 
trend can be observed clearly. Unlike the TBP, which opened a branch in Germany to 
gather votes among the immigrants, living in Germany, the BP was interacting with the 
Alevis, living in Germany directly, by including them in the decision making processes and 
the preparation of party program etc. In fact, the level of interaction between the German 
and Turkish parts was so visible, so that the Turkish dailies reflected the establishment of 
the Party as; ‘the Federation of European Alevi Unions established the party’ (Cumhuriyet 
26.11.1995). This creates an opposite picture in reference to the TBP whose shadow 
association in Germany, TALEP, abolished itself after the ban of the party with the 
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military takeover of 1980 (Gül, 1999: 84). However, there was not such a strict relationship 
in the case of the BP. For instance, even though the Turkish part of the party had rejected 
participating in the elections in 1996, the AABF insisted on continuing to participate in the 
elections with independent candidates (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001: 85). Therefore, it can be 
claimed that whereas Turkish part was the determining factor for Alevis living in Germany 
in the 1970s, in the establishment of the BP, Alevis living in Germany were more active in 
determining the process. An analysis of the party program of the BP reveals the symbolic 
capital that transferred from Germany. The most obvious traces are among the special 
emphases on the immigrant problem. For instance, in the party program, there is a specific 
section dedicated to the Turkish nationals living abroad, which was absent in any other part 
of the time. The party program was stating (Party Program, 1999: 86): 
Our Peace Party will stop the perspective, that perceives our citizens 
abroad only as remittances machines and will initiate the necessary 
measures for regulating their status in the countries of residence…On the 
basis of various international organizations, efficient measures will be 
held against the racist attacks and discriminatory regulations and it will be 
fought insistently in order to protect and assure the recognition of their 
rights that arise from their minority position. On this basis, a great effort 
will be used to actualise the existing international agreements between the 
countries.    
 
Since there is a large population of immigrants from Turkey in Europe, it is possible to 
claim that such statements should be one of the main issues of each Turkish political party, 
but none of the other political parties had statements concerning the issue. Due to the high 
concentration of immigrants from Turkey in Germany, when the statement, the problems 
of the immigrants is used, it means automatically the problems of the Turkish nationals 
residing in Germany. Indeed, most of the statements mentioned in the party program were 
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directly connected to the problems of the immigrants in Germany. For instance, the 
demand about the international agreement is a direct reference to the Ankara Agreement 
signed in 1963 between Germany and Turkey, which foresees the abolishment of the 
restriction on freedom of the movement for the immigrants from Turkey (Ostergaard-
Nielsen, 2003: 37). However, the German authorities have never actualised the agreement. 
In addition to this, there are also other statements that reflect the situation in Germany 
(Party Program, 1999: 87):  
Our Peace Party defends the right of dual citizenship. With the recognition 
of this right, all of the rights of the citizens living abroad such as dual 
retirement will be guaranteed. Our citizens will be given the right to 
attend elections via the consulates or similar institutions… Our Peace 
Party will … rehabilitate the consulates abroad, in order to deal with its 
responsibilities towards the citizens. That is, these institutions will be the 
places where the problems of citizens will be solved.  
 
In fact, Germany is the only European country that forces migrants to choose between the 
citizenship of Germany and the citizenship of the country of origin (Seifert, 1998). 
Moreover, the majority of the Turkish consulates are located in Germany and there is a 
heavy debate on their behaviours concerning the immigrants. Basically, consulate 
employees are not successful at communicating with the immigrants and there are endless 
complaints about maltreatment (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 107-111).  
 
However, the most important element concerning our aim, i.e. investigating the transfer of 
the symbolic capital from Germany to Turkey, is the statements and articles dealing with 
the concept of multiculturalism. In the party program, it was claimed that the BP would 
employ multiculturalism for integrating minorities and different ethnic groups to the 
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mainstream society. Needless to say, this statement was not seen in any other party 
program of the time, though multiculturalism was the dominant paradigm in the German 
context (Seifert, 1998). There is a special section dedicated to the ethnic, religious and 
cultural pluralism in the party program (Party Program, 1998: 37-42): 
Our Peace Party defends pluralism in politics and multiculturalism in the 
social life; it is in favour of a society in which different cultural and 
religious clusters can fully actualise themselves … Our Peace Party, will 
end all of the procedures that create inequality and unfairness between 
different ethnic, cultural and religious clusters. On the basis of this, the 
justice system and policies of education and culture will be reconsidered 
and it will aggregate and improve the brotherhood, love and friendship 
between different ethnic, cultural and religious groups.  
 
The lack of political rights and utterance of social multiculturalism or culture sensitive 
policies demonstrate a perfect correspondence with the understanding of multiculturalism 
in Germany. Basically, multiculturalism here is defined as the state of including more than 
one ethnic, cultural or religious group within the borders and their peaceful and friendly 
cohesion in the cultural realm, without any reference to the de jure political rights. The 
claimed aim of the multiculturalism in the social life is a clear manifestation of the 
multicultural Alevism.  
 
Moreover, in terms of Alevism, there are some specific statements within the party 
program (Party Program, 1999: 40-41). For instance, the program states that the party will 
take the necessary measures to change the prejudices, caused by conscious or unconscious 
propagandas against Alevis. This statement is without doubt, a repetition of the demand 
first pronounced in the Declaration of Alevism in 1990. Basically, in order to change these 
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prejudices the party plans to investigate the textbooks and proposes the reformation of 
them in order to provide accurate knowledge about the Alevi faith and culture. However, 
the current textbooks used in the religious courses basically ignore Alevism and do not 
provide either positive or negative information about the issue, though there are heavy 
debates about the attitudes of the instructors. However, creating textbooks for Alevism was 
one of the main discussions among the Alevis in Germany and in fact, now there are Alevi 
courses offered within the German schools in several states as discussed in the previous 
chapter. This statement within the party program is a transfer of this discussion to the 
Turkish politics. Now there is even a textbook for the Alevi faith, with the name: ‘The 
Religion and Ethic from the Perspective of Alevi-Bektashism’ (1996). 
 
More important than all, the main motive of the party was different in reference to the 
TBP. Whereas the TBP was aiming to get into the parliament and create a power block 
within the parliament, which will defend the interest of Alevis, in the BP the aim was 
creating an organ to defend the interest of Alevism either in or out of the parliament. In 
fact, the head of the Federation of German Alevi Unity explains this trend: 
Our main motive in establishing a party was making Alevism a public 
debate that would be discussed in whole Turkey. In Germany before the 
elections everybody, even the gay and lesbians establish a party and after 
creating a public opinion they support one of the mainstream parties. 
What we wanted to create in the attempt of Peace Party was something 
like this.37  
 
                                                 
37 Interview with Turgut Öker, the leader of AABF, 23. 08. 2001, PSAD, Ankara. 
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As the quotation reveals, the aim of the party was not mobilizing Alevis to participate in 
favour of the BP, but to create a discussion and support in the public view to defend Alevi 
interests. With this features, it is possible to classify the BP as an interest party. The 
concept of the interest party is first used by Yashia, who was trying to investigate the 
peculiar interest group formation, which struggles within the political arena though it is not 
a party. In other words, an interest party consists of an interest group who joins to the 
elections and competes with the other parties for forming a public opinion in favour of the 
interest group (cited in Clives, 2001: 5). Indeed the observations of the participants in this 
movement are supporting this statement. For instance, Zeynel Gül (1999: 158) was saying 
that the idea behind the Peace Party was establishing a movement that has a strong support 
in Europe, like that of Milli Görüş, National Outlook, and Islamist mobilization in Turkey. 
The BP was an experience of interest party in Turkey, which worked in the transnational 
political space. The party was an instrument to transfer the symbolic capital of 
multicultural Alevism to Turkey. Since a party is more difficult to be closed down or 
censure, it is a valuable method in the Turkish field for creating large-scale public debates. 
Without doubt, the party was successful at that level and in the present picture; political 
parties create programs and statements concerning the Alevis and conduct special meetings 
with the leaders of the Alevi associations from Germany and Turkey before the election 
campaigns. Therefore, though the party never gained a significant political power, it 
achieved the mission of making Alevism a public debate.   
 
 
 123
5.2.3 The Constitutions of the Alevi-Bektashi Representative Council 
After the 1990s, the associational life of the Alevis in Turkey increased to a great extent. 
Many new associations were established and the existing associations opened new 
branches. This trend was further activated with the Sivas and Gazi events. As a reaction to 
these bloody events, the membership of the Alevi organizations skyrocketed and Alevi 
associational life reached its peak. Statistically speaking, whereas the Pir Sultan Abdal 
Culture Association was a relatively small organization with only three branches before the 
Sivas event, it reached 25 branches and more than 20,000 members within a year. Similar 
trends can be observed within other Alevi organizations as well. Within this climate the 
constitution of an umbrella organization that will gather all of the Alevi organization under 
its roof became an important agenda for the Alevi movement. To discuss this possibility 
several organizations arranged a meeting on 18 November 1994 in Şahkulu Endowment in 
İstanbul. Similar to the previous two cases within this process the Alevi associations in 
Germany were also represented and the first leader of this umbrella organization was 
elected as Ali Rıza Gülçiçek, who was also the leader of the Federation of European Alevi 
Unions at the time (Kaleli, 2000: 88). Argun (2003: 108) claims that the Federation of the 
German Alevi Unions “presided over the formation of the first federative structure 
combining the Alevi associations in Turkey”.  
 
During the meeting in the Şahkulu Endowment, the Representative Council was 
established and several decisions concerning the future and mission of the association were 
determined. Some of the statements were direct repetitions of the Declaration of Alevism, 
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such as condemnation of the compulsory religious courses and the policies and of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs. However, there are some statements, which indicate that 
the attempt set a new agenda for the Alevi movement in comparison to the Declaration of 
Alevism. For instance, the attempt defined a new mission to the Alevi movement that were 
absent in the previous decades. Namely, this new mission is the struggle for the recognition 
of the Alevi identity. Basically, the Representative Council defined the “juridical and 
social acceptance of the Alevi identity” as its mission. Before the establishment of the 
Representative Council the three main Alevi associations did not mention such a mission 
before the establishment of the Representative Council38. For instance, the editor of the 
monthly publication of the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Organization, which was also a 
constitutive partner of the Representative Council, next to the European organizations was 
in the article explaining the main objectives of the publication was stating in 1992 (Balkız, 
1992: 3): 
During this time when there is reactionary, racist and sectarian movement 
all around the world… Our world and our country was in a position like 
this [referring to the post coup d’etat political climate] though it is not the 
time, though it was unnecessary, suddenly, intentionally, the discussion on 
Alevism is activated…Under these conditions, as revolutionaries, 
democrats, socialists, our urgent mission is keeping the peace, the human 
rights, the democracy, the brotherhood of the nations and struggle for the 
actualization of them…Our Association claims … The Directorate of 
Religious Affairs should be abolished, the policy for the compulsory 
religious courses should be ended, the assimilation policy towards the 
Alevi citizens should be given up.    
 
                                                 
38 In fact, since the Cem foundation was established after this early attempt, therefore the claim does not 
cover this foundation.  
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All of these demands clearly fit to the positioning of the Alevi movement of Turkey in the 
1990s, where basic motive was regaining the rights that are lost due to the differentialist 
policies of the state. Moreover, the leader of the association claims that the organization of 
Pir Sultan Abdal is not an organization that utters the demands of a specific political party, 
a particular sect, a race or a region (Demir, 1992: 5). Similar to the Pir Sultan Abdal, the 
Anatolian Hacı Bektaş Veli Culture Foundations were not making any statement 
concerning the legal recognition of the Alevi identity. On the contrary, the foundations 
were engaging in the activities of the commemoration of the “martyrs of Sivas incident” 
and establishment of the headquarter in Ankara. Interestingly, after the first meeting of the 
Representative Council, the leaders of these two associations changed their positions and 
endorsed the constitution of the representative council, which was defining the juridical 
recognition of the Alevi identity as a primary mission. However, interestingly enough, the 
constitutional acceptance of the Alevi identity was a statement of the constitution of the 
Federation of German Alevi Union. The article defines this mission as: “AABF works for 
the acceptance of the Alevi belief as the constitutional right and for the protection of this 
right, in Turkey”.  Moreover, there is another statement published after the first meeting 
(Kaleli, 2000: 88-9):  
From now on, all issues concerning the Alevi society, be it political, social 
or cultural, the only legitimate institution that should be consulted is this 
Representative Council. None of the declaration that are delivered by 
individual persons and institutions, would interest the Alevi public.  
 
Obviously, this statement is contradicting with the claim of not being an organization of a 
specific, group, sect or party, which are expressed by the leaders of Pir Sultan Abdal 
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Culture Associations, repeatedly. (See Cumhuriyet, July, 21, 1998) The very constitutions 
of the Alevi-Bektashi Representative Council was the repetition of the institutionalization 
process experienced in Germany and the statement about being the only legitimate actor to 
speak on the behalf of Alevism.  
 
However, due to the political discussions within the Council and establishment of the 
Peace Party, the movement of the Representative Council have been come to an end within 
a year. The discussions on an umbrella organisation in Turkey were activated in 1998 again 
with the struggles of the Federation of the German Alevi Union and in 1999 the Union of 
the Alevi-Bektashi Institutions was established, with a larger representation than the 
former: the Alevi-Bektashi Representative Council. On 12-13 August 1999, the new 
constitution of the Union of the Alevi-Bektashi Institutions was first read to the public in 
the annual festival of Hacı Bektaş Veli. The leader of the Federation of German Alevi 
Union explained the establishment of this umbrella organisation as:  
Instead of expressing ourselves with other names, by Making Takkiye and 
by rejecting Alevism, which is our essential identity, we decided to 
organise under the Alevi-Bektaşi identity, like it has been the case in 
Europe. We, organise freely in Europe since the last ten years. We 
constructed a federation with the cooperation of representatives from 11 
countries. Now, we will combine the organisations in Europe with that of 
in Turkey. So that, from now on, we will continue our activities under a 
single name (Radikal, 19.08.2002).  
 
 The objectives of the Council were approximately same with the previous attempt: one of 
the objectives was the recognition of the Alevi identity and the creation of the legal 
guarantee of the Alevi identity. This second attempt occurred simultaneously with the 
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discussion on Alevi religious courses in Germany. On the basis of this simultaneity, it is 
possible to read the event as the mirror image of the struggle of the Federation of the 
German Alevi Union to be recognized as a religious community, a denomination in 
Germany.  The representative Council aims to get a position vis a vis the state similar to 
that of the Federation of the German Alevi Union has acquired vis a vis the German states, 
the legitimate representative of the religious community. Moreover, the constitution of this 
second attempt was including several statements that were never openly declared within 
the constitutions of the three main Turkish associations, due to the legal restriction in 
Turkey. For instance, there was the article that claims that the Union Alevi-Bektashi 
Institutions open Alevi prayer houses. Argun (2003: 108) as explains this position as:  
The organization has also contributed to and presided over the formation 
of the first federation of Alevi associations in Turkey and the Union of 
Alevi-Bektashi Organizations (AAKB) in 2000, which was legally 
challenged by the Interior Ministry for its declared goal to foster the 
proliferation of Alevi prayer houses (cemevis) in Turkey.  
 
Still the Alevi-Bektashi Representative Council is the largest umbrella association within 
the Turkish political arena. It only excludes some minor associations mainly organized 
locally and the CEM foundations, which position itself against the Representative Council 
and engages in close relations with the Turkish state. As a result of this processes, the 
claim of state indifference towards Alevis is replaced by the slogan of state difference 
towards Alevis. Now, almost all of the organizations that took part in the process of 
Representative Council adopted the main premises of the movement. For instance, the Pir 
Sultan Abdal Culture Associations, which was strongly rejecting the label of Alevi 
organization, endorsed the constitution that claims to be the only legitimate representative 
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of Alevism in Turkey. Similarly, the Anatolian Hacı Bektaş Veli Culture Foundations 
adopted the slogan of the juridical recognition of the Alevi identity by the Turkish state as 
its main mission. So, in the 2001, both the Anatolian Hacı Bektaş Culture Foundation and 
the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association endorsed the corporate declaration that was 
claiming, “the only solution of the Alevi Enigma lies in the constitutional guarantee of the 
Alevi identity” (PSKAD, 2001).    
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 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis emerged out of the dissatisfaction with the existing literature that explains 
political activities of immigrants as the peculiar outgrowth of the political realm of the 
emigration country. Instead of conceptualising immigrants as passive agents that have lost 
their ties with the emigration country and/or solely determined by the realities of the 
politics of the emigration country (eg. Turkey), this thesis claims that though they act 
within the immigration country e.g. (Germany), immigrants have the potential and capacity 
to direct and define the politics of the emigration country as well.  
 
In order to discuss the critical interaction between immigrants and their counterparts 
remained in the emigration country, the thesis reviewed literature on transnationalism and 
discussed the main attempts to theorise transnationalism. Basically, the thesis accepted the 
approach of Thomas Faist, who employed the term transnational social space. By debating 
the delicate relationship between globalisation and transnationalism, the thesis drew the 
general schema of transnational social space. Since Germany hosts the majority of the 
immigrants from Turkey, the thesis discussed and summarized the preconditions and 
conditions conducive for the emergence of a transnational space between the two countries. 
Principally, by visiting the literature of migration from Turkey to Germany, the thesis 
confirmed the existing literature that points to the emergence of a transnational space 
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between the two countries within the last two decades. Moreover, by providing a crude 
typology among the immigrant population from Turkey on the basis of social stratification, 
the thesis claimed that the background of the immigrants in terms of social class is decisive 
in determining the extent and content of the transnational activities in which they 
participate. On the basis of this observation, the thesis focused on the lower strata of the 
immigrant population and defined their activities within the transnational space between 
Turkey and Germany as claimed as an inquiry of a symbolic identity within the Turkish 
political arena.  
 
In order to discuss its main argument, the thesis took the case of the Alevi identity politics 
as a case study and discussed the content and scope of the transnational Alevi space 
binding the two countries. After providing the working definition of Alevism, the thesis 
concentrated on the distinctive discourses constructed in Germany and Turkey and 
discussed the main objectives and demands of the Alevi movement in Turkey and 
Germany. By discussing the role of different opportunity structures within these countries, 
the thesis claimed that whereas the main motive of the Alevi movement in Germany was 
the ‘demand of recognition of difference from the state’, the main motive of the Alevi 
movement in Turkey was ‘the demand of indifference from the state’.    
 
After discussing the similarities and differences between the two versions of Alevism, the 
thesis investigated the institutional interaction between the Alevi associations in Turkey 
and Germany. Basically, the thesis concentrated on three main events:  The Declaration of 
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Alevism, The Establishment of the Peace Party, and The Constitution of the Alevi-
Bektashi Representative Council. By providing an in-depth analysis of these events, it 
claimed that the understanding of Alevism constructed in Germany became an effective 
factor in directing the discourses among the Alevi associations in Turkey. Basically, the 
thesis demonstrated that in order to fully understand the Alevi Revival, besides the factors 
prevalent in Turkey, the structural factors in Germany and the Alevi movement in 
Germany should be also analysed. In other words, instead of analysing the Alevi 
movement in Turkey and Germany by just investigating Turkish politics, the thesis claimed 
that the Alevi revival is a transnational event that occurred with the critical interaction 
between the pairs of the transnational Alevi space.  
 
In order to defend the main argument, which conceptualises the Alevi associations in 
Germany as the political agents initiating the Alevi identity politics in Turkey, the thesis 
compared the main argument of the thesis with those of the conventional literature on 
Alevi politics. On the basis of the institutional analysis, the chapter challenged the validity 
of the conventional literature that claims the developments in Turkey and the global 
political transformation are the sole determinants of the emergence of the Alevi politics, 
and argued that by utilising the transnational space between Turkey and Germany, the 
particular understanding of Alevism in Germany was transferred to Turkey and tuned out 
to be an effective factor influencing Turkish politics. 
 132
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Abadan-Unat, Nermin. 1993. “Impact of External Migration on Rural Turkey.” In 
Paul Stirling, ed., Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Village. The Eothen 
Press: Cambridge. 201-215. 
 
Abadan-Unat, Nermin. 1995. “Turkish Migration to Europe.” In R. Cohen, ed., The 
Cambridge Survey of World of Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
279-284. 
 
Abadan-Unat, Nermin. 1997. “Ethnic Business, Ethnic Communities, and 
Ethnopolitics Among Turks in Europe.” In Emek Uçarer and D. J. Puchala, eds., 
Migration into Western Societies: Problems and Policies. London and Washington: 
Pinter, 229-251. 
 
Ahmad, Feroz. 1988. “Islamic Reassertion in Turkey,” Third Wold Quarterly 10 (2): 
750-69. 
 
Al-Azmeh, Aziz. 1996. Islams and Modernities. London, New York: Verso.  
 
Algül, Rıza. 1999. Geçmiş ve Gelecek Gözüyle ‘Alevilik İnsandan Başka İnsandır’ 
(In the Perspective of Future and Past ‘ Alevism is Another Human Than the 
Human). İstanbul: Can Yayınları.  
 
Alund, A. and, C. Shierup. 1991. Paradoxes of Multiculturalism: Essays on Swedish 
Society, Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
Aktaş Ali. 2000 “Anadolu Aleviliği’nde Ocak Sistemi ve Dedelik Kurumu.” (The 
System of Ocak and the Institution of Dede in Anatolian Alevism) Paper presented at 
Uluslararası Anadolu İnançları Kongresi (International Congress of Anatolian 
Beliefs). 23-28 October 2000. Ürgüp-Turkey. 
 
Appadurai, Arjun. 1999. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural 
Economy.” In Kate Nash, ed., Readings on Contemporary Political Sociology. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 100-115. 
 
Arinberg-Lantzsa, Marianee. 1998. “Alevis in Turkey – Alawites in Syria: 
Similarities and Differences”, In Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina 
Roudvere, eds., Alevi Identity:  Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. 
Richmond:  Curzon Press.151-165.  
 
 133
Argun, Betigül Ercan. 2003. Turkey in Germany: The Transnational Sphere of 
Deutschkei. New York and London: Routledge.  
 
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. 1989. Nutuk (The Discourse), Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 
Yayınları, V. 2. 
 
Baha Said Bey. 2000. Türkiye’de Alevi-Bektaşi, Ahi ve Nusayri Zümreleri (Alevi- 
Bektashi and Nusayri Groups in Turkey,) Ankara: TC Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları. 
 
Bal, Hüseyin. 1997a. “Sosyal Kurum Olarak Musahiplik.” In Hüseyin Bal, Alevi-
Bektaşi Sosyolojisi. İstanbul: Ant Yayınları. 
 
…………….. 1997b. Alevi-Bektaşi Köylerinde Toplumsal Kurumlar, Burdur ve 
Isparta’nın İki Köyünde Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma (The Social Institutions in the 
Alevi-Bektashi Villages: A Comparative Study Within the Two Villages in Isparta). 
İstanbul: Ant Yayınları.  
 
Balkız, Ali. 1992. “Çıkarken”  (Introduction) PSKAD 1(1):1. 3. 
 
…………….. 2002. Pir Sultan’da Birlik Mücadelesi) (The Struggle for Unity in Pir 
Sultan). Ankara: İtalik Yayınları. 
 
Barış Partisi. 1998. Türkiye Toplumsal Barış Projesi: Yeniden Yapılanma Programı, 
Ankara.  
 
Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller and Christina Szanton Blanc. 1994. Nations 
Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deteritorialized 
Nation-States. Basel: Gordon and Breach. 
 
Bilici, Faruk.  1998.  "The Function of Alevi-Bektaşi Theology in Modern Turkey." 
in Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Roudvere, eds., Alevi Identity:  
Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. Richmond:  Curzon Press, 51-67. 
 
Birge, John Kingsley.1965. The Bektashi Order of Dervishes, London: Luzae.  
 
Bora, Tanıl and Kemal Can. 1991. Devlet, Ocak, Dergah: 12 Eylül’den Sonra 
Ülkücü Hareket (The State, Ocak, Dergah: The Idealist Movement after September, 
12). Istanbul: İletişim.  
 
Bozarslan, Hamit. 2003. “Alevism and the Myth of Research: The Need for a New 
Research Agenda.” In Paul J. White, ed., Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive 
Overview. Leiden: Brill. 3-17. 
 
 134
Bozkurt, Fuat.  1998.  “State-Community Relations in the Restructuring of 
Alevism.” In Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Roudvere, eds., Alevi 
Identity:  Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. Richmond:  Curzon Press, 85-
96. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. 
Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 
 
Buch, H, A Gieseck and H. D. Von Loeffelholz. 1994. Auslaendische Selbstaendige 
in ther Bundesrepublik. Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung von 
Entwicklungsperspektiven in den Neuen Bundeslaendern, Berlin: Duncker and 
Humbolt.  
 
Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Rise of the Network Society. Cambridge: Blackwell. 
 
Castles, Stephan. 1985. “The Guests Who Stayed –The Debate on ‘Foreigners 
Policy’ in the German Federal Republic,” International Migration Review 19(3): 
517-534.  
 
Castles, Stephan and Mark Miller. 1993. The Age of Migration: International 
Population Movements in the Modern World. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : 
Macmillan.  
 
Clives, Thomas S. 2001. “Studying the Political Party-Interest Group Relationship.” 
In Thomas Clives S., eds., Political Parties and Interest Groups: Shaping 
Democratic Governance, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1-23. 
 
Cohen, Anthony P.  1985.  The Symbolic Construction of Community.  New York: 
Tavistock. 
 
Cohen, Phil. 1999. “Through Glass Darkly: Intellectuals on Race.” In Phil Cohen, 
ed., New Ethnicities, Old Racism. New York: Zed Books, 1-18. 
 
Coşkun, Meliha. 2003.  Village Associations as Migrants’ Formal Organizations: An 
Empirical Study in Mamak Ankara. Unpublished master’s thesis. Ankara: Bilkent 
University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration.  
 
Çağlar, Ş. Ayşe. 1995. “German Turks in Berlin: Social Exclusion and Strategies for 
Social Mobility” New Community 21(3): 309-323. 
 
Çamuroğlu, Reha. 1997. "Some Notes on the Contemporary Process of 
Restructuring Alevilik in Turkey." In  B. Kehl-Bodrogi, A. Kellner-Heinkele and 
Otter-Beaujean, eds., Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East. K. 
 135
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 25-33. 
 
…………….1998.  "Resmi Ideoloji ve Aleviler."(Official Ideology and the Alevis) 
Birikim 105-106 (Ocak-Şubat): 112-116. 
 
…………….2000. Değişen Koşullarda Alevilik. İstanbul: Doğan Kitapları. 
 
Dankoff, Robert. 1995. “An Unpublished Account of Mum Söndürmek in the 
Seyahatname of Evliya Çelebi.” in A. Popovic and G. Veinstein, eds., Bektachiyya : 
Etudes sur L'ordre Mystique des Bektachis et les Groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach. 
Istanbul: ISIS, 67-73. 
 
Demir, Murtaza. 1999. “Anadolu Aleviliği ve Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneğinin 
Konumu”, PSKD, 35(1). 24-31. 
 
…………….1992. “Sunuş” PSKAD 1(1): 4-6.  
 
Demiray, Mehmet and Besim Can, Zırh. 2002. “Yeniden Yapılandırılan Alevi 
Kimliği Üzerine Yapıbozumsal Bir Deneme” (An Deconstructivst Attempt for the 
Reconstructed Alevi Identity) 8. Sosyoloji Öğrencileri Kongresi, (8th Annual 
Congress of Sociology Students) 35 May, 2002 İstanbul Bilgi. 
 
Dole, Chris. 2001. “The Urbanization of the Charisma: Healing and Identity in a 
Turkish Migrant Community” paper presented in Middle East History and Theory 
Conference: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies of Chicago, 11-12, May  2001. 
 
Dubetsky, Alan. 1977. "Class and Community in Urban Turkey", in C.A.O. Van 
Nieuwenhuijze, eds., Commoners, Climbers and Notables, Leiden: Brill. 360-371. 
 
Eral, Sadık. 1995. Çaldıran’dan Çorum’a Anadolu Alevi Katliamları. İstanbul: Ant 
Yayınları. 
 
Erdemir, Aykan. 2002. “A Critical Assessment of Anthropological Approaches to 
the Study of Alevism”.  Paper presented at the 36th Annual Meeting of the Middle 
East Studies Association of North America (MESA). Washington, D.C.: 23-26 
November 2002. 
 
Erman, Tahire and Göker, Emrah. 2000. “Alevi Politics in Contemprory Turkey”, 
Middle Eastern Studies 36(4): 99-119. 
 
Erseven, İhan Cem. 1992. “Bir Gül Açmıştı Banaz’da” PSKAD 1(1): 9-14. 
 
Faist, Thomas. 1994. “How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of 
 136
Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978-1992.” In Martin Baldwin 
Edwards and Martin Schain, eds., The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe, 
Essex: Frank Cass. 49-71. 
 
…………….. 2000.  The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and 
Transnational Social Spaces.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fetzer, Joel S. 2000 Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, 
France and Germany, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
 
Gitmez, Ali and Czarina Wilpert.  1987.  “A Micro Society or an Ethnic 
Community? Social Organization and Ethnicity Amongst Turkish Migrants in 
Berlin.” In Immigrant Associations in Europe J. D. Rex and C. Wilpert, eds., 
Aldershot: Gomer. 86-126. 
 
Glick Schiller, Nina, Linda Basch, and Christina Szanton Blanc. 1992. 
“Transnationalism: a new analytic framework for understanding migration.” In Nina 
Glick Shiller, Linda Basch and Christina Szanton Blanc, eds., Towards a 
Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism 
Reconsidered. New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1-24. 
 
Göker, Emrah. 1999.  Reconstructing the Political: A Study on Contemprory Alevi 
Politics from a Generative Structuralist Perspective. Unpublished master’s thesis. 
Ankara: Bilkent University, Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration. 
 
Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe.  1991.  “Gecekondularda Kimlik Sorunu, Dayanışma Örüntüleri 
ve Hemşehrilik.”  Toplum ve Bilim 51-52: 89-101. 
 
…………….1992. "The Turkish Alevis."  Innovation 5(3): 109-114. 
 
…………….1994.  “Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey.” In L. Roniger and 
A. Güneş-Ayata, eds., Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society Boulder: Lynne 
Riemer Publishers, 49-63. 
 
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Blackwell.  
 
Gül, Zeynel. 1999. Dernekten Partiye: Avrupa Alevi Örgütlenmesi (From 
Association to the Party: Alevi Organizations in Europe) Ankara: İtalik Kitapları. 
 
…………….. 2003. “Almanya’da Alevi Dernekleri.” (Alevi Associations in 
Germany) In İbrahim Bahadır, ed., Bilgi Toplumunda Alevilik. Ankara: Bielefeld 
Alevi Kültür Merkezi Yayınları. 
 137
 
Ireland, Patrick. 1994. The policy challenge of ethnic diversity: immigrant politics in 
France and Switzerland. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.  
 
Hall, Stuart. 1994. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” In P. Williams and L. 
Chrisman, eds., Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, New York: Colombia 
University Press. 392-403. 
 
Hillman, J. 1998. Türkische Unternehmerinnen und Beschaeftigte im Berliner 
Ethnischen Gewerbe, Discussion Paper FS 198-107, Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung.  
 
Joppke, Christian. 2003. “Multicultural Citizenship in Germany”. In John Stone and 
Dennis Ruthledge eds., Race and Ethnicity: Comparative and Theoretical 
Approaches Malden: Blackwell. 357-368. 
  
……………. 1999. Immigration and the Nation-state: the United States, Germany, 
and Great Britain. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Jurgens, Jeffrey. 2001. “Shifting Spaces: Complex Identities in Turkish-German 
Migration.” In Ludger Pries, ed., New Transnational Social Spaces: International 
Migration and Transnational Companies in Twenty-first Century, London: 
Routledge, 94-113. 
 
Harvey, David. 1989. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins 
of Cultural Change, Cambridge: Blackwell.  
 
Kaleli, Lütfü. 2000. Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeler (The Alevi Identity and the 
Alevi Organizations). İstanbul: Can Yayınları 124. 
 
……………..  1990. Kimliğini Haykıran Alevilik: Araştırma Derleme (The Alevism 
that Claims Its Identity: Research and Documentation). İstanbul: Habora Yayınları.  
 
Karpat, Kemal  H. 1976.  The Gecekondu:  Rural Migration and Urbanization.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kaya, Ayhan. 1998. “Multicultural Clientelism and Alevi Resurgence in the Turkish 
Diaspora: Berlin Alevis” New Perspectives on Turkey Spring 1998(18): 23-49. 
 
……………. 2002. “Aesthetic of Diaspora: Contemporary Minstrels in Turkish 
Berlin,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28(1): 43-62. 
 
 138
…………... 2000. Sicher in Kreuzberg, Berlin’deki Kucuk İstanbul: Diyasporada 
Kimligin Oluşumu, (Sicher in Kreuzberg, The Little Istanbul in Berlin: The 
Construction of Identity in Diaspora). İstanbul: Büke Yayınları.  
 
Kaygusuz, İsmail. 1991. Aleviliğin Toplumsallaştırılmış Tapınç Kurumlarından, 
Musahiplik (Musahiplik; A Communalised Worship Institution of Alevism) İstanbul: 
Alevi Yayınları. 
 
Kehl-Bodrogi, Krisztina. 2003. “Von Der Geheimen Glaubenslehre Zur Öffentlichen 
Religion Alevitischer Religionsunterricht in Deutschland” (From the Secret Belief 
system to the Open Religion: The Alevi Religious Courses in Germany) In İbrahim 
Bahadır, ed., Bilgi Toplumunda Alevilik. (Alevisim in Information Community) 
Ankara: Bielefeld Alevi Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 453-473.  
 
…………….1997b. “Introduction” In Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-
Heinkele, Anke Otter-Beaujean, eds., Syncretistic Religious Communities in The 
Near East. Leiden, Newyork, Köln: Brill. XI-XVII.   
 
…………….1997a. “On the Significance of Musahiplik Among the Alevis of 
Turkey: The Case of Tahtacı.” In Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, 
Anke Otter-Beaujean, eds., Syncretistic Religious Communities in The Near East. 
Leiden, Newyork, Köln: Brill. 119-137. 
 
…………….1988. Die Kizilbas/Aleviten. Untersuchungen über eine esoterische 
Glaubensgemeinschaft in Anatolien. (The Kızılbash/Alevis. Researches on an 
Esoteric Belief Community in Anatolia) Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Bd.126. 
Berlin. 
 
Kemper, Franz-Josef. 1998. “Restructuring of Housing and Ethnic Segregation: 
Recent Developments in Berlin” Urban Studies. 35(10): 1765-1789. 
 
Keyman, Fuat and Ahmet İçduygu. 2003. “Globalization, Migration and Citizenship: 
The Case of Turkey” in Eleonore Kofman, ed., Globalization: Theory, and Practice. 
London: Continuum Intl. Publishers, 191-206. 
 
Kieser, Hans-Lukas. 2003. “Modern Çağda Aleviler (19.-21. Yüzyıl)” (Alevis in the 
Modern age: 19.-21. Centuries) In İbrahim Bahadır, ed., Bilgi Toplumunda Alevilik. 
(Alevisim in Information Community). Ankara: Bielefeld Alevi Kültür Merkezi 
Yayınları. 
 
Kivisto, Peter. 2001. “Theorizing Transnational Immigration: A Critical Review of 
Current Efforts,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24(4), 549-557. 
 
 139
Koopmans, Ruud and Poul Statham. 2000. “Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? 
Postnationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claims-Making of Migrants 
and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany” in Ruud Koopmans and Poul 
Statham, eds., Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Polities. London: 
Oxford University Press. 13-56.  
 
Kutlu, Haşim. 1997. Alevi Kimliğini Tartışmak. İstanbul: Belge.   
 
Laclau, Ernesto. 1990. New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London: 
Verso.  
 
Livni, Eran. 2002. “Alevi Identity in Turkish Historiography”. Paper Presented at the 
17th Middle East History and Theory Conference. Chicago: May 10-11. 2002.   
 
Mandel, Ruth. 1989. “Turkish Headscarves and the “Foreigner Problem”: 
Constructing Difference through Emblems of Identity,” New German Critique Issue 
46: Special Issue on Minorities in German Culture (Winter, 1989), 27-46.  
 
…………….. 1994.  " Migration Zwischen Der Turkei und Deutscland: Ethnizitaet 
und Kulturelle Zwischenwelten.” (Migration Between Germnay and Turkey: 
Ethnicity and Cultural In-Betweenness) In R. Heltlage, ed., Migrationsprobleme in 
Deutschland und Italien: Zwischen Offenen Raeumen und Neuen Grenzen 
(Migration Problems in Germany and Italy. Between the Public Sphere and the New 
Frontiers, Berlin: Italienisch/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Sociologie, 467-486. 
 
…………….. 1996.  "A Place of Their Own: Contesting Spaces and Defining Places 
in Berlin's Migrant Community." In B. D. Metcalf, ed., Making Muslim Space in 
North America and Europe, Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California 
Press, 147-166. 
 
Martin, Philip L.  1991.  The Unfinished Story:  Turkish Labour Migration to 
Western Europe.  Geneva:  International Labour Office. 
 
Massicard, Elise. 2003. “Alevist Movement at Home and Abroad: Mobilization 
Spaces and Disjunction” (Forthcoming) New Perspectives on Turkey 28(Fall 2003).   
 
…………….2003. “Alevism as a Productive Misunderstanding: the Hacıbektaş 
Festival”. In Paul J. White, ed., Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview. 
Leiden: Brill. 125-141. 
 
McElwain, Thomas. 08.10.2001. “Ritual Change in a Turkish Alevi Village” 
http://www.alevibektasi.com/xrituel.htm.  
 
 140
Melikoff, Irene. 1998. “Bektashi/Kızılbaş: Historical Bipartation and Its 
Consequences.” In Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Roudvere, eds., 
Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. Richmond:  Curzon 
Press. 1-7. 
 
Naess, Ragnar. 1988. “Being an Alevi Muslim in South-western Anatolia and 
Norway: The Impact of Migration on a Heterodox Turkish Community.” In Thomas 
Gernholm and Ingvar G. Lithvan, ed., The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe. 
London and New York:  
 
Ocak, Yaşar. 1991. “Alevilik ve Bektaşilik, Son Yazılar Üzerine bir Değerlendirme” 
(Alevism and Bektashism: An Evaluation on the Current Literature). Toplum ve 
Bilim. July-Agust.  
 
…………….. 1996.  Babailer İsyanı Aleviliğin Tarihsel Altyapısı  yahut Anadulu’da 
İslam-Türk Heterodoksisinin Teşekkülü. (The Historical Background of the Alevism 
or the Construction of the Islamic-Turkish Heterodoxy in Anatolia). İstanbul: Dergah 
Yayınları. 
 
Okan, Murat S. 1999. “Etnisite, Din ve Kültür İlişkisi: Aleviliğin Tarihsel Boyutu ve 
Cem Vakfı Örneğinde Bugünü Üzerinden Sosyal Antropolojik bir Değerlendirme” 
(The Relationship of Ethnicity, Religion and Culture: A Social Anthropological 
Evaluation Over the Historical Dimension of Alevism and the Example of Cem 
Endowment). Unpublished Masters Thesis, Ankara:  Hacettepe Üniversitesi. 
 
Olsson, Tord.  1998.  "Epilogue:  The Scripturalization of Ali-Oriented Religions." 
In Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Roudvere, eds., Alevi Identity:  
Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. Richmond:  Curzon Press. 199-206. 
 
Onulduran, Ersin. 1974. Political Development and Political Parties in Turkey. 
Ankara: Ankara Üniv. Siyasal Bilgiler Fak. Yayınları 
 
Ortaylı İlber. 1999. “Alevilik, Nusayrilik ve Bab-ı Ali” (Alevism, Nusayrism and the 
Supreme Porte) In Türkiye’de Aleviler Bektaşiler Nusayriler (Alevis, Bektashis and 
Nusayris in Turkey.) İstanbul: ISAN.  
 
…………….1997. “Les Groupes Heterodoxes et L’Administration Ottomane” In B. 
Kehl-Bodrogi, A. Kellner-Heinkele and Otter-Beaujean, eds., Syncretistic Religious 
Communities in the Near East. K. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 25-33. 
 
Ostergaard-Nielssen. 2003. Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany. 
London: Routledge. 
 
 141
Özdemir, Cem. 1999. Ben Almanyalıyım. İstanbul: İletişim.  
 
Paul, John P. 1981. “The Greek Lobby and American Foreign Policy: A 
Transnational Perspective” In F. John Stack, ed., Ethnic Identities in a Transnational 
World. London: Greenwood Press. 
 
Pecoud, Antoine. 2000. “Cosmopolitanism and Business: Entrepreneurship and 
Identity Among German-Turks in Berlin” 
http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working_papers.htm. 
 
Piscatori, James P. 1981. “The Formation of the Sa’udi Identity: A Case Study of the 
Utility of Transnationalism.” In F. John Stack, ed., Ethnic Identities in a 
Transnational World. London: Greenwood Press. 
 
Portes Alejandro. 1999. “Conclusion: toward a new world – the origins and effects 
of transnational activities”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22(2): 463-77. 
 
Portes Alejandro; Luise Guarnizo, and Patricia Landolt, 1999. “The Study of 
Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 22(2): 217-37. 
 
Pries Ludger. 2001. “The Approach of Transnational Social Spaces: Responding to 
New Configuration of The Social and The Spatial” in Ludger Pries, ed., New 
Transnational Social Spaces: International Migration and Transnational Companies 
in Twenty-first Century. London: Routledge: 3-33. 
 
Radtke, Frank-Olaf. 1994. “The Formation Of Ethnic Minorities And The 
Transformation Of Social Into Ethnic Conflicts in A So-Called Multicultural Society 
– The Case Of Germany.” In John Rex and Beatrice Drury, eds., Ethnic Mobilisation 
in a Multi-Cultural Europe, Averbury: Aldershot. 30-37.  
 
Raudvere, Catharina.  1998.  "Urban Visions and Religious Communities:  Access 
and Visibility." In Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Catharina Roudvere, eds., 
Alevi Identity:  Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. Richmond:  Curzon 
Press, 185-197. 
 
Rex, John and Beatrice Drury, eds. 1994.  Ethnic Mobilization in Multi-Cultural 
Europe.  Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
Rigoni, Isabelle. 2003. “Alevis in Europe: A Narrow path towards Visibility.”  In 
Paul J. White, ed., Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: a Comprehensive Overview Leiden; 
Boson: Brill, 159-177. 
 
 142
Rittersberger-Tılıç, Helga. 1998.  “Development and Reformulation of a Returnee 
Identity as Alevi” In Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Cathrin Roudvere eds., 
Alevi Identity:  Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. Richmond:  Curzon 
Press.  
 
Say, Yağmur. 2003. Alevi Bektaşi Tarih Yazıcılığında Yöntem Sorunu” (The 
Problem of Methodology in the Alevi-Bektashi Historiography), In İbrahim Bahadır 
ed., Bilgi Toplumunda Alevilik( Alevism in Information Community). Ankara: 
Bielefeld Alevi Kültür Merkezi Yayınları: 237-267. 
 
Schüler, Harald. 1999. Türkiye’de Sosyal Demokrasi: Particilik, Hemşehrilik, 
Alevilik. (Social Democracy in Turkey: Partisanism, Hemşehrilik, Alvilik). İstanbul: 
İletişim.   
 
Seifert, Wolfgang. 1998. “Social and Economic Integration of Foreigners in 
Germany” In Peter Schuck, Rainer Muenz eds., Paths to inclusion of Migrants in the 
United States and Germany, Oxford 83-113. 
 
Shankland, David. 1993a. “Alevi and Sunni in Rural Turkey (Diverse Paths of 
Change)”, Unpublished PhD Thesis. Cambridge: Darwin College. 
 
Shankland, David. 1999. Islam and Society in Turkey, Cambridge, The Eothen Press. 
 
…………….. 1998. “Anthropology and Ethnicity: The Place of Ethnography in the 
New Alevi Movement”, In Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga and Cathrin Roudvere 
eds., Alevi Identity:  Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. Richmond:  Curzon 
Press. 15-22. 
 
…………….. 1995. “Social Change and Culture: Responses to Modernization in an 
Alevi Village in Anatolia”. In C. M. Hann ed., When History Accelerates: Essays on 
Rapid Social Change, Complexity and Creativity. London: The Eothen Press. 238-
254.  
 
…………….. 1993b. “Alevi and Sunni in Rural Anatolia, Diverse Paths of Change”, 
In Paul Stirling ed., Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Villages, Cambridge, 
The Eothen Press. 46-64. 
 
Shindeldecker, John; 10,08,2001 http://www.alevibektasi.com/xalevis_home.htm.  
 
Slater, Martin. 1981. “International Migration and French Foreign Relations”. In F. 
John Stack ed., Ethnic Identities in a Transnational World. London: Greenwood 
Press.  
 
 143
Soysal, Yasemin. 1994. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Sökefeld, Martin and Schwalgin Susanne. 2000. Institutions and their Agents in 
Diaspora: A Comparison of Armenians in Athens and Alevis in Germany” Paper 
presented at the 6th European Association of Social Anthropologists Conference. 
Krakau (26-29 July 2000) For the text See 
www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working_papers.htm. 
 
Sökefeld, Martin. 2002. “Alevi Dedes in the German Diaspora: The Transformation 
of a Religious Institution”, Zeitschrift für Ethnologie. 127:163-186. 
 
Stack, John F. 1981. “Ethnicity and Transnational Relations: An Introduction.” In F. 
John Stack, ed., Ethnic Identities in a Transnational World. London: Greenwood 
Press.  
 
Stillar, F. Glenn. 1998. Analysing Everyday Texts: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social 
Perspectives. London: Sage Publication.  
 
Martin Stokes. “Ritual, Identity and the State: An Alevi (Shi’a) Cem Ceremony”, in 
Kirsten E. Schulze et al. eds., 1996. Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: 
Identities and Rights in the Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 188-189. 
 
Şahhüseyinoğlu, Nedim. 2001. Alevi Örgütlerinin Tarihsel Süreci (The Hsitorical 
Process of the Alevi Organization) Ankara: İtalik. 
 
Şahin, Şehriban. 2001. “Transformation from Secret Oral to Public Written Culture 
in National and Transnational Social Spaces” Unpublished PhD dissertation. New 
School, Department of Sociology. 
 
Şener, Cemal and Miyase İlknur. 1995.  Kırklar Meclisi’nden Günümüze Alevi 
Örgütlenmesi: Şeriat ve Alevilik (From the Council of the Forties to the Alevi 
Organization of Today: Sheriah and Alevism).  İstanbul: Ant Yayınları. 
 
Şener, Cemal.1999. “Alevi Örgütlerine Bakış ve Siyaset.” Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür 
ve Sanat Dergisi  35: 34-47.  
 
…………….1989.  Alevilik Olayı Toplumsal Bir Başkaldırının Kısa Tarihçesi. 
İstanbul: Yön Yayınları. 
 
…………….1997.  Şaha Doğru Giden Kervan:  Alevilik Nedir? İstanbul:  Anadolu 
Matbaası. 
 
 144
…………….1998a. “Aleviler ve Alevilik Üzerine Oyun”. Cumhuriyet, July 13-30, 
1998.  
 
…………….1998b.  Aleviler Ne Yapmalı? İstanbul: Ant Yayınları. 
 
 
Şenocak, Zafer. 1994. War Hitler Araber? IrreFührungen an den Rand Europas. 
 Berlin: Babel Verlag.  
 
Thieme Gunter, Laux Hans Dieter. 1996 “Between Integration and Marginalization: 
Foreign Population in the Ruhr Conurbation” In Curtis C. Roseman, Hans Dieter 
Laux and Gunter Thieme eds., EthniCity : Geographic Perspectives on Ethnic 
Change in Modern Cities, Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 141-
163. 
 
Van Bruinessen, Martin 1996.  "Kurds, Turks, and Alevi Revival in Turkey." Middle 
East Report, July-September: 7-10.  
 
Vergin Nur. 2000.”Din ve Muhalif Olmak: Bir Halk Dini Olarak Alevilik” (Religion 
and Being Opposition: Alevism as a Folk Religion) in Din Toplum ve Siyasal Sistem, 
(Religion, Society and the Political System).  Istanbul: Baglam. 
Vertovec, Steven. 1996. “Multiculturalism, Culturalism and Public Incorporation”, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 19(1): 49-69. 
Vorhoff, Karin. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und Neuer Gemeinshchaft: 
Alevitische Identitaet in der Türkei der Gegenwart. (Between Belief, Nation and 
New Community: Alevi Identity in the Present Turkey). Berlin: Klaus Schwarz 
Verlag.  
Vorhoff, Karin.  1998.  "Academic and Journalistic Publications on the Alevi and 
Bektashi of Turkey." In T. Olsson, E. Özdalga, C. Raudvere eds.,  Alevi Identity:  
Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. Richmond, England: Curzon Press. 23-
50. 
 
Wilpert, Czarina.  1988.  "Religion and Ethnicity:  Orientations, Perceptions and 
Strategies Among Turkish Alevi and Sunni  Migrants in Berlin.". in The New Islamic 
Presence in  Western Europe, edited by T. Gerholm and Y. G.  Lithman.  
London:  Mansell: 68-107 
 
…………….. 1998. “The Ideological and Institutional Foundations of Racism in the 
Federal Republlic of Germany ”., Racism and Migration in Western Europe In 
Wrench & Solomos John eds., Oxford. 67-83. 
 145
 
Yalçın-Heckmann. 1995. “The Perils of Ethnic Associational Life in Europe: 
Turkish Migrants in Germany and France”. In Tariq Madood and Pnina Werbner 
eds., The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and 
Community London: Zed Books. 95-110.   
 
Yalçınkaya, Ayhan. 1996. Alevilikte Toplumsal Kurumlar ve İktidar (The Social 
Institutions and Power in Alevism). Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yay.  
 
Yavuz, Hakan M. 1999a.  “Media Identities for Alevis and Kurds in Turkey.”  In D. 
F. Eickelman and W. Anderson eds., New Media in the Muslim World:  Emerging 
Public Sphere,.  Bloomington and Indianapolis:  Indiana University Press: 80-199. 
 
…………….1999b.  “Alevilerin Türkiye’deki Medya Kimlikleri: “Ortaya Çıkış”ın 
Serüveni.” In Türkiye’de Aleviler Bektaşiler Nusayriler, İslami İlimler Araştırma 
Vakfı, Tartışmalı İlmi Toplantılar Dizisi 28.  İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat. 57-87. 
 
Yiğenoğlu, Çetin. 1994. Şeriatçı Şiddet ve Ölü Ozanlar Kenti Sivas, Ankara: Ekin. 
 
Yörükan, Yusuf Ziya.1998. Anadolu’da Aleviler ve Tahtacılar (Alevis and Tahtacis 
in Anatolia). Ankara,Kültür Bakanlığı Yay.  
 
Zeidan David. “The Alevis of Anatolia” 
http://www.angelfire.com/az/rescon/ALEVI.html 10,08,2001 
 
Zelyut, R.  1990.  Öz Kaynaklarına  Göre Alevilik (Alevism According to its 
Essential Sources). İstanbul:  Ak.  
 
Zentrum Für Türkeistudien 1999 Die Regionalen Transferstellen für auslaendische 
Existensgründer un Unternehmet in Nordhein Westphallen. Ökonomische Daten der 
türkischen und asulaendischen Sebstaendigen in NRW und Deutaschland, Essen: 
Zentrum für Türkeistudien.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 146
